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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
ô despoinai, deomai toinun humôn touti panu micron, 
tôn Hellênôn einai me legein hekaton stadiousin ariston. 
 
O Mistresses, I ask of you this very small favor, 
Of all the Greeks that I be the best in speaking by one hundred miles. 
    -Clouds, 429-430 
 
 Understanding the role of the comic playwright Aristophanes in the history of 
persuasive speech and performance is no small task.  Rhetoric scholars and classicists 
often consider his plays testimonial documents for the origins and practice of oratory in 
the late 5th century BCE in Athens; Clouds in particular is regularly treated as 
contemporary evidence that the sophists were peddlers of logical snake-oil, teaching 
unscrupulous students how to take advantage of their fellow citizens purely for selfish 
ends.  This point of emphasis reduces Aristophanes to the role of historical witness 
without giving him credit for his own acts of social commentary and intellectual 
contributions to the polis.  Other attention is given to Aristophanes as pandering moralist, 
decrying the outrageous and inimical behaviors corrupting a once prosperous city and its 
many institutions.  This avenue of research routinely minimizes the playwright’s 
influence because his anti-war plays appear to have little practical effect on Athenian 
politics, and focuses mainly on institutional critique without solutions for the audience to 
consider.  My purpose in this dissertation is to draw attention to Aristophanes as an 
ethicist who uses comedy to reorient audience values and behaviors.  Using Kenneth 
Burke’s theory of the hortatory negative, I argue that Aristophanes depicts his characters 
as abhorrent models for oratorical behavior, suggesting implicitly to the audience via 
inference that an alternative type of speaker may engage in more ethical oratory and 
thereby provide more effective and beneficial leadership in the polis.  As introduction to 
my analysis in this chapter, I consider the performance culture and politics of Old 
Comedy, the rhetorical power and advantage of using ridicule over more traditional 
persuasive forms, review the scholarship of Aristophanes and his relationship to rhetoric 
and oratory, present arguments about the ethical character of comedy, and conclude with 
a discussion of Burke’s theory of the hortatory negative and its relationship to 
Aristophanes. 
 
 
I. Performance Culture in 5th c. BCE Athens 
 
 Athenian culture in the late 5th c. BCE was marked by an array of intersecting 
values and practices, all of which fashioned a keen identity for democratic politics and 
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communal welfare.  Male citizens were encouraged to take an active interest and 
participation in the body politic, serving as soldiers, officials, or members of the voting 
public.  They enjoyed and promoted agonistic competitions throughout society, through 
such varied fora as the deliberative assembly, which established public policy, or by 
judging plays in the polis-wide dramatic festivals.  At the heart of these contexts lie 
oratorical performance and a budding understanding of rhetorical theory.  Citizens 
engaged in combative arguments before audiences of their peers to carry influence, 
decide important issues of the day, and construct a uniquely democratic identity based 
“upon larger habits of thought, feeling, and imagination” compared with other areas of 
the ancient Mediterranean world (Halliwell “Audience” 141). 
 These values and the democratic ideology they privileged encouraged citizens to 
adopt certain practices which would fashion them into a robust, ideal member of the 
polis.  Although a person had to possess the proper birthright in order to be granted the 
benefits of citizenship, active participation in Athenian culture was equally as important 
and considered a core behavior for this ideal citizen.  The number of citizens exceeded 
the available positions of leadership within the political infrastructure, so the majority of 
voting-eligible males would contribute by serving as members of audiences.  Legislative 
debates may have been guided by individual orators, but the audience in attendance 
would make the final determination over which policies were accepted and rejected.  
Advocacy in the lawcourts would have been a pointless exercise without juries to provide 
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verdicts to cases.  Even the plays performed at dramatic festivals required an audience to 
give opinions about which production had been the most enjoyable.1 
It may seem like a pedestrian act to hoot and holler, boo or clap for a play, but this 
active participation was heavily encouraged for all citizens.  Unlike the other oratorical 
fora, it was more convenient and manageable for citizens to watch tragedies and 
comedies because the festival environment was a handy justification to rest from work.  
The additional attendance also creates a more democratic environment because more of 
the citizenry is represented in the same place (Cartledge 17). Even the poor of Athens 
could attend the festivals through the Theoric fund, which provided money for citizens to 
pay the entrance fee if they could not otherwise afford it.   This fund was considered so 
vital to the democratic process and conception of citizenship, that it “was protected by 
law: it was a prosecutable offense even to propose changes to the fund” (Goldhill 
“Audience”67).  The Theoric fund was such a hallmark of the festival experience that it 
persisted well into the 4th c., only being abolished by a Macedonia-supported oligarchy 
aiming to reduce democratic power (Csapo and Slater 287).  Even if they were not trained 
orators themselves, great value was placed on witnessing a speech performance and 
rendering a judgment on it.2  One could say that political involvement was an ethical 
imperative for the Athenian citizen.   
Oratory served as the object of audience judgment in a wide range of contexts.  Apart 
from the direct speaking situations involving an individual policy, court case, or play, the 
                                                 
1
 Goldhill (“Audience” 1997) provides a robust discussion of the roles of citizens at the dramatic festivals, 
including pre-ritual events and the importance of participation (55ff). 
2
 Cartledge (1997) presents more detailed information about the wages owed to jurors, indicating again the 
institutional importance of participating as a witness to oratory at political events (10). 
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act of addressing the audience worked to solidify community values and create a 
comprehensive culture of debate and nascent intellectualism.  Halliwell explains that 
oratory’s “forms and modes of discourse permeated well beyond the official frameworks 
of political and civic institutions, and impinged upon larger habits of thought, feeling, and 
imagination” (“Between” 141).  As sophistry became more prominent around Athens, 
both speakers and audiences recognized that an effective speech or performance was the 
key to securing influence, power, personal advancement, as well as benefits for the rest of 
the polis.  Even if one believes that there was not yet a systematized and disciplinary 
understanding of rhetorical theory in the late 5th c., more people were concerned with 
using speech as a powerful tool and recognizing its uses and abuses (Halliwell “Between” 
125). 
Oratory was intimately bound with the Athenian appreciation for competition and 
agonistic exchange (Poulakos 173).  The format of the speech would vary based on 
circumstances and audience expectation, but would likely take one of two shapes.  First, a 
lengthier and more elaborate monologue (rhesis) offered by a speaker to describe a 
position, outline a policy, or set the narrative scene for an argument or drama.  Second, 
and often found in dramatic works, a shorter and more pointed exchange (stichomythia) 
of opinions, insults, or dialogue to carry an argument more fluidly (Goldhill “Language” 
127).  Whether the competition took place at a more protracted, sophisticated level or 
worked as dialogic refutations, Athenians came to expect some kind of conflict in their 
public addresses.  Moreover, this expectation was not limited to speaking situations, as 
Athenian culture promoted the same value in physical experiences such as cockfights, 
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athletic competitions, and privileged honor attached to military endeavors (Cartledge 12-
13).  The ideal citizen would appreciate and recognize the value in this type of spirited 
competition, especially regarding political issues. 
 
II. The Politics of Old Comedy 
 The cultural institution of Old Comedy created a unique intersection of these 
values for competition, skill in speaking, and political participation.  There is no doubt 
that drama was a profoundly political institution, as evident from the opening ceremonies.  
As Meier explains (56-57), tribute from the members of the Delian League were collected 
before the performances and 
 
the orphans of war who had just come of age entered the theatre in solemn 
procession.  They wore for the first time the armour which the city had given 
them, after having taken care of their upbringing.  A herald announced that they, 
whose fathers had fallen as brave warriors in battle, would now be released from 
the care of the people.  They were given seats of honor. 
 
Moreover, the arrangements and selection of the khoregoi, as well as other 
responsibilities, were decided by government administrators (Cartledge 18).  Unlike other 
oratorical fora, a greater proportion of the citizenry was able to attend and participate in 
the event, with numbers estimated between 14,000 – 17,000 present (Goldhill 
“Audience” 55-58). 
The winner of the festival competition was determined by a small jury of 10 
citizens, who were allowed to take audience reaction into account when casting their 
vote, therefore the process was heavily dependent on audience participation.  Moreover, 
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there is evidence that the plays had a strong effect on the audience.  Apart from clapping 
and providing a positive response, Goldhill explains that audiences could also boo loudly 
enough for actors to leave the stage.  Audience reaction could be so intense, that 
playwrights could personally suffer if a performance was not well-received: “A play 
about the historical event of the Persian sack of Miletus, an act the Athenians failed to 
prevent, so moved the audience that the author, Phrynichus, was fined and the play 
banned” (“Reading” 76).  This demonstrates that attendance at the theatre was not a 
passive action, that its role in developing and interacting with ideals of citizenship was 
very much a dynamic and interactive process. 
It is obvious to note that oratory and public speaking are a signature element of 
live performance, but what is less obvious is how or why playwrights used these speeches 
to influence the audience.  Scholars disagree on whether the plays should be taken as 
serious political commentary for the late 5th c., mere comedic entertainment, or some 
combination of the two (Goldhill “Poet’s” 194).  The very nature of the satirical 
performance presents a shifting ground on which the live spectator or modern reader 
must interpret often conflicting evidence.  For this reason, some argue that “Everything in 
comedy, including anything that seems to be an authorial claim or a programmatic 
statement, is to be imagined as being inside ‘quotation marks’” (Wright 10).  Because no 
testimony from or about the playwrights explains the purpose of their comedy and 
satirical commentary (if any), it is tempting to make as few assumptions as possible, 
pushing the political dimensions to the margins of interpretation.  Malcolm Heath argues 
from the polarized position that the ambiguous nature of comedy compels a rather 
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conservative interpretation from both the critic and audience member.  Because humor is 
such a slippery concept that is always governed by a concrete context and historical 
period, he advises caution when looking too deeply into the political meaning of 
Aristophanes’ plays (“Aristophanes” 242). 
The greatest interpretive obstacle for Heath is intentionality.  Aristophanes has not 
provided a clear answer to his political ambitions (the parabaseis notwithstanding) and 
no additional playwrights or critics can illuminate how seriously one is meant to treat his 
comedy, therefore the politics of Old Comedy remain an open question.  He explains that 
there is certainly conflict between some prominent orators of the late 5th c. and 
Aristophanes (most notably Cleon), but that the two are not in direct competition for 
influence over the polis.  He continues (“Aristophanes” 238):  
 
But for the comic poet, unlike the orator, winning the competition did not entail 
establishing direct competitive ascendancy over the victim of the abuse, since the 
comic poet was not in direct competition with the victim.  Henderson’s statement 
that the comic poets “argue…purposefully” is not in dispute, therefore; the 
question is, What was that purpose. 
 
If we treat the different speech genres as Heath suggests, there is certainly some influence 
occurring but not one that pits playwright directly against demagogue; although they are 
both addressing the same audience, their purposes must be more circumspect and 
pragmatic given the context of performance. 
His answer to these concerns is that one can detect political leaning or perhaps a 
political component to the characterizations and plots, but that there is no direct evidence 
of political ends.  He summarizes his position succinctly: “Politics was the material of 
   8 
 
comedy, but comedy did not in turn aspire to be a political force” (“Political” 42).  As 
evidence, he refers to the festival context for the Lenaia or Dionysia and the need to win 
over the audience to secure victory in the dramatic competition.  If the path to victory 
requires a certain kind of material such as the skewering of key public figures, 
Aristophanes must provide his audience with what they expect (“Political” 43).  
Moreover, Heath claims that the festival context may be considered political in a very 
narrow sense, “that is, it may be a celebration of the polis” (“Poetics” 65).  With this 
perspective, it would not be practical to directly engage the issues of the day for fear of 
offending partisans judging the competition, and that it is easier to focus on Panhellenic 
themes that appeal to wide range of spectator. 
Heath also addresses the broad roles of poetry, positing that some forms (such as 
tragedy) have a didactic function in society but that Old Comedy is largely exempt from 
this duty.  He reduces the 5th c. Athenian audience’s desire to a simplistic drive for 
entertainment without significant critical thinking; this argument stems largely from the 
idea that Athenian drama (including tragedy) does not have covert or hidden meanings 
within its plays and that the average Athenian audience member is not looking for such 
signs in the plot, characters, acting, etc.  The only political activity that Heath identifies is 
“an uncontroversial, pan-Athenian kind” (Poetics 70).  This position distinguishes the 
political topicality of drama from the overt, partisan policies and advocacy of other 
oratorical fora while still situating festival performance into an institutional Athenian 
context. 
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The final point for Heath’s conservative interpretation concerns the narrative 
content of Athenian drama.  Compared with the more thorough and explicit advocacy in 
the assembly, Old Comedy is short on solutions and long on laughs.  It is not 
unreasonable to examine the effects on the audience, which do not appear to be lasting or 
consequential.  Cleon does not appear to suffer any permanent indignities to his 
reputation and continues to be a powerful political force despite Aristophanes’ continued 
attention.  Under this perspective, the playwright is neither a policy wonk nor a figure 
sufficiently influential enough to move the citizens who can directly submit proposals to 
the assembly.  If the playwright is only concerned with putting on a good show, “The 
anodyne proposition that peace is nicer than war may generate good drama, but it lacks 
political substance” (Heath “Aristophanes” 240).  A playwright concerned with winning 
the dramatic competition cannot afford to dwell significantly on the minutia of wartime 
policy because the audience can already consume this content in other institutions and, 
perhaps more importantly, few authors can resolve this content into something 
legitimately funny. 
In contrast to Heath, a number of other scholars have taken a less conservative 
interpretation of the purpose and effects of Old Comedy, arguing that its political edge 
concerns not just mere entertainment but active political engagement with fellow citizens.  
Beginning with the issue of intentionality, Konstan agrees that it is difficult to pinpoint a 
single authorial viewpoint from Aristophanes’ collected work; however, there is a 
political delineation that becomes consistent as some viewpoints are privileged and others 
are discouraged (“Greek” 6): 
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There is no unambiguous “Aristophanes” within the texts.  There is, however, a 
complex of ideologically valorized elements that are not wholly reconcilable with 
each other, but which in combination yield determinate ideological effects: not a 
political line, necessarily, but an angle of vision, from which some social 
possibilities are occluded and others are rendered especially visible. 
 
Heath concedes this very point (“Aristophanes” 241), that the playwright has favorite 
targets and patently ignores their rivals (Nicias and his friends are routinely spared the 
Aristophanic treatment), but where he sees this as only political topicality Konstan traces 
a political temperament that nudges the audience gently in a particular direction without 
coming across as direct political policy.  It does not matter if Aristophanes has a direct 
political agenda because the content of the plays is guiding the audience to criticize key 
factions and demagogues.  Konstan argues that there is no single “author” present in the 
text so much as a series of ideological elements, thus the issue of intentionality becomes 
unimportant.  Regardless of Aristophanes’ intentions as a man and author, the plays 
speak for themselves and present a consistent vision about demagoguery and its effects 
on the polis, and presents an implied course of action for any concerned citizen spurred to 
action. 
 The next logical step is to consider the more broad purpose of the festivals, 
referred to by Konstan as the “social interpretation of ancient comedy” (“Greek” 5).  If 
Aristophanes and the other playwrights are not considered partisans as political as Cleon, 
there must be another explanation for the origin and continued participation of the 
citizens for the dramatic events.  Some scholars, such as Goldhill, believe “the public 
space of the festival becomes not merely the arena for a contest between poets, but also 
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for contestation of the values, attitudes and beliefs of the citizens” (“Poet’s” 174).  
Henderson argues the “Festivals were one of the chief ways in which the city organized 
itself, established who was who, and demonstrated what was important” (“Dēmos” 287).  
This perspective, echoed others by Meier, Ober, and Silk3, positions comedy less as 
entertaining if somewhat political distraction and more as social and political influence.  
When the polis comes to celebrate as one all-encompassing group of citizens, there is 
opportunity to take stock of the previous and current issues of the day, explore them in a 
different yet socially permissible manner, and make considerations for the future identity 
of the community.  Although the playwright and his works are sources of influence, 
scholars do not interpret his efforts or the plays’ arguments as direct attempts to draft 
policy, manipulate, or cajole the audience into adopting certain beliefs or behaviors.  Silk 
argues compellingly that the extant Aristophanic plays never present or defend an explicit 
call to action (305), a position also taken up by Heath (“Political” 42).4 
 There is sound reason to think that the “mere entertainment” argument is overly 
reductive and simplistic, as the terms “serious” and “humorous” can coexist in a number 
of rhetorical situations.  Hybrid genres are more of a modern concept than something 
                                                 
3
 See Meier (1929) for exploration of the ability for drama to develop and maintain public values: “It seems 
possible that we have here a rather special example of a social body carrying out quite publicly the 
maintenance and development of its mental infrastructure” (4).  Ober and Strauss (1990) explain why 
drama can possess such potent influence: “indirect political symbolism is more resonant with meaning than 
a blatant and straightforward political speech.  Politics can be powerfully manifested in apparently 
nonpolitical institutions, such as rites of passage, funerals, and drama” (“Drama” 249).  For additional 
corroboration, see Silk (2000). 
 
4
 See also Redfield (1990): “[Tragedy] is an art of understanding and compassion, and does not tell us what 
to do next.  In this sense tragedy is after all detached from history; like social science it is ‘wertfrei,’ value 
free.  It reveals the conditions of action, but cannot reach that ground of action which is themis” (“Drama” 
326). 
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derived from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but there is nothing to suggest that an ancient speaker 
or author could not attempt to evoke more than one emotion within a single work (Silk 
309-310).  The experience of living in 5th c. Athens could not have been so segmented 
and rigidly structured that politics was reserved only for those occasions when the 
assembly debated proposals, as Meier explains: “It is surely clear that politics, when it 
becomes the very stuff of life for a citizenry, is not limited to its commonplace 
definition” (21).  The converse would also be true, that festive environments were not the 
only situations at which public humor was permitted; therefore, it is not necessary to 
relegate the comedic plays to the status of being written only for laughs.  The reduction 
of these situations and their rhetorical expectations to a single, unalterable purpose will 
inevitably blunt the corners and minimize interpretive possibilities so that one response is 
considered appropriate (Silk 319).  Such an interpretation robs any rhetorical work of its 
sophistication, relegates context to an unchanging constant, and ties the hands of a critic 
looking for new insight.5 
 Viewing Old Comedy as a more versatile rhetorical practice shows that the genre 
has a distinct advantage over traditional forms of oratory.  Its explicitly humorous side 
allows what Ober and Strauss refer to as “deep play,” where one may “spell out 
externally an internal truth” (“Drama” 246).  Not every lesson is absorbed through the 
rigors of schoolwork, political campaigning, or waging war — these situations do not 
                                                 
5
 Silk (2000) makes a similar argument about the reductive purposes separating tragedy and comedy, in that 
they are not direct opposites as commentators often assume (55).  Furthermore, Silk points out that tragedy 
and comedy are often described as a pair, with tragedy acting as the first and privileged term.  This 
preference demonstrates that tragedy defines comedy by its presence and prior characteristics and that 
comedy has been treated as the secondary and less important term, although strictly speaking they are not 
direct opposites (82-83) 
 
   13 
 
satisfy the whole experience of being a human and ignore much of the social nature of 
humanity.  Narratives, comical and otherwise, held a prominent place in Athenian 
culture, often acting as a guide for the values and behavior allowed for one to participate 
in society.  Failing to count them among the formative experiences of both children and 
adults again reduces the Athenian political experience to a fixed number of situations and 
excludes the possibility that a citizen can be influenced outside these formal boundaries.  
An idea hammered out in the assembly could be reshaped, refuted, or reaffirmed 
depending on any number of additional influences, from the everyday conversation 
between citizens to the more stylized messaging of the festivals.  As Goldhill explains 
(“Reading” 65-66):  
 
The sense of the involvement of a citizen in the life of a city goes far beyond the 
democratic institutions of power, and a description of the city cannot sensibly 
limit itself to a history or description of the formal institutions of power.  Indeed, 
it is this complexity of power relations and possible rivalries within such a 
polymorphous system that makes the political analysis of Athens so complex — 
or, for Plato and others, that makes its order so unwieldy and unstable. 
 
The business of politics is not constrained to one argumentative arena and may take a 
number of different forms, demonstrating that one need not engage in “pure” persuasion 
to effect social and political change.  
 
III. The Rhetorical Power of Ridicule 
 The paradoxical intersection of humorous advice and serious political influence is 
where comedy, the dramatic festival, and the power of narrative find their institutional 
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roles in the polis.  Comedic narrative possesses the power to mediate and regulate values 
and behaviors, even if the genre of Old Comedy and the context of dramatic competition 
do not allow for overt discussions or the satisfying resolution of political issues via 
directing voting.  These narrative performances can shape and redirect audience 
understanding of and emotional reaction to individual people and whole classes of 
citizens, and undermine or strengthen the ways they influence the policies, identity, and 
survivability of the polis.  As Meier explains, the building and maintenance of this mental 
infrastructure is what Max Weber refers to as “nomological knowledge,” or “the general, 
overarching and normative knowledge to which we relate all our thinking, actions and 
experience, and in which these must all be incorporated if things are to seem ‘right’” (34-
35).  It is perhaps more useful to think of Old Comedy as providing a moral orientation 
for the audience member concerning his relationship to peers, the polis as community, 
and how the individual and collective citizenry can interact in the most beneficial 
manner. 
 The most potent force in Old Comedy is the ability to mock and ridicule targets 
with abandon.  These attacks are not value-free judgments made only to impress the 
audience, because even the most flattering humor has an undercutting tone of criticism.  
Athenian citizens had many different ways to censure behavior, through both the formal 
procedures of litigation and the euthunai regularly performed to audit the work of public 
officials.  Old Comedy provides an alternative and less formal approach to identifying 
undesirable social behaviors and drawing attention to them in public.  Henderson 
convincingly argues that “ridicule uses complaints about disruptive but otherwise 
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unpunishable behavior (that is, gossip and malice) as a form of social control” (“Dēmos” 
295).  One reserves ridicule for when formal redress is not permissible or perhaps 
appropriate, but nevertheless is necessary for the polis to strike back at individuals or 
groups who are engaging in behaviors that should be discouraged.  This affirmation of 
community norms has the additional advantage of being remarkably difficult to argue 
against; to acknowledge the nature of the accusations and rail against them, as modern 
politicians such as Rick Santorum have recently discovered, implies that they have the 
power to legitimately damage one’s reputation and ability to provide leadership.  Even if 
the mockery becomes outright slander and the targets have the weight of truth on their 
sides, a good joke is difficult to forget or completely put out of mind.  This one-sided 
advantage may be unfair, Henderson concludes, “But it is the fate of prominent people to 
live, or die, by their public images” (“Dēmos” 304-305). 
 The comic playwrights could mediate these unpunishable behaviors and promote 
more positive values through the strategic ridicule of scapegoats.  This technique creates 
a bond with the audience, in which the playwright emphasizes ideas already in circulation 
and that allow him to sympathize with the plight and values of the common Athenian.  
Once a certain commonality is established6, the audience views the scapegoat as an 
abnormal or toxic other that is not representative of their ideal society.  The current 
political and social landscape is not presented intact, however, because “everything 
appears in exaggerated or distorted form, as it might be in a refracting mirror” (Wright 
                                                 
6
 Borrowman and Kmetz draw on Kenneth Burke to explain the need for developing commonality in order 
to influence an audience (2011): “Thus division creates identification, the discomfort of being separate 
from one another causing the natural human need to find points of commonality, parallels in ideology, 
shared beliefs 
and values, and enemies” (281). 
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16).  The playwright can present this altered and perhaps even false equivalence of 
Athenian society because he has established a certain trust with the audience; humor 
tends to connect people quickly, and it is easier to bond with someone when you have a 
common enemy or mutual hostility to something else (Redfield “Drama” 330). 
 The scapegoat may be an individual capable of great damage to the polis, but his 
real value lies in representing an entire class of similar people.  Aristophanes used many 
of the same targets across his plays not only for the potential to make a good joke the 
audience would understand, but because these figures are associated with military 
agendas, disruptive influences in the assembly, and initiating major policy that may 
benefit themselves over the public.7  As a member of the literary profession, 
Aristophanes does not have the power to provide a coherent counterpoint or argue 
directly against the demagogues, which would violate the expectations of the audience 
and may not even play to his persuasive strengths.  Instead, he can give voice to “the 
spectators’ resentment of this kind of selfishness at a time when the city is fighting for its 
survival.  The spectators feel that something has been done about [a demagogue], even if 
nothing has been changed, and hope that people like [the demaoguge], present and future, 
will take a lesson, even if they can choose not to” (Henderson “Dēmos” 295-296). 
The people similar to the scapegoat are encouraged to take notice of his treatment 
at the comic playwright’s hands, because such shame-inducing attacks are especially 
                                                 
7
 As Ober and Strauss explain (1990), the radical democracy of Athens did not create a fully egalitarian 
society and even distribution of power amongst all citizens, thus abuse of political office was a legitimate 
threat to the prosperity of the polis: “Despite a wide acceptance of the principle of political equality among 
the citizens, Athenian political society was never socially or economically homogenous.  The citizenry 
remained hierarchically stratified in terms of class and status, and the interests of elite citizens were 
sometimes at odds with those of the mass of ordinary citizens” (“Drama” 237). 
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personal in a timocratic society (Goldhill “Poet’s 185).  Cairns argues that it is only 
possible to reduce or tarnish one’s honor in such an environment through the presence of 
an audience: “One feels shame before those who witness one’s actions, and focuses on 
what the members of that audience may say or think of one” (15).  This feeling of 
vulnerability implies that such a target is being seen in an appropriate or unfavorable 
context, such as being observed naked when everyone else is fully clothed (Williams 78).  
Moreover, the scapegoat could be demonized through a combination of verbal jokes and 
nonverbal, physical representations.  The festive environment is not suited to point and 
counter-point argumentation, where evidence is presented in a more logical and summary 
fashion (Silk 334).  The additional, visible layer of buffoonery via slapstick comedy and 
unflattering masks reinforces that the scapegoat is subject to public shame because the 
audience may witness the fictional manner and consequences of his poor behaviors.8  The 
result of these characterizations is that the scapegoat has great difficulty in disproving or 
using rational argument against effective comedy, therefore he and the others of his class 
are left in a rhetorically disadvantageous position. 
 Using scapegoats as a stand-in for the larger class of disreputable or dangerous 
individuals suggests that the audience can alter the status quo and redirect Athenian 
values that may have drifted away from ethical values.  Redfield outlines the concept of 
“antistructure,” which describes not only our understanding of classical Athens but the 
kind of culturally accepted mockery that can take place across the world in various time 
                                                 
8
 Also drawing on Kenneth Burke, Hawhee (2006) argues that “words as human analogs of barks or yaps 
become re-infused with emotive force, while bodily disposition and movement exhibit purpose” 
(“Language” 339).  The power of comedic narrative hinges not just on poetic cleverness but the ability for 
nonverbal representations to reinforce the caricatures and memorably frame the scapegoat in a negative, 
censuring way. 
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periods (“Drama” 328).  Maintaining order or structure in any culture creates a set of 
binding restrictions that comedy deconstructs and criticizes.  By lowering even the 
highest individuals and values to a position and status that may be occupied by everyone, 
hierarchy is brought to a more democratic level.  This happens through the humiliating 
processes of scatology, obscenity, and allowing the audience to see the scapegoat 
vulnerable and naked.9  The trappings of position and power are stripped away so that the 
elite are made equal to everyone else.  The status quo becomes marginalized and 
reframed so that that “Individuals are deprived of their dignity — but in the process, 
mankind in general, embodied in the audience, recovers a sense of power and liberty” ( 
“Drama” 328). 
The narrative technique of critiquing society through a representative figure is a 
signature characteristic of Old Comedy because it avoids the thorny issue of dealing with 
audience complicity for current problems.  According to the Old Oligarch, the collective 
citizenry “is pragmatic but unprincipled and unaccountable.  It makes policy in its own 
self-interest but cannot be made to take any responsibility.  Instead, it can blame the 
individual who has advocated or called for the vote on a policy or an agreement” 
(Henderson “Dēmos” 275).  Political speech must work around the same limitation 
because even if the demos is directly responsible for voting a failed policy into action, 
they do not have the desire or wherewithal to admit their culpability.  Old Comedy also 
cannot risk antagonizing the voting audience because any direct criticism would lead 
                                                 
9
 Bostdorff (1991), quoting Brummett, explains that comedy is "more deterministic than is tragedy 
concerning the inevitability of sin, for it shows that error arises not from the occasional violation of 
principle but from the human condition" (6).  This idea highlights that the imperfections of the human 
condition (which are felt and experienced by elite and commoner alike) will ultimately lead to corruption, 
mistakes, and the need for a rebalancing of social values. 
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them to act defensively or angrily, which would greatly reduce the chance of a playwright 
receiving top honors at the festival.  This obstacle is not insurmountable, however, 
because any rich or elite citizen could be mocked so that the greater majesty of the polis 
and demos would be preserved (Henderson “Dēmos” 295). 
 It is also crucial that the audience recognize a clear difference between the 
scapegoat and themselves, otherwise the playwright risks making the critical attacks 
strike too close to home for the voting public.  Old Comedy revels in using scathing and 
distorted caricatures to flesh out some jokes, which presents difficulties for the modern 
reader in determining whether an attack is based in truth or fiction.10  The playwright had 
enormous freedom to take an existing belief or perception about a fellow citizen and 
bring it to an absurd pole.  One must note, however, that not simply any citizen was 
treated as a target for comic attention; Aristophanes aligns himself against the more 
popular demagogues associated with Cleon and never directly attacks his political rival 
Nicias or his allies (Henderson “Dēmos” 273).11  Cleon is never given credit for political 
or military victories, demonstrating that Aristophanes is under no compulsion to present a 
fair and balanced approach to any character in his plays.12 
                                                 
10
 Acknowledging this difficulty, Timmerman and Schiappa maintain there is still valuable insight in 
engaging comedic texts: “Although we must recognize the use of exaggeration for humorous effect, these 
characterizations give us insight into the political and social practice that we typically do not see in prose 
texts” (76). 
11
 Henderson (1990) explains this point further: “Those who claim that the comic poets were mere 
humorists must explain why they consistently and one-sidedly championed the position of the ‘best’: like 
Thoukydides, they refrain from criticizing Nikias (who could just as fairly be called a slave and a seller as 
Kleon); they explain away, play down, or even omit to mention the victories both military and financial that 
were achieved by the new politicians; and they hold profoundly ambivalent views about the ability of the 
dēmos at large to choose responsible leaders (like themselves)” (“Dēmos” 284). 
12
 For further elaboration concerning the types of characters and plots in drama, Gredley (1996) discusses 
the flexibility of characters to make choices and influence their environments in comedy, while Taplin 
(1996) presents some of the major differences between tragedy and comedy. 
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As long as the audience can see the tangible difference between themselves and 
this other citizen, there is room for the plays to present a competing vision of Athens 
compared with its present state.  For the comic distortions to have such an effect, the 
audience must be able to recognize that there is an existing person or behavior being 
parodied and that the new version is an exaggeration of the old.  Goldhill argues that this 
realization is the first necessary step for crafting any narrative parody.13  The audience is 
not told explicitly that a parody is occurring because the festival environment more or 
less guarantees that Old Comedy (excluding the later Aristophanic plays) will present this 
kind of material.  The plays therefore operate through narrative enthymemes, being 
drawn together through the jokes, physical actions, and costumes from the characters.  
Because the argument is primarily an implicit one, the audience must infer who the target 
is, why they are being parodied, and what the objective lesson is to be gleaned from the 
dramatic experience.   
 The comic (mis)representations comment on the perceived state of affairs in the 
polis so that they may be transformed into a more beneficial, potential reality for the 
citizens.  Konstan remarks that many plays in the Aristophanic corpus reflect an 
idealized, utopian perspective that often reaches back to events and circumstances in the 
past, much as members of an elder group look wistfully back towards a golden age of 
values and prosperity and lament the moral or economic lapses of the most recent 
generation (“Greek” 8).  Even if Aristophanes does not desire the return of some 
                                                 
13
 Goldhill (1991) explains that virtually any person or institution could become fodder for Old Comedy: 
“institutions such as the Assembly and Law-courts, public figures such as poets, generals and orators, 
rituals of social behavior and rituals of religious observance, all fall under the general rubric of an inversion 
or distortion of an assumed model, set in a new context, for comic effect – a rubric that remains the 
starting-point for definitions of parody.” (“Poet’s” 206) 
   21 
 
idealized past circumstances, there is always an implicit (and sometimes direct) 
comparison between social conditions of the present and a future state without their ills, 
injustice, or pains.  The plays hold out the possibility that Athens can live up to a higher 
ideal and that present circumstances are not the only ones available.  We need not assume 
that universalism or equality is Aristophanes’ endgame (as Konstan does), only that 
comedic plays invite the audience to think that a solution exists for Athens’ struggles.14    
 The enthymematic structure of the plays situates the ethics of their arguments.  
Even if the plays do not instruct the audience on how to address Athens’ troubles, they 
imply that the city can be saved with the proper intervention and that it is the ethical 
responsibility of the citizens to enact these changes.15  Commenting specifically on Birds, 
Henderson’s argument may be writ large to the rest of the Aristophanic corpus: 
“Nephelokokkugia appears to be a superior alternative to Athens that implicitly criticizes 
the real Athens” (“Mass” 145).  The Athenian audience must first recognize per 
Goldhill’s description of parody that such a comparison is offered in the first place and 
note the differences and similarities between target and its new form (“Poet’s 206-208).  
A second recognition must follow, inferring that the difference between these positive 
and negative characterizations also carry an implied judgment about the worth and 
                                                 
14
 Silk (2000) also concurs with Konstan: “Aristophanic comedy’s essential connection is, of course, with a 
pre-existing Athens and its citizens collective memory — of Marathon, of country life, of the festival 
institutions and their traditional celebratory resonances” (409-410).  I argue that Aristophanes does 
sympathize with these past values, but that they are not the only means of comparison borne out by the 
plays. 
15
 Bonnstetter (2011) engages in criticism of modern American comedy to arrive at a similar conclusion; 
the character Bart in Blazing Saddles does not forsake the townspeople of Rock Ridge and the film does not 
condemn them; “they are fools for acting antagonistically towards Bart, and the film allows them to correct 
that behavior” (22).  Even if Athens is currently plagued with serious social and political problems, 
Aristophanes would have the audience believe the city can still be saved and redeemed with the proper 
intervention.   
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qualities of the target and how the audience should react to them.  Evaluating the new 
context and how it applies to contemporary Athens is fundamentally an act of criticism 
for both playwright and audience.  By highlighting certain qualities and pushing them to 
a comic extreme, the playwright asks the audience to judge whether the target is a 
legitimate or insignificant threat to the polis, determine whether it is worthy of their 
continued attention, and decide how they can best react to implement the ideal, potential 
community implied in the drama. 
 The critical judgment asked of the audience is inherently a democratizing force 
that seeks to pull control over the polis away from elite politicians and restore authority 
back to the collective citizenry.  Through the scapegoating process, even the most 
honored or powerful individual can be brought to the same level as the lowest commoner, 
which demonstrates to the other citizens that they are not so different after all.  This 
emphasizes a perception of parity that allows the citizens to believe they too can 
influence political or social affairs and that this power does not belong only to the 
privileged elite.  As Redfield explains, when we reduce everything to the same basic level 
and strip away the status and emotional attachments they enjoy, all values and behaviors 
can be evaluated honestly (“Drama” 331): 
 
Perhaps the poetry we admire is mere bombast, our religious language sententious 
nonsense; the statesmen we admire are fools, and those we trust are knaves.  
Comedy weakens the control of the performers over their audience and thus 
increases the power of the people.  In this sense it is after all a democratic art. 
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It is no accident that these equalizing attacks also take place before the majority of the 
citizens where all are encouraged to attend (via the Theoric fund), so that as many voting 
members of the public as possible can witness the ridicule and judge for themselves how 
effective their leaders have been, whether they are worth keeping, and whether the 
identity they have crafted for the polis is worth pursuing. 
 This responsibility is not one that should be considered lightly, as the Athenian 
people were known for capriciously reacting to politicians who had promised more than 
they could deliver.  As the Old Oligarch indicates, trusting the citizens to make the right 
choice would not always be a fruitful gamble, and Plato is hardly confident in the 
deliberative abilities of democratic groups in the later books of the Republic.16  However, 
the audience is charged with making their own determinations and must be assumed to 
act ethically and in the best interests of the city since the festival context does not allow 
Aristophanes to provide specific guidance or instruction for resolving the tensions in 
Athens.  Given the political success of Cleon after his drubbing in plays such as Knights 
and Wasps, the concern of elites that drama would hold undue influence over the citizens 
is perhaps moot.  There is no guarantee and perhaps should be no significant expectation 
that the audience will react immediately and work to create the ideal city sooner rather 
than later because Old Comedy is a genre of subtle influence.  The audience is invited to 
rather than tasked with response, and may hold out the hope that things can get better 
                                                 
16
 Ober and Strauss (1990) provide further commentary on this point: “the play [Ecc.] reaffirms the unique 
power that political action in a democratic state carried with it, the power to change, in a revolutionary way, 
the nature of relations between elite and mass within the political society, and the relations between citizens 
and noncitizens.  That power was potentially dangerous, open to abuse, and perhaps even limited in its 
efficacy if it were stretched too far, but the play locates it in the center of the organizing social structures of 
the society” (“Drama” 269). 
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without the difficult, pragmatic work of actually making it so.  Ideals are easier to 
conceive than to put into action, as Henderson explains: “The mediating force of humor 
softens the realization that ideals are more easily imagined than attained” (“Dēmos” 311). 
As the preceding remarks indicate, scholars have explored the purpose of 
Aristophanes’ work and how it might have contributed to the intellectual developments 
and culture of the late 5th c. BCE in Athens.  In addition to these questions, scholars have 
examined the connection between Old Comedy and rhetorike, especially regarding the 
reconstruction of rhetorical theory beginning in the 5th c. with the sophists and ending 
with Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the 4th c.  In the next section, I discuss a few noteworthy 
examples of how scholars have changed their perceptions of the playwright, viewing him 
as a more skilled practitioner of rhetoric in a culture thriving on innovative, intellectual 
developments.  I survey some of the major works linking Aristophanes to rhetoric, 
identify their contributions to this area of Aristophanic scholarship, and explain what I 
will add to existing understandings of the playwright.  I will discuss the need to read 
Aristophanes as a link to oratory rather than rhetoric and argue that his characterizations 
of oratory and oratorical performance can be read using ethical behavior as an 
interpretive touchstone.   
 
IV. Aristophanes as Rhetorical Agent 
The earliest such study appeared in 1938, an article by Charles Murphy entitled 
“Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric.”  Murphy’s analysis of rhetorical arrangement 
across the Aristophanic corpus was pivotal for its time, but not followed up by his peers 
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for many decades.  His main argument is that Aristophanes was familiar with the art of 
rhetoric as it existed in the second half of the fifth century.  He attempts to prove this by 
showing 1. ) that Aristophanes had an opinion about the rhetors of his time, which 
implies enough knowledge of their art to portray and criticize them; and 2.) that he was 
able to use their own techniques to mock them in his plays.  It is unclear whether Murphy 
believed Aristophanes was a student of the sophists firsthand; there is no doubt, however, 
that Murphy argues that Aristophanes was familiar with the art and its principles (110).  
 Murphy thoroughly examines the entire surviving Aristophanic corpus for any 
traces of “opinion” about rhetoric.  His conclusion is that Aristophanes “condemned 
rhetoric on moral and political grounds” because it was significantly harming Athens and 
its citizens (69).  Fragments from Aristophanes’ first play, the Banqueters (Daitales) 
show a father coping with a son who shows sophistic tendencies compared with a more 
upstanding, traditional son.  It is clear the latter is preferable to the former (Murphy 71).  
A brief passage in Knights shows that the young men of the day (the 420’s BCE for this 
play) are fond of the speaker Phaeax, who is known for a variety of clever verbal tricks 
(72).  The sophistic signature from this section is the series of descriptions for Phaeax 
that use several –ikos words.  Furthermore, Aristophanes routinely criticizes leading 
politicians such as Cleon, who is named or alluded to in Acharnians, Knights, Wasps, 
Clouds, and many other plays, for flattering the demos and leading them into 
manipulation (72-4).  Many of these examples appear in later works, such as O’Sullivan 
and to a lesser extent Hubbard.  Murphy also uses Pheidippides, the young man from 
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Clouds, as a representative example of the type of youth corrupted by the new education 
(78): 
 
Pheidippides, who had entered the school of the sophists as a young aristocrat, 
comes out as a demo-cratic rhetor, willing and able to pervert justice and twist the 
truth for selfish ends. The democratic orators as a group use their rhetorical 
training to overwhelm less skilled citizens in court, to dupe the mass of citizens 
into an uncritical acceptance of their leadership, while they themselves line their 
own pockets and ruin the state. Such, in brief, is the charge of Aristophanes 
against the new rhetoric of his day.  
 
Murphy contends that Aristophanes is critical of the new education because it allows 
young aristocrats to use undue influence over the assembly and law-courts purely for 
their own ends.  It is ultimately a perversion of the state and a danger to Athenian 
democracy. 
 Next, Murphy argues that Aristophanes was certainly familiar with the art of 
rhetoric despite his negative opinions towards it.  He argues that one can detect this 
rhetorical knowledge by closely examining the arguments in the plays for rhetorical 
structures, topoi, and techniques.  Murphy never states a clear definition of rhetoric as it 
existed in the fifth century; instead, he relies on later texts, in particular the Rhetoric to 
Alexander (87-90), to identify and explain the techniques he observes in Aristophanes.  
After dissecting several speeches, he describes the presence of prooimion, eunoia, 
prothesis, diegesis, pistis, bebaiosis, and epilogos (81-84).  Furthermore, the speeches are 
filled with phrases that act as signposts to cue the audience for rhetorical progressions in 
the argument (84).  Rhetorical topoi from later writers appear in Murphy’s analysis, such 
as building up eunoia in the presence of diabole, and various types of pisteis, such as 
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paradeigmata, semeia, and tekmeria that one may use for different situations (90-4).  He 
concludes his analysis with a diagram of various speeches that outlines their constituent 
parts using the preceding terms (99-110). 
 Murphy’s article is a valuable contribution to both the history of rhetorical theory 
and the appearance of rhetoric in Aristophanes.  He was one of the first to connect 
Aristophanes explicitly with rhetoric and to show that his work has a significant 
rhetorical dimension.  Many of the passages he examines have become the subject of 
debate for later scholars who see inferential evidence of sophistic thought and 
theorization in the last decades of the fifth century.  By identifying many of the 
references to oratory and sophistry in Aristophanes’ speeches, Murphy situates the 
playwright into a culture of public performance and speechmaking that is consistent with 
other sources about the fifth century.  He has adequately demonstrated that Aristophanes 
was familiar with the new education taking root in the Athens of his day as well as the 
practitioners who made it so visible to the Athenian populace. 
 Murphy has not, however, adequately demonstrated that Aristophanes was 
himself a student of rhetoric or intimately familiar with rhetoric as a systematized 
discipline.  If we examine the first part of his evidence, that Aristophanes had a negative 
opinion about the new education, we see that Murphy commits the authorial fallacy.  At 
no point can we conclusively determine what Aristophanes the playwright actually 
thought about the sophists and their students because the narrative drama of the plays is a 
comic distortion of reality, just as the constraints of the genre dictate.  It is certainly 
possible that Aristophanes was not enamored of the sophists, but his plays are catering to 
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an audience that need not share his personal views.  If his purpose is to win over the 
audience of Athenian citizens, his own opinions about education are immaterial so long 
as he can give the audience enough of what they want to see to take first prize.  If we are 
to accept that Aristophanes was a student of the new education or well-versed in its 
concepts, we would need some kind of biographical evidence making this link.  No such 
information has survived to the present, so we cannot assume that Aristophanes had this 
kind of in-depth knowledge. 
 Murphy is the precursor to many later scholars who use texts outside the fifth 
century to explain and identify the precepts of the sophists.  Unlike O’Sullivan, who uses 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the Hellenistic poets, Cicero, Quintilian, et alia to make his 
connection to the fifth century, Murphy uses the Rhetoric to Alexander almost 
exclusively.  It is his belief that this text is chronologically closest to Aristophanes’ 
period of writing and hence is a working guide to the rhetorical theory of the fifth 
century.17  He assumes that rhetoric is a systematized discipline widespread enough in 
Athens that Aristophanes has incorporated many sophisticated techniques into his 
comedy.  Unfortunately, this belief is impossible to prove without direct evidence from 
the fifth century and language contemporaneous with Aristophanes’ plays.  The technical 
terminology Murphy uses is well beyond Aristophanes’ time and shows a level of 
complexity that is simply not found in our surviving texts from the fifth-century BCE.  
Moreover, the definition of rhetoric he uses is one that Aristophanes himself never 
mentions by name or allusion. 
                                                 
17
 This view has been roundly discredited by Sansone (2012) and Major (2013).  See also Schiappa and 
Timmerman: “Fourth-century BCE use of the word rhētorikē is sporadic, and it seems fairly clear that not 
all educators of the era embraced it” (131). 
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 Finally, Murphy takes a very text-based approach to Aristophanes without 
looking at the narrative drama.  I believe he is correct to focus on the language 
Aristophanes uses with only brief recourse to outside texts (such as the Rhetoric to 
Alexander), but he never considers why Aristophanes might have made certain linguistic 
choices for his immediate audience.  If we accept that Aristophanes knew enough about 
politicians to caricature them onstage, this alone does not imply that he had a working 
knowledge or interest in rhetorical principles.  Moreover, it is not reasonable to think that 
the majority of his audience was sufficiently trained in rhetorical education to recognize 
the constituent parts of a speech by name or the strategies of flattering an audience and be 
able to discuss the theory behind them intelligibly.  All we can conclude from 
Aristophanes’ plays is that he was a master of comic mimicry, that he could sew together 
arguments to fit the genre of his choice, and that he was familiar with some of the leading 
political and sophistic figures of his day.  None of these necessitates a firsthand 
knowledge of rhetorical precepts. 
 
V. Aristophanes as Stylistic Critic 
Neil O’Sullivan’s influential book Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of 
Greek Stylistic Theory (1992) further advanced Aristophanes as a rhetorical agent and 
Athenian intellectual familiar with rhetorical precepts from the fifth-century BCE.  
Working on the assumption advanced by George Kennedy that classical rhetoric stems 
from a single, unified tradition from at least as early as the sophists to the later years of 
the Roman Empire, O’Sullivan attempts to point out 
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rhetorical criticism before Aristotle.  His book examines various references to style, as 
well as descriptions of politicians and orators in the plays of Aristophanes to demonstrate 
that a technical vocabulary designed for rhetorical and poetic criticism was present in 
fifth-century Athens.18  His main source of evidence is Frogs because it features a 
protracted argument between Aeschylus and Euripides about whose poetic skills can best 
save Athens from its troubles.  The poets stridently attack their opponent’s style and 
justify their own as a benefit for the city.  O’Sullivan takes this as definitive evidence that 
stylistic criticism was alive and well in Athens in the fifth-century and had much in 
common with the writings of rhetorical theorists from the fourth-century and beyond, 
especially regarding differences between the grand and low styles (genus grande vs. 
genus tenue as O’Sullivan consistently refers to them). 
Aristophanes describes Aeschylus and Euripides in stark, contrasting terms 
consistently across his plays.  Aeschylus and his language is bloated and swollen, with 
images of hugeness and massiveness (such as “words big for a horse” or “mountainous”); 
he has language that is quite ornate and sophisticated, but that is not easily 
comprehensible to everyone.  Furthermore, he tends to evoke emotion in his audience 
rather than induce a more intellectual response (O’Sullivan 8).  Euripides is the very 
opposite: his language is described as leptos, thin or narrow in contrast to the bloat of 
Aeschylus, is fairly easy to understand, and uses ordinary (phrazein anthropeios, or 
lalein) rather than elaborate words and syntax (9).  Moreover, his plays do not evoke a 
                                                 
18
 O’Sullivan is a prominent representative of the view that since language in Greek drama may appear 
rhetorical with a modern or even 4th c. perspective, “it is therefore likely to have originated with the 
pioneers of rhetorical theory and practice, from whom dramatists like Sophocles and Euripides would have 
learned it” (Sansone 181). 
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heavily emotional response, but seem to appeal to a more rational mood in the audience.  
O’Sullivan also links these descriptions of style to three later authors who wrote 
specifically about rhetoric: Aristotle and his Rhetoric, “Demetrius” and On Style, and 
Cicero in the Orator (10-14).  He also shows a few connections to possible 
contemporaries of Aristophanes, but these are limited to a scholion of a lost play of 
Pherecrates called Krapataloi, two comic fragments, and some references in Plutarch 
(14-16).  O’Sullivan’s efforts adequately demonstrate that Aristophanes was aware of 
different styles and could point out examples of them for his audience. 
He then takes the argument to prose authors, specifically Gorgias and Prodicus.  
He sees these two as historical counterparts to the Aeschylus and Euripides of 
Aristophanes in terms of their style, and examines a variety of sources to prove this link.  
He refers to characterizations of Gorgias and Prodicus in the works of prose authors, such 
as Plato, Aristotle, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Gorgias himself.  He concludes that 
Gorgias is also an example of the grand style because he uses elevated language, 
mystifies or stuns his audience, uses complicated language (the dipla onomata as 
explained by Aristotle), and mentions that Gorgias may have used language of fullness or 
hugeness to describe a play of Aeschylus (Areos meston for the Seven Against Thebes). In 
contrast, Prodicus is described as having a preoccupation with the correct definition of 
words (orthotes onomaton) and performing the same speech after careful calculation.  
O’Sullivan also examines their portrayal in Frogs and some other plays, and briefly 
analyzes a short passage from Euripides’ Medea to show the playwright’s similar interest 
in orthotes onomaton (16-22).  He shows that many of these similarities are also found in 
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leading politicians from the fifth-century (such as Pericles and Cleon) and rivals of 
Aristophanes (such as Cratinus) to further demonstrate the terminological links between 
politics, rhetoric, and poetics (107ff). 
O’Sullivan can legitimately defend his assertion that Aristophanes is contrasting 
different concepts of style in his plays, and that similar descriptions of style occur 
between orators and poets.  It is difficult to argue that Aristophanes was unaware of 
stylistic concerns within his own genre of comedy, tragedy, and political oratory as well.  
However, the evidence says little beyond these assertions, because O’Sullivan has not 
demonstrated that such language constitutes a technical vocabulary used in a systematic 
or disciplinary understanding of style or rhetoric.  To explain my reasoning, I argue that 
O’Sullivan’s argument suffers from four improper assumptions: 1.) that rhetorical 
theorists after Aristophanes are necessarily part of the same tradition as he; 2.) that 
criticism is conflated with rhetoric as a discipline; 3.) that any reference to an orator or 
poet must contain technical language; 4.) that it is not necessary to use contemporary 
sources to prove his argument. 
 First, O’Sullivan assumes that rhetorical theorists after Aristophanes are 
necessarily part of the same rhetorical tradition as the comic playwright.  This thesis was 
propagated largely by George Kennedy and argues that traces of classical rhetoric as a 
discipline can be found through much of antiquity, even before Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
(which is considered by many scholars as the earliest systematic understanding and 
conception of disciplinary rhetoric to date).  O’Sullivan openly admits to such an 
assumption (1-6), and his argument relies almost exclusively on the works of established 
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rhetorical critics from well after the fifth century BCE to explain the “technical” 
meanings of his focal terms.  Unfortunately, there is no way to determine how much 
cultural caché these terms had acquired in the decades leading up to Aristotle’s Rhetoric; 
this becomes even more problematic when using terms found in Cicero or Plutarch.  
O’Sullivan rarely calls these authors into question as legitimate sources of information.  
He readily accepts their interpretations of words without examining their motivations, 
how the terms operate in their own systems of rhetorical thought, and only claims we 
have to be skeptical of critics as late as Cicero (109).  The eminent philologist Kenneth 
Dover explicitly warns against any such comparison: “The terminology of criticism, 
including metaphors and similes which might have an obvious appeal and catch on, must 
have percolated in varying degrees from those who cared a great deal about poetry, 
through those who gave it less attention, down to those who gave it hardly any.  For that 
reason it is unwise to assume, when we find words used in the appraisal of poetry both by 
Aristophanes and by the literary critics of the Hellenistic period, that they already 
constituted a technical terminology in 405, let alone that they originated in sophistic 
treatises” (32-3).   
 Second, O’Sullivan assumes that criticism is conflated with the kind of technical 
vocabulary associated with rhetoric as a discipline.  Dover explains that even in 
preliterate periods, “the composition of songs is a process in which discussion and 
criticism, often passionate, play an important part---and inevitably so, because any 
aesthetic reaction implies preference, and preference implies criticism” (32-3).    Any 
time an audience has the opportunity to see a performance, there will be some kind of 
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critical reaction.  Aristophanes is hardly the first person to detect differences in 
performances from a range of competing authors.19  However, such a detection is a far 
cry from demonstrating that he was thoroughly familiar with rhetorical practices and 
could speak about them systematically.20  Rhetoric by our definition must imply some 
understanding and awareness of criticism, but criticism need not imply an understanding 
of rhetoric.  One may recognize that a play’s jokes are funny and enjoy them without 
having a thorough understanding of joke composition, the art of timing, or how to engage 
in comedy writing. 
 Third, O’Sullivan assumes that any reference to an orator or poet must contain 
technical language.  This is a risky proposition because it completely ignores the genre of 
comedy and its performative setting in Athens.  Old Comedy, regardless of its political or 
institutional purposes, was designed at the very least to get a laugh out of the audience.  
O’Sullivan routinely ignores that, as a comedic institution in Athens, it may have been 
subject to the same kinds of generic constraints as other forms of speech; if the audience 
happens to like a certain caricature or gag, one is somewhat obligated to throw these in to 
score points with the judges.  Consequently, he often neglects the context of each 
reference to the orators or poets within the larger context of the plays themselves.  
Certain metaphors and similes might have been consistent crowd-pleasers based on the 
                                                 
19
 Sansone extends this logic to explain that playwrights could not be successful at their craft without a 
discerning eye: “Attic playwrights learned their lessons from the immediate reaction of the audience in the 
theater, the verdict of the judges, and the potential for mockery by rival poets” not from explicit rhetorical 
training (168-169). 
20
 It is telling that Clouds, one of the plays that most explicitly discusses sophistry and the ability to speak 
effectively in public, never uses the terms rhētorikē or rhētoreia.  As Schiappa explains (1999), “Socrates’ 
lesson concerning how to win a lawsuit is an exercise in the invention of creative arguments that has little 
in common with the discussions of forensic rhetoric found in the fourth century” (51).  This is further 
evidence that the technical terminology of later rhetorical theory is noticeably absent in the Aristophanic 
corpus and that Aristophanes is more of a discerning critic of oratory first and foremost. 
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types of stories the audience enjoyed, or that they fit more in-line with a political agenda 
of the author to direct public attention to certain issues.  There is no guarantee or 
reasonable expectation that in these types of plays Aristophanes is making a point to 
demonstrate technical knowledge of the budding rhetorical discipline without at least 
some consideration for comedic and narrative elements. 
 Finally, O’Sullivan seems to think that it is not necessary to use contemporary 
sources to prove his argument.  This is the biggest obstacle for his argument because so 
few sources about or from the sophists from the fifth-century BCE have survived to the 
present.  If one had access to sophistic treatises in their entirety from Prodicus, Gorgias, 
or the other sophists, one could more conclusively determine what, if any, technical 
language was being used and by how many people.  Unfortunately, there is little evidence 
of this, thus all O’Sullivan can use as evidence from the fifth-century itself is 
Aristophanes and other comic fragments.  He has been forced to supplement these with 
quotations about the fifth century, but from much later sources, the accuracy and bias of 
which he rarely considers.  Without definitive evidence that rhetoric was systematized as 
a discipline, without direct usage of technical vocabulary in a non-literary context 
contemporaneous with Aristophanes, the references in his work can only demonstrate that 
he was a critic in the sense Dover outlines, which is not radically new or noteworthy. 
O’Sullivan is a significant contributor to the history of rhetoric because his 
descriptions note some of the earliest motifs and characterizations for oratory and public 
performance, which perhaps later writers will take up when more technical discussions of 
rhetoric occur.  Many of the connections he notes amongst politicians, sophists, and poets 
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show a wide range of performative practices in fifth-century oratory.  Unfortunately, such 
arguments demonstrate only that Aristophanes was a shrewd critic and keen observer of 
oratorical behavior, not that he was familiar with rhetoric as a systematized discipline.   
 
VI. Aristophanes as Critic of Rhetoric 
Thomas Hubbard’s 2007 book chapter entitled “Attic Comedy and the 
Development of Theoretical Rhetoric” attempts to reconstruct the early stages of classical 
rhetorical theory in the manner of O’Sullivan.   He argues that the agonistic elements 
typical of debates in Old Comedy highlight terms and techniques from the newer form of 
education which the sophists began and politicians subsequently adopted.  The key to 
detecting these terms can be found “in the comic poet's own verbal practice and in his 
satirical depiction of the social and intellectual currents of his time.”  Hubbard has 
synthesized much of the criticism from earlier scholarship, acknowledging that the late 
fifth-century lacked the technical vocabulary and systematization of the fourth, but still 
asserting that “rhetoric” was sufficiently formed as a discipline because “Comedy clearly 
shows speakers engaged in self-conscious linguistic and discursive strategies to succeed 
in persuading a specific target audience.”  By examining the argumentative techniques of 
Aristophanes’ characters and recognizing that they appeal to specific audiences, Hubbard 
sees enough strategy to denote the presence of sophisticated rhetorical awareness.  As 
evidence for these claims, Hubbard looks at arguments within Aristophanes’ plays 1.) to 
show that characters use strategies to persuade specific audiences; 2.) to characterize the 
old vs. new forms of education with certain stylistic and moral terms; and 3.) to show that 
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intellectual interests such as philology were certainly present at the end of the fifth 
century and signify the early formation of classical rhetorical theory. 
 Hubbard presents a number of scenes in Aristophanes’ plays that show characters 
implementing strategies to persuade a specific internal audience.  Hubbard describes 
Dicaeopolis’ attempts to convince the chorus in Acharnians that his personal peace treaty 
with Sparta was a necessary and reasonable thing to do; he also dissects the techniques 
used by both the Paphlagonian and the Sausage-Seller in Knights when they try to 
persuade Demos.  He analyses the protracted contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in 
Frogs to prove to Dionysus which is the better poet, and of course the agon between the 
Greater and Lesser Discourse in Clouds over who will instruct the young Pheidippides.  
In each of these scenes, the characters have a pragmatic objective at hand, to convince an 
independent party that their position is the most legitimate; arguments are tailored for the 
judge, often with claims to provide the most advantages based on the judge’s position in 
society, so that the interlocutors may receive a personal advantage of some kind with a 
favorable result.  There is also a discussion of Banqueters and how certain orators have 
provided pithy expressions or witticisms for the Athenian young. 
 Hubbard next shows that young sons overcome their fathers in arguments in 
Clouds and Wasps to highlight the difference between the old and new educations.  He 
closely examines some of Bdelycleon’s arguments in Wasps to show that he is using 
eikos-like reasoning: his catalog of the money Athens takes in vs. what it pays out to the 
jury means that politicians are taking a large cut of the income.  Hubbard argues that this 
is strategically designed to show the chorus of Wasp-jurors that the politicians are far 
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from looking after them if they pocket this difference.  He also asserts that Clouds shows 
a clear demonstration of speech-making education because the first steps to defeating a 
charge are grammar, orthopeia, metrics, and other things that could reasonably constitute 
inventio.  When Socrates is instructing Strepsiades at the Phrontisterion, he begins with 
these steps as a way to build up towards fraudulent reasoning and swindling, hence they 
form the foundation to more advanced sophistical training. 
 The Socratic inventio in Clouds leads to Hubbard’s last main point, that 
intellectual activities such as orthopeia and philology indicate the presence of 
sophisticated rhetorical understanding.  As evidence, he takes the discussion in Clouds 
about different terms for gendered things (“fowl” compared with “fowless,” for 
example), as well as Strepsiades’ confused attempt to dissuade his creditors using such 
distinctions later in the play to show the presence of philology early in Aristophanes’ 
career.  The more progressed discussion about definitions and word usage found in Frogs 
demonstrates to him that philology had advanced significantly towards the end of the 
fifth-century.  Hubbard also argues that making the lesser argument appear the stronger, a 
parody of a well-known saying of Protagoras, further shows that Aristophanes thought 
the audience would be familiar enough with the concept to recognize and approve his 
mockery of it. 
 Hubbard’s analysis of Aristophanes’ plays is thorough and insightful because it 
addresses the concept of audience.  It is unfortunate that he does not linger on this topic, 
because it is a crucially important one for the formation of rhetoric.  Rhetorical strategy is 
often dependent on the audience that will hear one’s argument, thus when Aristophanes’ 
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characters make such appeals, it shows much more of a self-conscious attempt to 
persuade.  One must also consider that these scenes present only a snapshot of the 
persuasive process, where characters do not show what they are thinking before the 
speech or what their initial thoughts were afterward.  The only terms and techniques we 
see are those of performance; it is entirely possible that Aristophanes saw successful 
speeches and hoped to recreate the same effect by imitating them or making similar 
statements without regard for a more explicit and rational strategy.  Hubbard’s analysis of 
argumentative appeals is invaluable because it treats speeches and arguments in 
Aristophanes as rhetorical situations within a narrative structure, a perspective I use in 
my own analyses.  For him, the dramatic elements are much more critical and necessary 
for consideration then for Murphy and O’Sullivan, even if he focuses on individual 
scenes to the exclusion of entire plays and their broader themes.  He has also 
demonstrated that the agonistic trend in Aristophanes’ early plays also appears in later 
ones, indicating that debate, argument, and public performance were almost certainly at 
the core of the litigious and contentious Athenian culture during the late 5th c. BCE.   
 Despite such an important contribution to the scholarship of Aristophanes and 
rhetoric, there is not definitive enough evidence in Hubbard’s analysis to conclude that 
rhetoric was overtly and systematically a discipline during Aristophanes’ tenure as a 
comic playwright.  Much of my earlier criticisms concerning O’Sullivan and Murphy 
apply here, because without definitive evidence showing Aristophanes’ awareness of 
rhetorical training, or the presence of more explicit metalanguage from the teachers of the 
new education in Athens, the most we can say is that oratory was a booming business in 
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the late fifth-century.  Hubbard and O’Sullivan’s analyses both work under the 
assumption that “In the absence of evidence, [scholars are] constrained to use an 
argument from likelihood,” which should generate a healthy amount of skepticism and 
critical examination (Sansone148). The outcome or public reception after a performance 
was the main measuring-stick for persuasion, not discussion of technique or strategy as 
one might see in the fourth-century.  Even in Aristophanes’ plays, we only catch glimpses 
of characters engaged in debate and argument, rarely consciously discussing how they 
will achieve persuasion in debate and argument. 
Perhaps the lone exception to this is Socrates’ questioning of Strepsiades as to 
how he will escape his creditors.  Strepsiades provides a series of statements emphasizing 
fallacious reasoning, but this alone does not constitute rhetoric as systematic and 
teachable discipline, which at least in the fourth-century featured strategic thinking as 
well as the ability to enact it in public.  Pheidippides, the young man in Clouds who 
receives the sophistic training from Socrates, also does not engage in lengthy speech, 
opting instead to use the more “Socratic” form of question and answer to effect 
persuasion.  At no point in Clouds do we see language that is specifically identified with 
rhetoric.  Strepsiades routinely describes the training he and his son will receive as legein 
or eu legein.  Based on the way these characters and Socrates in the Phrontisterion put 
the training to use, legein could reasonably refer to a type of sophistic logic or the ability 
to converse with an interlocutor to one’s advantage.  Even the Ettōn Logos embodies this 
style of questioning when arguing with his Kreittōn counterpart. 
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Furthermore, it is reasonable that intellectual activities such as orthopeia were 
present well into Aristophanes’ career.  The sophist Prodicus is reported to have engaged 
in such activities, for example.  But an interest in the verbal arts does not alone mean a 
person is committed to or engaged in a rhetorical discipline that stresses strategy in public 
performance.  A modern day philologist or etymologist may have the deepest 
understanding of the origins of words and suitable definitions based on context, but that 
in no way guarantees a knowledge or ability to speak well in public.  The same applies in 
the works of Aristophanes.  Orthopeia is certainly one of the verbal arts ascribed to the 
late fifth-century, but its existence does not guarantee or necessarily imply an explicit 
understanding of rhetoric. 
Wilfred Major’s dissertation Aristophanes: Enemy of Rhetoric (1996) and 
subsequent book The Court of Comedy (2013) served as the next great foray into 
Aristophanes and his relationship with rhetoric, and did much to recognize that the 
playwright uses language about public persuasion without assuming he was himself a 
student of the sophists.  Major takes a more critical approach to examining rhetoric in 
Aristophanes; rather than looking only at individual speeches (as Murphy did), he looks 
at all of Aristophanes’ plays for evidence of language about orators, oratory in society, 
and rhetorical motifs, often looking at the same evidence as O’Sullivan.  His 
investigation is more broad and sweeping than Murphy and shows the full extent to 
which Aristophanes comments on or makes use of language about rhetoric, thus he casts 
a much wider net than O’Sullivan.  Moreover, he provides a far-reaching survey into 
previous scholarship.  Based on his analysis of previous work, Major concludes that one 
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is obligated to view Aristophanes and his plays as comic institutions in Athens that react 
to the political institutions of his day.  He argues that Aristophanes saw the new 
education as both a danger to the state and a potential rival to Old Comedy as a political 
institution.  Failure to see the overtly political tone to Aristophanic plays prevents 
scholars from seeing an important and intrinsic component to Old Comedy and its 
treatment of oratory.  His criticisms of the various methodologies and perspectives that 
support the conclusions of other scholars are invaluable for anyone reading Aristophanes, 
regardless of whether their focus is rhetoric or another topic. 
 The idea that one must evaluate Aristophanes based on terms contemporaneous 
with his work is a necessary and legitimate corollary to Major’s political perspective.  
Our surviving texts do not indicate that rhetoric was a fully-formed and self-aware 
discipline in the same way that one observes in fourth-century texts.  Major convincingly 
argues that rhetoric was “not a crude, early form groping toward the more polished 
version in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” but “entrenched in its time, based firmly on intellectual 
principles of the day” (“Aristophanes” 38).  One should make no mistake; rhetoric was 
still at the stage where its language was evolving as practitioners became more skilled in 
public performance, but the metalanguage found in the fourth-century is noticeably 
absent.  Thus, one must use the language of Aristophanes’ day to determine the nature of 
his comments about oratory and to detect the possible cultural events and climates he 
uses to affect his audience without recourse to later writers.  For this reason, Major’s 
catalog of orators and oratorical motifs is important for establishing a relationship 
between oratory and Old Comedy in the late fifth-century BCE, in terms that show 
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antagonism and shared traditions.  By accounting for terms Aristophanes himself used or 
with which he might have been familiar, as well as examining historical circumstances, 
literary/aesthetic principles, and generic considerations for Old Comedy itself, one may 
get closer to providing a broad understanding of his language, the possible purposes or 
effects his works can produce, and the state of oratory as it existed in the fifth-century. 
Major contends that Aristophanes viewed the younger generation of orators as a 
threat to himself and Athens because they represented an alarming antidemocratic trend.  
He makes a point to explain that Aristophanes is not attacking rhetorical theorists as 
scholars typically understand Aristotle or Isocrates in the fourth-century BCE, but orators 
who perform in public (“Court 18”).  “Accordingly, the poets of Old Comedy criticized 
the rhetoric of the day via attacks directly on rhetoric’s practitioners.  Because Old 
Comedy’s thrust was fundamentally political, jokes about a speaker’s rhetorical 
mannerisms also mock the political agenda espoused by that speaker and, by extension, 
entire political movements” (“Aristophanes” 85).  He comments further that there is there 
is no explanation or description of a rhetorician in Aristophanes because rhetoric did not 
exist “as a distinct discipline and intellectual pursuit” (“Aristophanes” 86).  Therefore, 
any reference to the orators is made to highlight the potential danger that current 
politicians were posing to the Athenian populace and which Aristophanes considered a 
threat to his own medium.  To prove these claims, Major collects references to speakers, 
their personal characteristics, and things associated with their speech, putting them into 
two broad categories: “(1) relatively common and recognizable words easily associated 
with the courts, assemblies, the sophists, and any environment where speakers employ 
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suspicious and distinctive mannerisms (e.g., antilegin, demegorein); and (2) strongly 
evaluative terms which can be grafted to superficial mannerisms and to the speakers 
themselves, always to the speaker’s degradation, whether by applying a negative term 
(adolesches, alazon), or withholding a positive one (dexios, sophos) (“Aristophanes” 
110).  Major’s catalog is exhaustive, stretching across all the extant Aristophanic plays. 
Major also reorients the conversation surrounding Aristophanes and his 
relationship to rhetoric and oratory so that the playwright is interpreted through language 
from his own period rather than the highly technical and disciplinary terminology of the 
4th c.  As a historical source about the origins of rhetoric and performance culture in 
Athens, Aristophanes is able to comment on the intellectual developments of his period 
without the distorting filter of historical perspective or philosophical bias, such as those 
adopted by philosophers acting as rivals to sophistic education (“Court” 6-7).  His 
position stands counter to those of Murphy, O’Sullivan, and Hubbard, whose arguments 
he routinely discredits for ahistorical bias, lack of evidence, and unsupported logic 
(“Court” 10-15, 56-50, 106-108).  At issue is whether Aristophanes provides evidence of 
a the beginnings of rhetoric as a teachable discipline with its own culture, terminology, 
and established techniques.  His plays engage in persuasive speechmaking and show 
characters skilled in argument, therefore the traditional view espoused by O’Sullivan, etc. 
argues that he was familiar with the new discipline enough to demonstrate it onstage.  
Major (and Sansone, footnote 19) contends that “Playwrights of all places and times, of 
course, dramatize events to reflect and comment on the world they experience.” This kind 
of dramatization “does not require an established or nascent formalized system of critical 
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terminology to describe speech making” (“Court” 16).  This requires no logical 
gymnastics to justify the existence of something that has no direct contemporaneous 
evidence from its period and refers to the basic human practice of observation and 
storytelling. 
His analysis moves in a similar direction to my own in that we are both examining 
the often negative associations Aristophanes creates to the class of orators in the late 5th 
c.  Major’s focus spans the entire Aristophanic corpus, including of course the later plays, 
so the breadth of his analysis covers more ground than my own.  This allows him to look 
at how “Aristophanes and some other comic playwrights, initially at least, considered the 
use of proto-rhetorical language as inimical to the democratic process, but, following the 
challenges to the Athenian democracy in the wake of the Sicilian expedition, 
Aristophanes reframes the problem as what formal rhetorical techniques the Demos 
should allow as a component of democratic debate” (italics mine, “Court” 18).  This line 
of argument considers the ethics of debate and speech performance, because Athens had 
suffered considerably as a result of poor decision-making and was perhaps more 
reflective about its democratic processes.  He explains further that “comedy was in the 
business of policing politics and the beat included oratory, comprising its manner, 
technique, and purpose, for improper use of oratory was embedded in tyranny and was a 
fortiori antidemocratic” (“Court” 50). 
A significant difference between our analyses is that Major tends to focus on the 
monolithic character of the democratic institutions; thus criticism over the lawcourts or 
Assembly results in a solution of resetting or overhauling the system so the demos can 
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retake its rightful place of authority from the demagogues (“Court” 69, 71, 79, 102-103).  
The Athenian institutions are presumed to be of sound origin because the pre-Periclean, 
pre-Peloponnesian War periods enjoyed prosperity and profound influence throughout 
the ancient Mediterranean world, but Aristophanes’ early plays “feature processes central 
to the democracy (public debate, trial by jury, education) stalled in their normal and 
proper locations and translocated to other environments” (“Court” 52).  Any avenue for 
change involves a broad suggestion that the voting citizens assume their prior role, with 
little idea about how they might actually conceive of accomplishing this daunting task.  
My analysis considers the broken nature of the democratic institutions as Aristophanes 
describes them, but with focus instead on the speaker and voting citizen and their roles as 
individual ethical agents that can work towards a restoration of prosperity (this position is 
explained in greater detail in section VIII of this chapter). 
Even if one were to ignore his own independent research into Aristophanes’ 
plays, Major’s analysis of critical perspectives is itself invaluable for anyone interpreting 
Old Comedy.  It is clear that different critics have used a variety of perspectives to 
highlight what they consider the most important elements of Aristophanes’ work.  I 
support Major’s argument that it is necessary to view Old Comedy from a number of 
perspectives because the genre is such a complicated phenomenon in fifth-century 
Athens.  Because Old Comedy was such a vehemently political genre, one must take into 
account the immediate and recent historical context for each play, which often involves 
war efforts against Sparta and the politicians who push military agendas.  To conceive of 
Aristophanes as merely a poet with aesthetic tendencies is to ignore a crucial element to 
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his work; although his main, nominal purpose is to entertain the audience and work 
within the constraints of his poetic genre, he is reacting to the current events of his city 
and incorporating them so that he and the audience can consider them together.  He was 
an Athenian citizen, just as the audience members witnessing his plays; therefore, he 
could use cultural events and characters to advance comic plots or arguments.  Comedy 
was almost certainly an established part of Athenian culture to which Aristophanes had a 
strong affinity, thus it is reasonable that he would feel pressure from outside influences, 
political or sophistic, and be able to incorporate them positively or negatively into his 
plays.  As Major summarizes, “Greek comedy as an institution reacts to the institutions 
which support rhetoric.  Moreover, comic poets filter rhetoric through their own dramatic 
and literary screens.  Only an apparatus which processes Greek comedy as an institution, 
genre, and artistic creation can yield a meaningful analysis of rhetoric’s appearance 
within the comedies” (“Aristophanes” 29). 
 
VII. A New Direction: Ethical Arguments in Old Comedy 
The work from these scholars has been invaluable for showing the elements of 
and commentary about persuasion in Aristophanes’ work, but I believe another, 
unexplored area may also be fruitful.  Several authors in the Greek literary traditional 
have been considered ethicists or authors with ethical arguments, but Aristophanes is not 
reckoned among them.  In this section, I outline my position on interpreting Greek ethics 
from the late 5th c., why it is valuable to read texts from non-philosophers ethically, and 
   48 
 
how we can see the underlying ethical arguments in narrative works using Kenneth 
Burke’s theories on the hortatory negative and antithesis. 
 Understanding and evaluating Greek ethics is a thorny issue.  The concept of 
ethical character and behavior, pertaining to the identity of both individuals and the polis, 
seems to change from one historical period to another and even between 
contemporaneous authors.  MacIntyre refers to this conceptual heterogeneity as “an 
incoherence in moral standards and vocabulary” (124).  The more one tries to pin down a 
single definition for ethics or ethical terminology (such as dike and its related cognates, 
sophrosune, etc.), the more difficult it becomes to understand and negotiate the great 
disparity between competing authors.  This is especially true among the philosophers, 
where one sees certain similarities but also wide divergences between such closely 
related authors as Plato and Aristotle.   The very task of writing explicitly about ethics 
demonstrates, in many cases, a deliberate attempt to recategorize and define moral 
vocabulary in such a way that has not previously existed or been prevalent before (126-
7).  For this reason, we must be cautious when looking for any explanation that quickly 
summarizes the Greek position on the virtues; moreover, we must confront the possibility 
that the coherence of these terms and their corresponding concepts are a great deal less 
consistent than we would like.  It is a great disservice to accept wholeheartedly the ethical 
terms and definitions of one author at the expense of others because such an 
understanding assumes that one source may somehow speak for all Greek ethical views 
monolithically. 
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 The common overlap between “ethical” authors concerns the importance of one’s 
character as always related to the polis.  MacIntyre explains that “all do take it for 
granted that the milieu in which the virtues are to be exercised and in terms of which they 
are to be defined is the polis” (127).   The distinctions between terms may differ, certain 
emphases may not be the same between authors, but being an ethical person is directly 
related to one’s obligations and commitments to the larger community.  The dilemmas 
depicted by tragedians may not present explicit arguments and narrowly define ethical 
terms by example, but their conflicts inevitably revolve around the adjudication between 
competing social roles and the forces they exert on the citizen.  When Plato discusses the 
philosopher king in the Republic, the polis may be an allegory for the human soul but it 
can easily be read as the connections between citizens and how they may best cohere and 
live together.  Greek authors may see the virtues as doing different things and having 
different essences, but they maintain that the virtues are intimately connected to ideas of 
citizenship and relationships that exist beyond the individual. 
 Athens of the late 5th c. revolved around agonistic competition, thus it should 
come as no surprise that similar language and topoi appear in several aspects of public 
life.  MacIntyre convincingly shows that “the categories political, dramatic, philosophical 
were much more intimately related in the Athenian world than in our own” through the 
ubiquity of the agōn in such diverse places as the assembly, law courts, tragedy and 
comedy (which he refers to as “a piece of symbolic (and very serious) buffoonery in the 
plot-line of comedy” (129).  The audience would have been mainly the same for each 
performative context, and each individual member could potentially move from spectator 
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to active participant.  The agōn, in all its different representations, provides the context 
and occasion in which the virtues are to be discussed and enacted (130).   
If one accepts the premise that the agōn allowed Athenians to shape ethical 
understandings through such fora as the political arena and tragic plays, one may also 
consider the works of Old Comedy as vehicles for ethical discussion.  Nussbaum 
convincingly argues that poetry of all kinds was not considered ethically neutral, which is 
further evidenced by Plato’s view of them as a real threat to the well-being and 
development of citizens in the polis.  She argues that “For [the Greeks] there were human 
lives and problems, and various genres in both prose and poetry in which one could 
reflect on those problems” (“Fragility” 12).  Poets from the heroic age as well as 5th c. 
were considered both by the Greeks as well as modern scholars as prime instruction for 
citizens who wished to learn virtuous behavior and to see models who exemplified the 
most desirable qualities in citizenship.  Referring specifically to tragedy, Nussbaum 
writes that dramatic works can be considered “as ethical reflection in their own right, 
embodying in both their content and their style a conception of human excellence” 
(“Fragility” 13). 
One may object that Old Comedy has no stated purpose to articulate philosophy 
to its audience or that the claims of playwrights to improve the character and well-being 
of the polis are generic boasts designed to elicit laughs and trade good will for votes from 
the judges.21  However, I would argue that Old Comedy does not need to present ethical 
arguments using the language of philosophers and explicit concepts of morality (the 
                                                 
21
 Major (2006) articulates the differences between an actual boast and the more humorous posturing that 
occurs in Old Comedy. 
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genre would likely not allow discussions of this kind anyway), but can present situations 
that question the best way to live and act in the polis and frame ethical depictions of 
citizenship through comic narrative and characterization.  Although he does not explicitly 
connect this idea to Old Comedy, MacIntyre argues that “to adopt a stance on the virtues 
will be to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life.”  He concludes that 
such “a life is understood as a progression through harms and dangers, moral and 
physical, which someone may encounter and overcome in better and worse ways” (135). 
 There are even a few advantages to portraying ethics narratively compared to the 
more traditional style of philosophical argument.  Nussbaum champions the view of 
ethical dimensions in Greek tragedy, arguing that dramatic texts allow the presentation of 
human vulnerability in ways that more strictly philosophical texts are simply unable to 
do.  They can focus on the conflict between influential values, the difficulty of deciding 
which area to sacrifice, and the manner in which harm may be visited upon the self or 
those close to the self (“Fragility 13).  She refutes the idea that a philosophical text may 
present a series of shorter examples to illustrate the same tough choices because a 
narrative format may present the entire process of deliberating, as each choice is weighed 
and scrutinized, as well as the full extent of the consequences resulting from such 
choices.  Sansone concurs, contending that "The visible presence of these characters on 
stage, listening to the words addressed to them, makes it almost inevitable that we in the 
audience, overhearing those words, will make some mental effort to frame a response to 
them" (60).  Moreover, it involves the audience as an integral member of the deliberative 
process and allows them to feel many of the same conflicts and pulls as the dramatic 
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characters.  “[Tragedy] shows a searching for the morally salient, and it forces us, as 
interpreters, to be similarly active.”  (“Fragility” 13).  Nussbaum emphasizes the rational 
process as one debates different courses of action, which is perhaps not quite so 
applicable to Old Comedy.  However, the underlying argument for the visible depictions 
presented by Old Comedy, as well as the idea that one can construct or visit the logical 
processes of the characters (even those distorted for comic effect), provides another 
dimension to an ethical portrait of behavior that a philosophical text is unable to do. 
Nussbaum’s second main argument is that a philosophical text traditionally 
appeals to the intellect alone, but drama (specifically tragedy) appeals to our sense of 
emotions as well; we discover what we think about those events partly by noticing how 
we feel as we experience them along with the protagonists.22  A philosophical text, often 
by design, covers a series of rigidly logical statements and attempts to found a rational 
explanation for what virtuous behavior is, why one may consider it so, and how one may 
go about living in this way.  The first goal appears to be understanding before evaluation.  
The ethical arguments of drama provide a less rational but no less visceral scene for the 
audience; it may not be necessary to fully understand why a virtue is defined in a  certain 
way if one can see the tangible results for certain behaviors, especially if those behaviors 
produce intense reactions.  An audience may not be able to define sophrosune into other 
terms, but they can identify the troubles associated with a figure such as  Hippolytus 
when his excessive devotion to the virtue brings about his downfall, consider the 
                                                 
22
 Weaver (1953) articulates a similar theory discussing the ethics of rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus: when 
referencing the complete man and his ability to be “the ‘lover” added to the scientist,” he states that the 
problems of the world “will have to be handled, as Socrates well knew, by the student of souls, who must 
primarily make use of the language of tendency.  The soul is impulse, not simple cognition; and finally 
one’s interest in rhetoric depends on how much poignancy one senses in existence” (78-79). 
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ramifications for his decisions, and start to determine whether his choices were worth the 
costs.   The emotional reactions of sadness, empathy, or schadenfraude one may feel 
towards him or any figure in tragedy or comedy can jumpstart the process of considering 
similar ethical situations present outside the theatre. 
The earlier discussion regarding the politics of Old Comedy, the advantage and 
technique of using ridicule, and the ethical nature of drama come together neatly when 
we consider the plays of Aristophanes.  He is not typically considered an ethicist, but his 
comedies take advantage of the narrative form available to any playwright and can 
discuss matters of great importance to his audience.  I argue in this dissertation that 
Aristophanes creates arguments about ethical citizenship, focusing in particular on 
themes of persuasive speaking, public deliberation, and the role of oratory in democratic 
Athens.  The scenes and characters witnessed by his audience will not be as emotionally 
wrought and conflicted as those of the tragedians, but the audience is still able to observe 
the different choices available to protagonists, empathize or condemn their actions, and 
form an impression about whether they too would act in the same way if put into a 
similar situation.  I believe one may read Aristophanes as an ethicist regarding general 
acts of citizenship, but I will focus exclusively on the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens as speakers and audience members in 3 argumentative fora.  In the next section 
of this chapter, I outline some of Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theories concerning the 
origin and function of the hortatory negative and rhetorical figure of antithesis, the role of 
audience identification in persuasion, and how these concepts allow us to read 
Aristophanes as an advocate for ethical persuasive speech. 
   54 
 
 
VIII. Old Comedy and Kenneth Burke’s Theory of the Negative 
Kenneth Burke’s ideas regarding the ethics of human experience, most notably his 
theory of the origin and application of the linguistic negative, can provide insight for 
understanding Aristophanes’ arguments for his fellow citizens.  One may begin with the 
idea that ethics are situational in that “all moral judgments and acts are situated” in 
particular contexts and descriptions (Crusius).  Burke fleshes out this concept in 
Language as Symbolic Action, using the example of a novel’s title to illustrate his point 
(361): 
 
language [should] be viewed, not directly in terms of a word-thing relationship, 
but roundabout, by thinking of speech as the ‘entitling’ of complex nonverbal 
situations (somewhat as the title of a novel does not really name one object, but 
sums up the vast complexity of elements that compose the novel, giving it its 
character, essence, or general drift. 
 
Unlike the certainty and absolutism of a Platonic form, this ethical reasoning  privileges 
the response to a situation rather than applying a rule that can encompass any 
circumstance or context, as Crusius explains (2):  
 
MacIntyre is right: Our moral convictions are inconsistent. But they are not so 
primarily because we are confused. They are so because morality is always a 
response to a situation. If you abstract from the situations, of course what you’ll 
get are batches of inconsistent moral principles. But this is precisely what we 
Burkeans wouldn’t or shouldn’t do. What is language for us? Symbolic action. 
And what is symbolic action? “A strategy for encompassing a situation.” Our 
morality enters the picture both in sizing up some situations and in the strategies 
we adopt for encompassing those situations. 
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Applied to Aristophanes, it is important to see how his historical context situates the acts 
portrayed in the plays.  Moreover, one need not look for binding consistency because the 
comic heroes and the conflicts they encounter require more of an individual motive to 
solve the narrative problems of the plot.  One may object that the heroes and their 
antagonists have a striking similarity — demagogues and the pro-war factions are 
routinely criticized and taken to task by Aristophanes’ heroes, with utopian ideas of 
luxury, convenience, and the absence of war as common goals throughout the plays.  
Burke would argue that some consistency is possible and perhaps expected provided the 
situations are similar enough in scope, content, or purpose.  If Aristophanes offers up the 
situations for public viewing, it will be the duty of the audience to determine the moral 
motives most appropriate to handle the situation.  The logical consequence of Burke’s 
ethics concludes that the good man, good citizen, or good Athenian does certain kinds of 
acts when a situation requires — for example, when presented with a demagogue the 
motive or action can be acquiescence or resistance.  When interacting with other citizens 
in the agora or hearing a case as a juror, the appropriate response might be rude hostility, 
calm disinterest, or passionate partisanship.  When addressing an audience as speaker, 
one has the choice of speaking to the facts, providing entertaining digressions, or 
focusing entirely on emotional appeals.  Old Comedy never provides a direct answer, but 
allows the audience to consider the situation first before determining if their responses 
are similar to or contrary with those presented in the play, and whether one response 
would be considered more appropriate and ethical than another. 
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 The function of the linguistic, hortatory negative and its human origins provide 
important context for audiences making these kinds of ethical determinations.  Burke 
explains that the linguistic form of the negative arose from a positive description that 
came to hold “strongly imperative or hortatory connotations,” a demonstrative gesture or 
term that began as “look at that” that eventually became a “look out for that!” to prevent 
error or suggest action (“Language” 423-424).  Such a positive term is more than mere 
description, possessing the extra dimension of an implied negative without the full force 
of explicit command.  To highlight the idea that humans distinctly created the negative 
compared with non-linguistic animals, a negative characterization does not reside within 
the essence of an object or thing so much as how one expects it to be used or to act.  
Burke notes that “[I]f you are expecting something to be damp and it is found to be dry, 
then its dryness is expressible not just as dryness, but as the negation of your expectation” 
(“Language” 420).  The condition of the object remains the same regardless of whether it 
is touched, but our impression and perception changes from “I expect it to be wet” to “it 
is actually dry.”  The negative is primarily a linguistic phenomenon but may also be 
extended to nonverbal understanding, as Murray explains (38-39): 
 
Perhaps human beings, then, are primordially invented by the negativizing gaze of 
the Other. Perhaps the human being's initial separation from the Other plays a 
constitutive role in its coming into being. The existential assertion that "I am" 
would seem to be impossible without the simultaneous recognition that "I am not 
you" as manifested by the ontological negation/separation of self and Other. 
 
This argument would supplant Burke’s own origins of the negative and instead conclude 
that human identity and recognition of distinct selves from the other derives from a 
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nonverbal understanding that an “I” is not equal to a “you.”  Even without the key terms 
to entitle a situation or confer status and context, our eyes routinely reveal that many 
things are not as we expect and demonstrate that the logical process of using the negative 
need not be confined solely to words. 
When humans use language, any positive or negative term must thematically 
imply its opposite.  Drawing on material from mythological traditions, Burke explains 
that a “tale of conflict between order and disorder, chaos and cosmos” will offer up both 
terms to the audience regardless of whichever is being discussed at a given moment 
(“Language” 386).  The terms need not have a direct linguistic connection (such as we 
see with order and disorder), but their meanings will automatically imply presence and 
understanding of an opposing term.  For language-users, this division of meaning is a 
necessary part of entitling the natural world and making sense of one object from another 
(Borrowman and Kmetz 279). 
Insofar as terms imply one another, thematic opposition will continue indefinitely 
until their meanings change.  Rival terms assume almost a personified purpose to do 
battle against each other, striving to vanquish an opponent so that one term becomes 
dominant in situated context. Returning to Burke’s earlier example (“Language” 387-
389), 
 
[O]nce you have translated the logical principle of antithesis into terms of 
narrative combat, by the same token you have set the conditions for a purposive 
development.  Thus, for instance, the principle of disorder can be pictured as 
aiming to win over the principle of order, and vice versa, so that the purely 
directionless way in which polar terms imply each other can be replaced by 
schemes intensely teleological… 
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This pair suggests that a term such as order, especially once put into a narrative context, 
may assume temporary dominance which is recognized by the audience in a given 
situation.  However, its opposite is never completely vanquished or removed, as the term 
disorder does not disappear from an audience’s vocabulary or cease to be uttered ever 
again.  Once the linguistic or narrative context switches to something more hospitable, 
disorder and its associated meanings may appear in full force to resume control and 
become the dominant term in the previous or a new situation.  The dominance of a term is 
always contingent upon the audience, hence the potential existence of opposites is always 
present and terms will inevitably, constantly point back to each other. 
The tension between opposites must move beyond semantic territory for terms to 
have a profound effect on an audience and assume a dominant role.  Burke describes the 
characteristics and conflicts between competing principles, which he names the “Positive 
Favored Principle” and its rival, the “Unfavored Principle.”  A “principle, to be 
narratively ‘perfect,’ must be a person” (“Language” 403).23  Perfection as an ultimate or 
complete terministic form is an application of language that all words strive for, 
especially considering that humans are often concerned with pursuing matters to their 
final or most advanced form (“Language” 440).  Once a principle takes personified form, 
it becomes associated with a series of characteristics that must adhere to its favored or 
unfavored status.  Commenting on the Unfavored Principle, for example, Burke 
                                                 
23
 Hawhee (2006) uses the expression “somatic notion of identification,” which skillfully describes the 
perfect embodiment of the negative and how it can be slain or terministically overthrown in physical form 
(341). 
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concludes that its “ambition [should be] for total tyranny, absolute misrule” (“Language” 
403).  To take one more example, heaven and hell are the perfect embodiments of “thou 
shalt’s” and “thou shalt not’s,” because they provide a vivid picture of the ultimate 
destinations for who has acted appropriately and otherwise (“Language” 474).  
Regardless of their existence in a metaphysical sense, their linguistic presence is enough 
to imply the opposing term and take the concept of punishment and reward to their final, 
most complete forms. 
 The implications for the negating force between opposing terms effect not only 
linguistic persuasion, but reveal an essential part of the human experience.  Burke argues 
that without the ability to refuse, to choose to say no to an action, that humans cannot 
experience freedom.  This pertains to ethics because there can be no moral character 
without the choice to act and be this way; ethical conduct by definition cannot occur 
through compulsion or external force if the individual is unwilling to make it so.  This 
ability to assess a situation’s moral imperative via entitlement signals the possibility of a 
“higher, moral realm” that “is available only to” humans,” which corresponds to Burke’s 
concept of human action rather than motion (“Language” 439).  Moreover, the decision 
to act morally is balanced by the inevitable consequences of choosing immorality, or 
embracing the power of the negative to act contrary to an existing order.  Perfection is an 
ideal but ultimately impossible state for humans, therefore they will rebel against custom 
and choose the less ethical path from time to time.  Burke has anticipated these “conflicts 
of drama,” because it is through a second choice to return to the moral state that allows an 
individual or culture to feel guilt, sacrifice the self or a proxy to assuage negative feelings 
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for betraying their ethical system, and redeem themselves despite prior immoral actions 
(Appel 383). 
 The hortatory negative provides an explanation for how opposing terms can 
shape human ethics, but Burke also contends that ethical arguments are structured and 
formed effectively for audiences with antithesis (“Language” 19).  The pairing of 
opposites is a common feature of language and dramatic presentation because it offers 
clarity for difficult topics.  Fahnestock explains that the clarifying power of antithesis 
often results from its structure, which emphasizes “repetition that leads to the 
construction of parallel or even identical phrases: ‘If it does not rain, I will go; but if it 
does rain, I will not go’” (49).  Moreover, antithesis allows an audience to see relevant 
differences between competing claims and to make a choice about their validities, 
especially if the contrasts are set up on “a uniform background” or “placed side by side” 
(Fahnstock 50).  This notion of choice arranged strategically for audiences is important to 
Burke because it is one of the signature characteristics of human experience and morality.   
Burke says in The Rhetoric of Religion that “Action involves character, which involves 
choice; and the form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction between Yes and 
No (between thou shalt and thou shalt not).  Though the concept of sheer ‘motion’ is 
non-ethical, ‘action’ implies the ethical (the human personality)” (41).  When pressed to 
choose an action, one cannot escape that such a choice always implies the rejection of 
one idea and acceptance of another, both of which are called to mind as the issue is 
decided.  Positive and negative are viewed as counterparts that are equally capable of 
happening, and which have ethical implications that stretch beyond their first occurrence.  
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Burke refers to this as “a kind of ‘terministic compulsion’ to carry out the implications of 
one’s terminology” (“Language”19).  When the audience sees antithetical figures 
interacting in a debate, they are invited to reflect on the actions of these characters and 
determine what kind of persons they would be in Athenian society.  The audience must 
evaluate the personality, or perhaps personality type, they see onstage and determine if 
the corresponding actions regarding public speech are moral enough to promote city-
wide. 
 Antithesis presents two additional advantages besides the clear set of contrasts 
it can create for audiences.  First, the implied opposites that always exist between terms 
can be so apparent or already known to the audience that they are able to conjure or 
anticipate the unspoken concept, fleshing out the antithetical argument even if it is 
entirely ignored by a speaker.  “So strong, in fact, are the implications that can come 
from recognized pairs of opposed terms and from familiarity with the figure, that it is 
possible to use what could be only half an antithesis and still secure the effect of the 
whole” (Fahnestock 59).  Second, it is also rhetorically useful because once the form is 
recognized as an advantageous structure, antithesis can be used to frame entire narratives 
or arguments. Aristophanes’ plays are built almost exclusively around this structure, as a 
concept is introduced in brief to the audience, given concrete form often via debate and 
verbal combat, and ultimately shaped into “a new form that defines it ethically in the 
comic world” (Major “Court” 87).  To use Fahnestock’s terminology, this transformation 
can only occur when positioned against a suitable contrast, where the characteristics or 
behaviors for opposing figures stand at the end of a “measurable” scale such as hot/cold 
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or wet/dry, or contradiction, where the figures are so diametrically different that they are 
incomparable, exclusive opposites such as “‘rational/irrational,’ ‘known/unknown,’ ‘I did 
see it’/’I did not see it’” (48).  Aristophanes consistently creates an antagonist that works 
to undermine, debate, or overwhelm the protagonist because of their competing interests, 
values, or backgrounds. 
 Burke’s antithesis does not have to cover only topics that have polarized 
opposites, although these are frequently the examples he cites.  The major criterion for 
establishing the opposites in an antithetical pair is the question of choice, not mere 
existence.  He explains that there is no corresponding opposite to a table because we have 
no concepts of “counter-table, anti-table, non-table, or un-table,” therefore table would 
not exist antithetically (“Language” 11).  Other theorists have arrived at similar 
conclusions because objects in and of themselves do not project an opposing counter-
object or concept unless humans have provided the perspective and relevant language to 
illustrate this adversarial relationship.  “’Objects will therefore appear as opposites only 
in so far as some sensational factor is involved, i.e. in so far as adjectival elements, 
admitting of quantification or dichotomy, enter into their descriptions or definitions’” 
(Fahnestock 73).  So-called God-Devil terms are often found rhetorically paired against 
each other because they offer a choice to pursue a particular path and disavow the tenets 
of the competing idea once humans have established the antithetical concepts or 
practices.  This reflects the “intrinsically hortatory” function of language, which acts as 
“a medium by which men can obtain the cooperation of one another” (“Language” 20). 
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 Terms do not have to be diametrically opposed to each other to act 
antithetically, as Fahnestock’s contraries demonstrate.  However, Burke chooses a 
different point of emphasis to this issue, referring to responses that create antitheses 
through negative motivation.  The emergence or origin of world religions may arise in 
this way (“Language” 12):  
 
 Negative motivation of this sort is attested by such steps as the formation of 
Christianity in opposition to paganism, the formation of Protestant offshoots in 
opposition to Catholicism, and the current reinvigoration of churchgoing, if not 
exactly of religion, in opposition to communism.  So goes the dialectic! 
 
The key component in these examples is motivation not to act or be in a certain way, 
reaffirming Burke’s idea that language routinely guides human behavior and social 
identity through negative, admonitory images.  Antithetical language does more than 
provide clarity to issues, it should provide a sense of what one ought to do and what to 
avoid.  Although it may originate both internally or against other people, it creates 
prohibitions against a selected concept, activity, or person.  “The negative begins not as a 
resource of definition or information, but as a command, as ‘Don’t” (Burke 10). 
 The origins and properties of the linguistic negative and its rhetorical form in 
antithesis explain how rhetors can connect with audiences and establish ethical arguments 
through a process Burke calls identification.  A rhetor’s message is not created solely 
through individual consciousness because persuasion always occurs in a cultural setting.  
Convincing rhetoric allows a speaker to situate him or herself within the existing order of 
a culture and identify with the prevailing beliefs and values of the audience, creating a 
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sense of overlap between their visions of the world (Murray 32).  This common 
understanding and perception leads Burke to believe “that order is exploited rhetorically” 
so that an audience can be influenced to accept or modify their ethical choices (Wolin 
215).  In the context of a comedic scapegoat, rhetor and audience become united through 
the “the vilification of one who acts…beyond the bounds of acceptable expectation, 
beyond what is viewed as the consensus of the constituents for whom they stand” 
(Borrowman and Kmetz 278).  The materials for identification can be borrowed from 
sources internal or external to a culture, drawing upon experience, belief, value, or any 
kind of cognition that allows for consubstantial overlap.24  The defining characteristic of 
this process is that “There must be identification among the members of the out group, 
the members of that group within the social order, and the social order with the members” 
(Carlson 319). 
 The end point for identification is when an audience turns away from the 
scapegoat or target and focuses inward to examine their own behaviors and choices.  
Receivers of a rhetorical act will become “observers of themselves, while acting” and 
engage not in “passiveness, but maximum consciousness” (Betts Van Dyk 37).  A rhetor 
presents a situation, the ethical motives for which must be interpreted not through 
unchanging or rote principles but more of a nuanced understanding of context.  The 
presence of the negative provides an implicit or explicit counterpoint to the actions being 
criticized or advocated, allowing the audience to view and consider the different moral 
choices available.  If the rhetor has successfully identified him or herself with the 
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 Oravec (1989) explains that identification has another dimension, in that it can also be the process by 
which something comes to be identified and known for a community.  See also Hawhee (2006) for 
discussion of identification as “postural and somatic as it is social and psychological” (342).   
   65 
 
interests and values of the audience, they are encouraged to look past the decisions 
represented narratively so that there is more of an internal assessment if they encounter a 
similar situation.  This is the point where ethical conflict and resolution may arise, 
because the audience must choose whether they will support or reject the situational 
characterizations, whether they will act (and correspondingly be) similarly to the 
narrative, or follow an entirely different moral path. 
 The decision to act morally towards the interests of the polis is where one may 
apply Burke’s theories to the plays of Aristophanes.  Through the use of a scapegoat who 
represents certain members of Athenian society, Aristophanes argues that certain 
behaviors and values are damaging and dangerous to the citizenry.25  The caricatures on 
display highlight the worst excesses of these people, as perceived by at least some of the 
audience in attendance, so that the poet can establish a common identity with his 
spectators.  The presence of the agōn is noteworthy in this respect, because the plays 
often highlight a key debate which brings together some of the core issues put forward 
for audience consideration, the results of which often play a key role in the outcome of 
the plot.  Burke would argue this is one of the ways his principles of negation can be 
narratively perfect, because “The two principles must come to terms — and the most 
fitting way to do so narratively is in terms of a contest” (403). 
                                                 
25
 The relationship between antithesis and scapegoating is well established in Burkean theory: “As 
Aristotle observes in his Rhetoric, antithesis is an exceptionally effective rhetorical device.  There is its 
sheerly formal lure, in giving dramatic saliency and at least apparently clarity to any issue.  One may find 
himself hard put to define a policy purely in its own terms, but one can advocate it persuasively by an 
urgent assurance that it is decidedly against such and-such other policy with which people may be 
disgruntled” ( “Language” 19).  Going further, he concludes that “And in this way, of course antithesis 
helps reinforce unification by scapegoat.” 
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Aristophanes often presents Burke’s exploit of order and disorder in the plays.  
Flaws built into the common social order begin to upend the lives of one or more citizens, 
so that they are no longer able to live comfortably or in peace.  The citizens in question 
are usually dealing with a measure of unpredictability and disorder, because the polis has 
lost the stability of prior values and political continuity with the advent of demagogues 
and personal opportunism.  Aristophanes works with themes and narrative devices likely 
to resonate with the audience, their beliefs about the state of the polis, and the experience 
of being a (mostly) poor Athenian citizen so that he can rhetorically identify with them.  
Once the particulars of the situation have been established for the audience, the only 
remaining course of action is for the comic hero(ine) to effect a change, correcting the 
social and political ills so that the city may return to an ideal state of prosperity and 
freedom. 
The plays present the contrasting views and models for action based on the 
dramatic conflict between protagonist and antagonist, comic hero and villain.  
Antagonists are routinely portrayed in a disproportionately unkind manner so that their 
worst attributes and motives are amplified to an absurd extreme, but even the heroes 
show a remarkable degree of selfish interest and often work only towards their own 
satisfaction rather than for their peers.  The audience is not encouraged to identify with 
the protagonists completely, because their flaws render them an imperfect and unsuitable 
model for actual behavior outside the festival setting.26  Instead, the force of the linguistic 
                                                 
26
 Silk (2000) comes to a similar conclusion: “Diverse and endlessly impressive as carriers of humour 
though they are, Aristophanes’ recreative characters have little in the way of personality, relationships, or 
psychological life.  If we need fictional characters to identify with and grow with, we should look else” 
(413).   
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negative allows them to consider an alternative to the actions presented onstage, which 
works to solve Athens’ problems in a more beneficial and ethical way rather than through 
the vehicle of impractical, comic fantasy.  Each individual spectator is invited to embrace 
and enact this implied ideal of citizenship as both potential persuasive speaker and 
audience member, which is arrived at by rejecting the characterizations for ethical 
motives depicted in the plays and looking for something less extreme, less absurd, and 
within their ability to accomplish.27  As Biesecker explains, Aristophanes presents “a call 
to realize the ‘possibility for a future that is not simply a future-present, but a radically 
other future whose conditions of realization are given over to us as a promise but whose 
actualization rests solely upon us’” (Crable 120). 
 Even if one accepts the argument that Old Comedy is mere (or mainly) 
entertainment that concerns political topics, the genre has the ability to treat matters of 
public import with a flexibility unavailable to other forms of speaking in 5th c. Athens.  
Aristophanes represents the kind of freedom being advocated through his plays; audience 
expectation is an obstacle that must be accounted for, but the narrative depiction of 
competing principles allows him to identify with the audience, argue for the ethical 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27
 Referring to CloudCuckooland in Birds, Henderson (1997) also argues that Aristophanes uses a logic of 
implied contrast to make the case for ethical citizenship: “In the most fundamental ways, Nephelokokkugia 
is a utopia defined by its lack of what Athenians found annoying and its possession of what Athenians 
desired” (“Mass” 136).  Moreover, Silk (2000) believes that comparison is one of the cornerstones of 
dramatic logic, because comedy and tragedy are both understood and interpreted by contrasting the events 
onstage with one’s own experience (83-84).  He explains further that “Comparison (it follows) must 
underlie grief as much as it underlies amusement, and so too it must also underlie most feelings that are 
likely to generate art, or be generated by art, from perplexity to indignation, from curiosity to fear, from 
achievement to loss, from tolerance to intolerance” (84).  It is worth adding that comedy provides a fairly 
stark contrast because the form invites the perception of the audience as superior to those mocked or 
lambasted on stage. 
 
   68 
 
speaking values he considers worthy of discussion, and attempt to influence the audience 
to adopt his position and enact them outside the festival.28  This action empowers them to 
look beyond the confines of the status quo and to envision Athens free from the 
constraints of demagogues and political opportunists.  The audience is encouraged to act 
and become more ethical by retaking political power and channeling it in ways more 
productive and beneficial to the entire polis.  If more citizens act in this manner, 
Aristophanes’ plays argue that the competing and corrupt influences in Athens can be 
marginalized and political stability can be restored.   
In the following chapters, I examine Aristophanes’ descriptions of oratory and 
oratorical performance as characterizations of ethical citizenship in 5th c. Athenian 
politics.  I intend to focus on the language he uses to describe characters, their attitudes, 
and behaviors regarding oratory in three main contexts: sophistry, the law courts, and the 
legislative assembly.  Using Burke’s theories of the negative and the implied opposites of 
polarized terms via antithesis, I will argue that Aristophanes presents examples of poor 
ethical conduct to highlight the flaws surrounding oratory in 5th c. Athenian society.  He 
does not show the best qualities of ethical orators in his plays, but these actions and 
motives are implied as the opposite of the comic exaggerations embodied in his 
characters.  I argue that the audience is invited to see and evaluate certain characters as 
representations of poor ethical conduct and to envision how they may prove themselves 
                                                 
28
 Rueckert (1989) provides context for the freedom of art enjoyed by Aristophanes compared with other 
rhetorical forms: “Using Burke’s terms, we can speak of literary forms — that is, completed symbolic acts 
— as the perfection of the ontological motive intrinsic to language and symbolic acts.  Just as pure 
persuasion is persuasion undertaken for its own sake, to persuade itself, as it were, so literary work would 
represent pure verbal being, or verbal being interested only in being itself.  As Burke has argued most 
eloquently, poetry is the realm in which we can be most completely free” (“Rereading” 252). 
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superior as citizens working together in the polis.  Moreover, my analysis does not refer 
to later rhetorical developments (such as those of the 4th c.) so that we may more 
carefully discern attitudes about oratory and sophistry from a strictly 5th c. perspective.  
Although it is tempting to view Aristophanes as either a literary author or intellectual 
with philosophical pretensions, I believe it is important to regard his works as the ancient 
Greeks might have---as an author that possessed the ability to provide a dramatic 
performance combining the emotional expressions of poetry along with serious 
consideration of public affairs.  With this in mind, it is necessary to evaluate his 
characters within both a narrative and argumentative context to flesh out how vividly he 
portrays ethical speaking behavior before his audience.   
In chapter 2, I examine language about oratory and sophistry in Clouds, one of 
Aristophanes most notorious plays.  Clouds is often the focus of research because it has 
one of the earliest surviving characterizations of Socrates, and the agōn between Htton 
Logos and Kreitton Logos is one of the most explicit debates about sophistic education.  I 
examine how Aristophanes presents Socrates, Pheidippides, and Hetton Logos as 
examples of sophistic education run amok; although the audience does not see a clearly 
positive counterpart to their sophistic excesses (as Kreitton Logos is also a flawed 
character), the audience is invited to picture a citizen with oratorical training that does not 
serve only his own interests and might provide meaningful support for the polis.   
In chapter 3, I describe many references to judicial oratory and its effect on the 
Athenian populace found in Wasps.  This play critiques the Athenian judicial system and 
its susceptibility to corruption through abusive demagogues and irresponsible jurors; I 
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argue that Philocleon is a representative of the flaws in the jury system because he 
emphasizes the entertainment value of the lawcourts and the sense of personal authority it 
provides at the expensive of any lingering sense of justice or the betterment of the 
community.  Moreover, Aristophanes also characterizes politicians such as Cleon as 
deliberate manipulators of the audience to preserve their own influence over the polis 
without regard for the welfare of their supporters such as Philocleon.  The audience is 
invited to see how both participants in the legal process are attempting to game the 
system, and through their negative characterization to see the image of a citizen who uses 
the jury system to help the community run in a more egalitarian and just manner.   
In chapter 4, I outline characterizations of persuasion in the legislative assembly 
in Knights.  This plays features two characters, the Sausage-seller and Paphlagonian, who 
act as demagogues dueling for the privilege of serving the old man Demos, a clear proxy 
for the Athenian citizenry.   Each orator almost effortlessly influences decisions in the 
assembly through a number of contrived techniques.  I argue that Aristophanes portrays 
the audience as overly susceptible for these techniques and that a different class of 
speaker would persuade through a more ‘honest’ or direct manner of speech to guide the 
citizenry without resorting to threats, bullying, or sensational delivery.   
In chapter 5, I offer up conclusions from the earlier chapters and demonstrate how 
they contribute to existing work on Aristophanes.  I argue that Aristophanes should be 
considered as a serious author presenting questions of public ethics despite that his 
medium of choice is not the same as more those more traditionally considered 
philosophical.  Moreover, I will explain that the rhetorical medium of comedy should 
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receive more scholarly attention because its form may be more commonly experienced 
than major public address, it affects huge swathes of the population across the globe 
regardless of culture, and uses one of the most basic human experiences to shape values 
and behavior. 
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 Chapter 2 
 
Ethical Considerations of Sophistry in Clouds 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Not unlike the Gorgias or Phaedrus, Aristophanes’ Clouds presents competing ideas of 
communication and education within the context of 5th c. BCE Athenian life, constantly 
interweaving elements of oratory and public performance, ethics, and citizenship.  In a 
scathing caricature, Clouds highlights the excesses and abuses of sophistical training in 
an attempt to show the dangers inherent in this new model of education.  Although the 
majority of the play is devoted to mocking the group generally understood as sophists, 
Aristophanes also describes and criticizes an older, more traditional form of education in 
Athens.  The contrast between old and new, traditional and sophistic education, 
demonstrates that each system is fundamentally flawed and presents obstacles to an 
ethically-governed polis.  However, sophistry is the bigger villain in Clouds because it 
trains students to have no regard for the polis and one’s fellow citizens, creating the belief 
that each person is accountable only to the pursuit of one’s desires, not necessarily for the 
well-being of the community at large.  The traditional education emphasizes the 
importance of family and community, but at the expense of the self.  This instruction 
manifests through rigorous physical training and strict obedience to the elders of the 
community, foregoing the possibility of intellectual or linguistic development.  This too 
is dangerous because it has the potential for abuse via dishonest leaders and an improper 
concentration of power, but retains some benefit because it has the weight of tradition 
and some measure of accountability to the community.  Using Kenneth Burke’s theories 
of the negative, I explore how Clouds invites the audience to see balance between these 
competing perspectives, that education will perhaps be most beneficial if it promotes 
intellectual development and the sense that a student is one member of a larger 
community.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Although rhetoric scholars regularly read Plato, Aristotle, and other theorists from 
the classical period, the works of the comic playwright Aristophanes are less frequently 
circulated.    The most notable exception is his play Clouds because it lampoons Socrates 
and the role of sophistry in Athenian education.  Not unlike the Gorgias or Phaedrus, 
Clouds presents competing ideas of communication and education within the context of 
Athenian life, constantly interweaving elements of rhetoric, ethics, and citizenship.  
However, Aristophanes never presents a cogent or practical answer to the problems he 
poses or even a specific direction to pursue (such as dialectic in the Phaedrus).  As 
Gomme describes,“All drama represents a conflict of some kind; but there will be little 
success for the writer who can only take one side” (102).  Instead, Aristophanes forces 
the audience to contemplate and devise their own solutions.  After exploring some 
competing forms of education, the play invites the audience to consider the best kind of 
education for the city based on the ethical character of the young men it produces. 
The plays from Aristophanes’ earlier period show a heightened sensitivity to 
political and social matters.  They were especially devoted to anti-war themes and 
merciless mockery of public officials, as well as to crude jokes unrelated to such 
concerns; plays such as Acharnians, Knights, Clouds, Wasps, and Lysistrata typify this 
period.  One may argue that these plays used topics the common Athenians were 
discussing amongst themselves as subjects for conversation (Murphy “Aristophanes and 
the Art of Rhetoric” 113).  The debate between the Greater and Lesser Discourse, as well 
as other scenes in Clouds, therefore likely reflected ethical concerns about public 
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speaking norms that were relevant to the Athenian citizens.29  It is unlikely that the 
version of the play that has survived is the same one performed before an Athenian 
audience.30  Based on textual clues in the parabasis, our version of Clouds shows that the 
poet was displeased the play finished last in an earlier appearance.  However, because my 
purpose here is to discuss the ethical considerations raised in the play, we may privilege 
the idea that Aristophanes was interested in influencing an audience, even if the play 
itself never saw a second production.  I will explore the value this play may offer a 
modern audience by considering how Aristophanes portrays the adversarial and 
antithetical relationships between loyalty to the state vs. selfish desires and inability to 
speak in public vs. speaking well. 
Although much of the play follows a sophistic Socrates instructing his students, 
the agôn (889-1110) more explicitly examines key differences between Socratic sophistry 
and a more traditional education through the exchange of the Greater Discourse (Kreittôn 
Logos) and Lesser Discourse (Hettôn Logos).”31  This combative argument epitomizes 
                                                 
29
 Major (2013) points out that “Clouds is the earliest extant example of the perspective that the Sophists 
engaged in morally destructive projects” (84). 
30
 Hypothesis IV (or I as printed in Dover’s edition) indicates that some revisions differentiate the present 
text of Clouds from an earlier one, including the section concerning the two Logoi (Dover 1).  Dover 
presents a detailed account of the evidence for two versions for the play (lxxx-xcviii).  Hubbard (1986) 
examines clues in the parabaseis of Clouds to determine how much is new and to whom the new material 
is directed.  Sidwell (2009) argues that the revision was intended to attack more political targets than the 
previous version.  Rosen (1997) discusses the possibility that the revised version was intended only for 
literary use. 
31
 The Logoi are often translated as “Right and Wrong” (Dover 1968, Kleve 1983, Platter 2007) , “Just and 
Unjust” (Strauss 1966, Coulon and Van Daele 2009), “Better and Worse” (Revermann 2006),“Right and 
Anti-Right” (Nussbaum 1980), or “Stronger and Weaker” (Schiappa 2003)  to refer to the different moral 
values attached to the adjectives “Kreittôn” and “Hettôn.”  The Hypothesis before the text of the play also 
refers to them as o dikaios logos and o adikos logos, reflecting that the contrast of just and unjust was also 
one of the ways early scholiasts understood the Logoi.  They are also referred to as “Arguments” 
(MacDowell 1995, Bowie 1993) to capture the antagonistic nature of the term “Logoi.”  Euben also 
interprets them metaphorically, as “Old and New Education (1996). 
I have chosen to follow Hubbard (2007) in translating the Logoi as “Greater and Lesser Discourse” to 
highlight their opposition as embodiments of speech styles without over-emphasizing their argumentative 
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the ethical associations with the old and new forms of education and acts as the critical 
scene for establishing which type of education should be preferred, providing 
Pheidippides a direct choice over the manner and content of his instruction.  The contrast 
will prove anticlimactic in its own way because Clouds presents an condemnatory picture 
of both the Greater and Lesser Discourse, paving the way for its audience to conceive of 
an alternative style of speaking favored by a more ethically minded orator, who resists 
the flaws of the logoi and embodies the virtues they lack. 
 This ideal ethical citizen, acting as a contrasting figure to the flaws of both 
logoi, would undergo enough training to think critically on difficult legislative or policy 
questions and to see the importance of public engagement as a way of maintaining social 
stability.  The Greater Discourse’s greatest deficiency is that his students would be loyal 
to the state, but not necessarily able to comment meaningfully on how to run it.  The 
Lesser Discourse excels in this area because he and his pupils can think on both sides of a 
topic and use more than one style of reasoning, therefore they have the potential to cut 
through poor argumentation when the Assembly considers important matters.  
Considering how effortlessly they eviscerate the claims of their opponents, it would be 
impressive to see the marshaling of their oratorical powers on behalf of all the citizens 
rather than only themselves.  The ideal citizen would not only have such training but be 
                                                                                                                                                 
or moral characters. Moreover, I believe Aristophanes criticizes both characters and is not necessarily 
privileging one over the other.  “Discourse” allows us to consider the characters as more than their 
persuasive techniques, as the play is concerned not only with oratorical training but the caliber of citizens 
produced and their corresponding political influences toward the city.  As I argue in the concluding remarks 
of this chapter, the greatest danger presented by the Logoi is not a specific policy or agenda so much as 
their ability to alter the overall culture and caliber of discourse in the polis. 
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encouraged to use it in service of the state, which is one of the more cherished and 
important ethical norms in late 5th c. Athens.  As Ober explains (“Debate” 191), 
 
The Athenians expected that citizens would be educated, not just by the spirit or 
the wording of the law, but by engaging in (and observing others engaging in) 
political and legal processes: by serving as jurors, magistrates, Assemblymen and 
so on.  The Athenians assumed, I believe rightly, that a clear code of ethics arose 
not only from a public discourse centered on freedom, equality, and security, but 
also from the logic inherent fair and consistent public practices.  And they 
supposed that “practices in use” could be effective educators. 
 
  
The citizen whom the audience is invited to conjure does not represent the unfortunate, 
binary dilemma of choosing either the Greater or Lesser Discourse because either option 
is still inherently flawed and will not live up to the social and political norms identified 
by Ober.  Instead, this ideal person skilled in speech will be negatively motivated to 
avoid their flaws and embrace the characteristics and skills that make them poor models 
of ethical speaking skill and civic participation.  Burke might even say that the 
presentation of flaws implies a corresponding set of virtues even if they are not discussed 
or displayed for Clouds’ audience.  As the two Logoi demonstrate, it is not enough to 
have either a loyal appreciation for the values of the community or developed intellectual 
abilities and skill in argument.  The ideal ethical citizen will possess both characteristics 
and attempt to become something more than his opposites.  It is worth noting that Clouds 
does not give the impression that any citizen could become this idealized figure because 
the play presents contrasting dangers originating from both the accomplished orator and 
the audience seduced by his words.  Not every citizen would have the natural intellect to 
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undergo the training and develop the sophisticated techniques necessary to steer the 
Assembly, nor would everyone have sufficient attachments in the community to use these 
abilities responsibly (Nussbaum “Aristophanes” 79).  It would be insulting to suggest 
such an idea openly in the play and against the interests of a playwright trying to win the 
crowd’s favor, which is perhaps why the characters approach the question of ethical 
citizenship from a more understated and comical position.  Even if the audience members 
do not consider themselves as likely candidates to become the ideal citizen and orator, 
Clouds gives them the opportunity to contemplate the identity and moral character of this 
kind of person and to infer the actions and choices this person would make in public.  
They are invited to explore an antithesis to the portrayals onstage and to hope that an 
alternative figure may exist or come into existence that will steer Athens out of its present 
troubles and towards a more positive future. 
 In this chapter, I examine the values privileged by the Greater and Lesser 
Discourse and determine whose values are best served by their brands of education.  
Although Aristophanes presents a more critical view of sophistry compared to the more 
established education in Athens, I argue that he highlights the flaws of both educational 
systems and invites the audience to consider a more balanced, reciprocal relationship 
between attachments to the state and argumentative skills to promote ideas of good 
citizenship in the city.  This ideal citizen is implied by the deficiencies of his counterparts 
in the play and must be constructed by the audience as a viable alternative to the 
prevailing educational systems in the city.  
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II. Old vs. New Education 
 When we arrive at the agôn between the Greater and Lesser Discourse, 
Aristophanes has already established a new, sophistic form of education as a focus of the 
play.  Clouds has not, however, adequately addressed the relevance or superiority of the 
new education compared with the old, which has remained noticeably absent so far in the 
play.  Thus, lines 889-1110 advance the concepts already introduced by Strepsiades and 
Socrates but pit them against a suitable comparison to elaborate the qualities of the new 
education; this “pairing of opposites” is essential to making the argument that both Logoi 
represent absurd and illogical positions for Athenian education (Fisher 24).  This scene 
allows the audience to see the ethical implications behind each system through narrative 
and argumentative confrontation.   
 One may divide this agôn into two sections.  The first describes the posturing and 
initial set of insults hurled by the Greater and Lesser Discourse against each other, but 
before the debate proper begins. “That the two [Logoi] should be personified and brought 
before us as speaking characters is fully in accord with traditional Greek categories of 
thought and with the techniques of comedy” (Dover “Clouds” lviii).  This introductory 
language allows the audience to quickly learn who these characters are and what they 
represent, because their strange appearances as rooster/human hybrids will not have been 
readily recognizable without some kind of verbal explanation.32  Dover tells us the 
                                                 
32Major (2006) argues the Logoi are constructed to let the audience know immediately who they represent 
and that they are an excessive departure from actual citizens (135).  Papageorgiou (2004) explains that the 
appearance of virtue and vice in Prodicus’ parable of Herakles also provides clues to their identity, value 
systems, and lifestyles similarly to the two Logoi:  “However, both Vice and Hetton logos are eager and 
self-confident, while Virtue and Kreitton logos express a measured willingness” (“Prodicus” 65). 
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contest is a well-known case of old vs. new, “in which the older generation represents 
itself as tough, upright, and virtuous and represents the younger generation as soft, 
dishonest, and dissolute” (lxii).33  The chorus, who initiates the rules of the debate, also 
describes them as fitting the old. vs. new stereotype (934-938).  As this prologue reveals, 
the Greater Discourse will be mocked for being simple-minded, physically aggressive, 
and overly concerned with morality (especially sexual mores).  The Lesser Discourse will 
be mocked for being overly clever and subversive, effeminate and weak.  Quoting 
Aristotle’s Poetics (ch. 2), Van Hook reveals that “Comedy tends to make its personages 
worse than the man of the present day,” therefore the audience would recognize these 
characters as caricatures not directly relevant to their own experiences (284). 
The presentation of the logoi as buffoonish characters with clear moral leanings 
stands at odds with what was likely the more common and neutral understanding of the 
Protagorean expression for speech positions in a debate, “ton hēttō de logon kreittō 
poiein.”  Based on Protagoras’ reputation around Greece, it is unlikely Aristophanes 
arrived at the names for his logoi independently and without considering any possible 
familiarity or connotative associations in his audience.  As Schiappa notes, “Of the two 
logoi in opposition concerning any given experience, one is – at any given time – 
dominant or stronger, while the other is submissive or weaker” (107).  Aristophanes has 
cleverly distorted the speaking positions so that he can add a more pronounced moral 
dimension, which allows him to demonize the sophists and use them as comic 
scapegoats.  Major concurs with Schiappa, arguing that Aristophanes creates the 
                                                 
33
 Schiappa also discusses this point (1999): “With hindsight we can interpret specific portions of Clouds as 
an attack on Rhetoric, but a more historical reading suggests that the play was an attack on the newfangled 
‘higher education’ in general” (72). 
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appearance that “he is straightforwardly dramatizing or reflecting established usage, 
when in fact he is reconstituting terminology (italics mine) and reevaluating people 
involved in the exploration of, and training in, language use” (83-84). 
Greater Discourse is obsessed with morality, linking his program to sôphrosunê, 
justice, and divinity.  He claims to speak just things (900, ta dikaia legôn).  When 
confronted by the Lesser Discourse, who denies that any justice can be found and 
subsequently asks where it is, Greater naturally turns to what should be the trump card in 
his ideology: that justice resides with the gods (903, para toisi theois).  This should be an 
unimpeachable argument because few at this time would openly question the authority or 
power of the gods, especially as they pertain to matters of justice.  The Athenians gave 
added credibility to their own pledges and promises; thus when Greater Discourse 
invokes the gods, he links himself to their authority in an attempt to make his own 
argument appear stronger (Dillon 135).  By equating his own words (dikaia) with the 
ethical identity of the gods, Greater Discourse attempts to establish himself as a more 
trustworthy source than his opponent.  One may contrast the characterization of his own 
words to Lesser Discourse’s, which he considers “empty talk” or “bullshit” (931, lalian 
monon askêsai).  It is not only important to him that his words prevail over those of 
Lesser Discourse and prove more persuasive, but that they do so because they are “right” 
and his opponent’s are inherently meaningless, empty, and morally wrong.  This 
unshakable belief in the authority of the gods then comes under fire when Lesser 
Discourse asks why Zeus was not punished or killed for binding his father, an act that 
would have been considered morally outrageous by the Athenians of the 5th c. (904-906).  
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Lesser Discourse mocks Greater because the moral exemplar in question shows a 
profound disobedience to existing authority, which Greater Discourse holds in high 
regard.  The criticism the play directs towards Greater Discourse is not necessarily for the 
substance of his faith, but that his inability to defend it leaves him vulnerable to 
manipulation and abuse.  He never anticipates that his beliefs will be the source of his 
opponent’s criticisms and has no persuasive response when the logical inconsistencies of 
his position are revealed.  Even before the formal debate, the blind belief in the moral 
superiority of the gods has been made problematic and difficult to defend when put to the 
question, thus the audience may begin to ask what this moral belief is really worth. 
Greater Discourse is also concerned with sexual conduct.  He is regularly 
characterized as an aggressive, brawny creature who is not stupid exactly, but certainly 
less clever than his counterpart.  He makes a point to accuse Lesser Discourse of being a 
passive homosexual and debauch (909, katapugôn ei kanaischuntos).  At this point in the 
play, Greater does not discuss his own sexuality, but his charge is telling because it 
attacks an act considered objectionable in Athenian society.  There is some dispute about 
the degree of acceptance for homosexuality in 5th c. Athens, but it is clear that it was 
predominantly an elite, aristocratic activity and not commonly practiced in the lower 
classes.34  Although these types of jokes were common in Aristophanic comedy, their 
                                                 
34
 Papageorgiou (“Ambiguities” 2004) argues that homosexuality adhered to a “strong set of rules of 
propriety” to protect the interests and reputations of both parties and to contain homosexual desires within 
moderate, disciplined boundaries (289).  A desire for young boys was, in his view, only considered 
inappropriate if it skirted these boundaries and overtly made one participant sexually passive through 
penetration.  Dover (1978) comes to a similar conclusion, that “the male who breaks ‘rules’ of legitimate 
eros detaches himself from the ranks of male citizenry and classifies himself with women and foreigners” 
(103).  For a critical review of Dover’s work, cf. Davidson (2009).  Hubbard (1998, 2003) is more 
convincing, however, that the practice, regardless of how it was performed, would likely have been 
disapproved of by the lower classes because the distinction between passive and active was more fluid and 
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purpose here is to ally Greater Discourse with a more traditional type of morality that 
deplores passivity, sexual or otherwise.  This stance is corroborated by his threat to beat 
Lesser Discourse if he lays a hand on Pheidippides (933, klausei, tên cheir’ ên 
epiballêis).  When he fails to defeat Lesser Discourse’s initial arguments, he shifts tactics 
to emphasize his physical might as another advantage over his opponent to impose his 
will and win the debate.   He shows that at least initially, his claims to rightness have not 
been able to vanquish his opponent and thus he must reposition his authority.  His sexual 
mores might not be considered foolish at this point in the play, but he establishes them as 
a major theme for the defense of his education.  Lesser Discourse will fiercely attack this 
foundation and show that their moderate and reasonable appearance here (by Athenian 
standards) only covers up a prurient obsession with young boys. 
Unsurprisingly, Lesser Discourse has little in common with his opponent.35  In 
place of the traditional modes of behavior and thinking, Lesser Discourse explicitly states 
that he represents the discovery of novel ideas in Athens (896, gnômas kainas 
exeuriskôn).  This declaration may not be antagonistic per se, but the context makes clear 
that he is asserting subversive tendencies.  His opponent stands ‘with moral authority’ 
and traditional education, thus any new ideas would run contrary to the accepted will of 
the gods (as explained by Greater Discourse).  Not only are these thoughts new, but 
Lesser Discourse is openly trying to overturn the ‘just’ words of his opponent (901, all’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
unstable.  A young erômenos would become an erastês later in life, thus perpetuating “a closed and 
incestuous system of aristocratic gift-exchange which included even the exchange of one's own body for 
the privilege of admission into the chosen circle of the Athenian political and intellectual elite” (“Popular” 
69).  
35
 Papageorgiou (2004) convincingly argues that the Lesser Discourse represents not just one figure from 
classical Athens, such as Protagoras or Socrates, but the entire sophistic movement based on references to 
several intellectuals from the period (“Prodicus” 62). 
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anatrepsô taut’antilegôn).  Furthermore, he embraces the insults hurled at him (such as 
being called a passive homosexual) and says they are like roses (910, roda m’ eirêkas) 
and gold (912, chrusô pattôn m’ ou gignôskeis).  Lesser Discourse represents a direct 
threat to the former method of education and morality itself because he deliberately tries 
to sabotage its reputation.  This mission of intentionally overturning Athenian mores 
demonstrates that Lesser Discourse is a monstrous and unreal version of the sophists, 
which the audience should be able to recognize without much effort.36  He offers a 
striking contrast to Greater Discourse because he has no regard for his own reputation, 
delightfully embracing the accusations and epithets describing him.  Lesser Discourse 
may be more clever than his opponent, but at this point in the play he represents 
cleverness without principles, intellect apart from and opposed to morality.  The audience 
can plainly see he knows how to talk smoothly, but his arguments are fallacious and 
impious.  Few Athenians would publicly criticize Zeus and abuse his own father, even if 
the god were a suitable model for such behavior. 
To underscore disrespect for traditional authority, Lesser Discourse treats Greater 
as an old man with antiquated customs.  He refers to his opponent as doddering and silly 
(908, tuphogerôn ei kanarmostos) and very old (929, Kronos ôn).  The implication 
behind these attacks is that Greater Discourse is an ancient figure who has become 
                                                 
36 There is no doubt the sophists inspired caution or fear that customs and beliefs would change in the 5th 
c., but there does not appear to be signs of deliberate attempts to create social upheaval, especially with the 
kind of zeal displayed by Lesser Discourse.  As Marianetti (1993) explains, “Both the speculative approach 
of natural philosophy and the sophistic movement introduced new trends in viewing conventional religion 
and practical ethics.  The emphasis of natural philosophy on the contemplation of natural phenomena, and 
the concerns of the sophists with persuasive techniques in political assembles and law courts, challenged 
the validity of customs religious and political by promoting the primacy of rationalism and individualism” 
(5). 
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outdated in the current political and social landscape and whose ideas are no longer 
valuable.  The sophistic movement and intellectuals in general were not a new 
development in Athens, thus there had been ample time for Athenians to believe that 
traditional concepts of morality were being undermined with less consistent obligations 
to oikos and polis.37  Furthermore, Pericles had shown that political power rests in the 
ability to persuade the Athenian Assembly with words, not brute strength.  Before the 
debate begins, we see the clear dichotomy between these value systems.  As Dover 
explains, “Devotion to the technique of persuasion was incompatible with a firm belief in 
objective values” (“Clouds” xxxviii).  This was presumably because a set of objective 
values locks a person into certain courses of action, but techniques of persuasion open the 
door to all manner of possibilities, moral or otherwise.  Lesser Discourse seeks to 
undermine the credibility of his opponent as the representative of traditional education to 
show that the new system is superior and worth adopting in its place. 
 At this point I should clarify that the two Discourses certainly invoke morality 
for their own purposes, but neither should be considered a legitimate moral authority 
because their positions are ridiculous polarizations.  Greater Discourse values what he 
considers traditional morality, but he sacrifices critical thought and the ability to 
thoroughly examine his own beliefs.  As the next section will show, his blindly restrictive 
                                                 
37
 Gagarin (2001) argues that persuasion was not necessarily the main purpose in sophistic lessons, that 
there were other goals “such as the serious exploration of issues and forms of argument, the display of 
ingenuity in thought, argument and style of expression, and the desire to dazzle, shock and please,” which 
Athenians could easily perceive as an uncomfortable change to existing social practices (289).  This view is 
shared by Ford (2001) and Ober (2001), who suggest that personal contacts amongst the aristocracy may 
have been a more important benefit from sophistic training and that persuasive skills may have more 
incidental than deliberate.  Whitehorne (2002) maintains that intellectuals were prominent enough in the 
late 5th c. that they could be caricatured through props and poses that most Athenians would readily 
understand, further demonstrating that their presence in Athens had seeped well into the cultural 
consciousness (33-34). 
   85 
 
morality is predicated more on vanity and pride than on the welfare of young citizens.  
Lesser Discourse privileges intellectual thought and the ability to subvert traditional 
notions in society, but is hardly a model worth following because he has respect for no 
established custom and adheres to no principles other than self-satisfaction.  “If the old 
education was defective in its indifference to reason, the new education may be equally 
one-sided in its indifference to the training of the passions” (Nussbaum “Aristophanes” 
69).  Aristophanes deepens these flaws when the two Logoi combat openly for 
Pheidippides’ trust.   
 
III. The Ethics of New vs. Old Education 
 Although the debate between the Greater and Lesser Discourse is nominally 
about Pheidippides, its larger themes concern the development of young men and their 
responsibilities as ethical speakers participating in the polis; it should therefore come as 
no surprise that it is charged with fierce political overtones.38  As the debate progresses, it 
becomes clear that there is a pronounced urgency to its outcome.39  “In times of crisis the 
question is not simply who will define what is right or wrong, but who will define the 
discourse in which such claims are recognized as being either right or wrong” (Euben 
895).  The initial talking points give a clear indication of the participants’ interests.  
Unlike the initial exchange, however, they now provide more specific examples to 
                                                 
38
 Long rightly points out that “strictly taken, the agôn is meant to be not a contest but a lesson: 
Pheidippides is to learn about the two arguments by hearing them debate one another” (294).  However, 
this debate has implications beyond a matter of simple instruction, as the Logoi are not presenting 
information which Pheidippides can use at his own discretion.  Instead, they engage in logomachic attacks 
to vanquish their opponent so that there is only one option available for Pheidippides to choose, thus one 
must acknowledge that the debate acts as much more than a routine lesson for purely informative purposes.   
39
 As Schiappa explains, “The famous contest between the two logoi  is both a battle of words and a conflict 
between two ways of life (111).  See also Major (2013), page 90. 
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illustrate and amplify their points, which makes their value systems appear all the more 
foolish and impractical.  Greater Discourse again begins with moral issues (962, 
sôphrosunê), cueing the audience that it is a significant element of his educational 
method.  He defines this term through a series of examples explaining how boys behaved 
when he was in charge.  His speech shows remarkable consistency for describing the 
sexual mores of his students: they sat without exposing their thighs (966 tô mêrô mê 
xunechontas), swept away the ground so that lovers would not see the imprint of their 
youth (975-976, authis anistamenon…mê kataleipein), and did not use a soft voice or 
lead a lover on with the eyes (979-980, oud’ an malakên…ebadizen).  These are hardly 
radical concepts for Athenians hoping to train the next generation of civic-minded 
students and reflect the degree of modesty expected by Greater Discourse in his students 
(Eden 234).  As Cohen explains, “Boys who, under certain circumstances, participated in 
sexual intercourse with men were believed to have acted for gain and to have adopted a 
submissive role which disqualified them as potential citizens” (9).  However, the degree 
of detail and the constant attention that Greater Discourse brings to these descriptions 
seems to go beyond a simple concern.  Furthermore, one may conclude that because he 
has provided such specific details in the characterization of a young man seducing an 
older one, he has more than passing knowledge of the activity.  Eden suggests that this is 
a characterization of “the boys’ activities in chronological sequence as part of a day’s 
routine,” underscoring how many times Greater Discourse has observed the boys in this 
environment (234).  It is plausible under these circumstances that he has had to resist the 
temptation of pretty boys and presents an overly zealous case to conceal his interest.  
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Greater Discourse never explains his own sexual proclivities, but it is clear that he has 
been watching the naked young boys for some time (otherwise he would not have 
included these details).  He admits to being choked with anger (988, ôste m‘apagchesth’) 
that the students of Lesser Discourse cover themselves in cloaks (987, tous nun euthus en 
himatioisi didaskeis entetulichthai) and hide their “ham” (tês kôlês) with shields when 
dancing at the Panathenaea (988-989).   His outrage is that he can no longer see the flesh 
of young boys in a public forum (Hubbard “Homosexuality” 95)!  There is enough 
evidence in his speech for the audience to think that he is a little too concerned with the 
sexual habits of young boys and to give less credence to the sense of morality and 
restraint he is trying to promote.  It is difficult to take his arguments seriously when he 
displays such a prurient and contradictory interest in his students. 
Greater Discourse also advocates that young men act with deference to their 
elders and always unquestioningly obey.  They must keep quiet at all times (963, edei 
paidos phônên gruxantos mêden’ akousai), rise up from their seats whenever their elders 
pass by (993, tôn thakôn tois presbuterois hupanistasthai prosiousin), and never talk back 
to their fathers (994, mê peri tous sautou goneas skaiourgein, again at 998-999).   
Furthermore, if the boys acted like fools at school, they were soundly beaten (969-972, ei 
de tis autôn bômolocheusait’…ôs tas Mousas aphanizôn).  As seen with his concerns for 
sexual behavior, Greater Discourse is very interested in making sure young men know 
their place in society and rigidly adhere to that role.  In this educational system, young 
men do not speak unless spoken to and live for the service of their elders.  He does not 
value the intellectual development of his students because at no point in their training do 
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they learn to speak publicly, articulate their thoughts, or challenge existing opinions.  
Students of Greater Discourse become locked into a system that would perpetuate itself 
without significant risk of change to the status quo because its supposedly objective 
values are timeless.  The only potential source of change in his value system would have 
to originate from the top down, in which elders speak amongst themselves and come to a 
final decision without necessarily consulting the young, who must embrace and enact that 
change.  Greater Discourse would produce citizens who are not trained or perhaps 
comfortable enough to speak out of turn or voice opinions, whose discipline is ruthlessly 
enforced while they are students (i.e. through beatings), and who do not have the same 
sense of personal autonomy privileged by the Lesser Discourse.  As Nussbaum succinctly 
explains, “Its tools are stern discipline and rote repetition” (“Aristophanes” 55). 
This is a system whose sole design is to control the young, commit them to the 
bidding of others, and remove them from meaningful participation in public deliberation.  
Perhaps older Athenian citizens witnessing this argument would approve because they 
stand to gain the most from it, but younger citizens stand to lose any sense of 
individuality, independence, and the ability to influence public affairs.  With training in 
speech replaced with physical exercise and discipline, they become ill-equipped to 
present arguments, defend themselves intellectually, and use critical thinking when 
evaluating the positions and speeches of other citizens.  When one considers the effects 
associated with heightened sensitivity to sexual practices, the students of Greater 
Discourse will always be disciplined against personal pleasure and will also always be 
expected to obey orders; even if instructions are unbeneficial or foolhardy, they are not 
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given the privilege of asking questions or providing an alternative.  It is a system built 
with potential for abuse because the Greater Discourse’s earlier words indicate that older 
men will always lust after younger ones, keep them firmly in place, and hold onto their 
own power for as long as possible.  However, his solution is not to castigate the elders as 
certain Athenian laws were created to do (Cohen 6), but instead to impose responsibility 
for sexual purity, chastity, and adhering to rigid social roles on the young.  Instead of 
insulating them from such corrupting influences, they are still allowed to train naked and 
tempt would-be lovers.  They are allegedly shielded from moral lapses by a rigid 
psychological discipline predicated upon shame and personal reputation (especially lines 
992-997, kai tois aischrois aischunesthai…upo pornidiou tês eukleias apothrausthês).  In 
this system, the only major responsibility given to the young is protecting the reputations 
of their family and themselves while the business of decision-making and public 
deliberation is enjoyed only by elders.  If put in a position to steer the ship of state when 
they assume the role of elders, students of the Greater Discourse are unlikely to be 
effective speakers working ethically to produce decisions that benefit the entire polis. 
Greater Discourse continues his fixation on the appearances of young men by 
privileging a strong, muscular physique.  He summarizes the way they should look at 
1009-1014: a shining chest, dark skin, broad shoulders, small tongue, large buttocks, and 
a small penis.  The shining chest, dark skin, broad shoulders and large buttocks 
demonstrate that the student is an active, muscular youth who works outside and does not 
have female characteristics such as white skin (Dover “Clouds” 222, Coulon and Van 
Daele 111).  The small tongue shows the youth’s respect for his elders, that he holds his 
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tongue in their presence and does not act verbally abusive towards them.  The small penis 
was considered a sign of sexual restraint and temperance, and was thought to be more 
aesthetically pleasing (Hubbard “Homosexuality” 96).  These characteristics epitomize 
the mental and physical traits Greater Discourse would have in his students: a strong, 
sexually chaste young man who does not talk back to his elders.  Greater Discourse is 
mocked by Aristophanes because his students are pretty automatons acting at the whims 
of social superiors.40  Pheidippides would be inclined to choose this type of training if he 
were especially interested in his own beauty, in looking a certain way, and knowing that 
he was an object of admiration (Murphy “Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric” 95).    
Because this value system also privileges beauty, it would appeal to a student whose 
vanity needs approval and praise from everyone around him.  These conditions are 
perfect for creating the mentality of an erômenos and the kind of behavior prohibited in 
his system, but Greater Discourse seems oblivious to this contradiction.  The ethics of 
Greater Discourse affect the self and polis in one significant way: the alleged temperance 
serves only to massage the egos of vain students so that they may be more compliant with 
their superiors’ wishes and prevent behavior, such as providing new political agendas or 
policies, that could threaten or change the status quo. 
                                                 
40 Marrou (1956) presents an interesting counterpoint: “This ideal, strange though it may seem to us, is 
nevertheless perfectly legitimate; that is to say, in itself it is quite consistent.  There is nothing absurd in 
believing that physical beauty, the worship of the body, can be for some people a real reason for living, a 
way of expressing, indeed of fulfilling, their personality—after all, it has long been accepted as legitimate 
enough as far as women are concerned.  In fact these young Greeks were honoured and courted and 
pampered and admired very much like our women of today (or yesterday).  Their whole life was bathed, 
like any woman’s, in the glow of their youthful successes, the lustre of their beauty (Alcibiades is a case in 
point)” (44).  In a more sympathetic character, the virtue of physical beauty would not seem ridiculous, but 
I contend it is difficult to take this idea seriously when its main advocate is as exaggerated and comical as 
Greater Discourse.  His arguments are not the philosophical ideals of beauty found in Plato’s Symposium, 
as his continued attention to boys’ genitalia and the importance of their disuse make clear. 
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When we consider whose interests are served in this model, it is clearly the elder 
generation of Athenians and perhaps, one could argue, the welfare of the city at large.  
They would produce a group of very strong and fit young men who will not challenge 
them or attempt to usurp their authority, and who are also quite pleasing to the eye.  
These values emphasize the services youths can do for the rest of the city, and a broad 
sense of civic responsibility replaces any focus on personal pleasure or desire.  The city 
stands to benefit provided the elder generation does not abuse its authority and sets out 
meaningful tasks for the young, but Aristophanes puts this assertion in doubt through the 
overzealous statements of Greater Discourse.  Moreover, there is no evidence the students 
would take much interest in legislative affairs because they are not making any of the 
important decisions while young, nor does Greater Discourse mention training 
appropriate for speaking in the Assembly or law-courts as they assume responsibility for 
public action later in life.   The lone exception is if their sense of moral discipline 
somehow gives them the ability to speak the right words, as Greater Discourse claims to 
do before the debate.  The elders would obtain a large group of boys to carry out their 
will without questioning their orders, a discipline instilled through beatings, rigid sexual 
control, and an honor/shame based society.  The argumentative strategy employed by 
Greater Discourse to persuade Pheidippides is predicated not on the belief that it is the 
only way to understand education, but that it is the only right or moral way.  Greater 
Discourse never explicitly defines his brand of education, but he associates the term with 
a sense of morality (dikaia or sôphrosunê) that does not allow the possibility of 
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adaptation or evolution, and that should be considered legitimate because it has the 
weight of tradition and chronological priority (Baracchi 156). 
 It is easier to see the satire behind the characterization of Lesser Discourse 
because his excesses are more apparent and openly admitted than Greater Discourse.  His 
first such admission appears early in his speech, that he is expressly against the 
established customs of the city (1040, toisin nomois kai tais dikais tanti’ antilexai).  This 
is another way of saying he may support virtually anything that Greater Discourse 
opposes.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume he will not have the same prejudices about 
sexual behavior and commitment to following the orders of his elders, or to the sustained 
welfare of the polis. 
 Lesser Discourse claims that Pheidippides can do virtually anything he pleases if 
the young man chooses his brand of education, which he characterizes as choosing the 
worse argument but still winning (1042, airoumenon tous êttonas logous epeita nikân).  
This is a stunning admission because it implies that, to a certain extent, Lesser Discourse 
does not fundamentally disagree about the nature of his opponent’s moral impulses and 
beliefs.  The main point of contention concerns the value or significance of morality 
based on what it allows the individual citizen to do and how it satisfies personal desires.  
For Lesser Discourse’s system, one deliberately chooses to act contrary to those values 
knowing that it is not the right thing to do, but that the potential for profit can justify 
anything (1041, touto plein ê muriôn est’ axion stratêrôn). 
 Unlike his opponent, Lesser Discourse draws attention to his sophistic method by 
cross-examining some of the points made in the previous speech (1043).  This is a 
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different style of persuasion because there was little question-and-answer when Greater 
Discourse was speaking, and this method provides the audience with another opportunity 
to see stark differences between the two interlocutors (their appearance on-stage might 
have shown off their physical training as well).41  Euben notes that the debate format, 
which requires arguments of some kind, already rigs the contest against Greater 
Discourse and later Strepsiades: the inability to anticipate flaws in their positions creates 
a distinct disadvantage that proves insurmountable, especially compared with the level of 
attention and analysis applied by their opponents (897).  Lesser Discourse begins by 
attacking the idea that young men should avoid the baths and the marketplace, both 
points fitting into Greater’s system of avoiding situations that can bring shame upon 
one’s name.  After Greater Discourse claims the baths are very bad (1046, kakiston) and 
make a man cowardly (deilon), Lesser compels him to admit that Herakles, the best man 
in all of Greece (1050, beltion’ andra), is associated with hot baths (Dover “Clouds” 
224).  Furthermore, the marketplace cannot be a bad place because the poet Homer 
describes Nestor, a man known for his wisdom and good counsel, as a man of the 
marketplace (1057, Nestor’ agorêtên).  These are important points because they 
downplay the importance of being physically superior to other people (one will not 
become soft by going to the baths) and highlight the significance of being able to 
manipulate language and make logical connections.  Moreover, they again show that the 
moral participant in the debate has not examined his own beliefs and is incapable of 
                                                 
41
 Dover’s commentary is insightful on this point.  The text itself gives no indication about the physical 
characteristics of the Logoi, but the scholia indicate that “’the Logoi are shown in the theatre (upokeintai 
epi tês skênês ) in wicker cages, fighting like birds,’ (i.e. like cocks)” (xc).  His comments on the following 
pages suggest the scholia’s interpretation of the Logoi should be taken seriously in the second version of 
Clouds. 
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presenting a cogent argument on his own behalf; although Lesser Discourse has presented 
some clever examples, a more skillful opponent might examine the nature of this 
evidence and argue that they do not apply as given, or provide counter-examples to 
demonstrate the initial point more convincingly (Freydberg 42).  Even if Greater 
Discourse holds the moral high ground, he cannot defend himself against a more 
intellectual opponent or provide sufficient refutation.42  These exchanges show that 
Lesser Discourse is both capable of taking advantage of his opponent and willing to do so 
to further his own interests. 
 These are minor points, however, in Greater Discourse’s exposition.  Lesser 
Discourse next attacks the lynchpin of his opponent’s argument, sôphrosunê.  He puts 
morality and sophistry in direct contrast when he reminds the audience that Greater 
Discourse has claimed to be decent (1060, sôphronein) and not to exercise the tongue, 
which Lesser calls two bad things (1060, duo kakô megistô).  Then he puts Greater to the 
test, asking for the benefits conferred by sôphronein.  The answers are hardly memorable: 
that Peleus, the father of Achilles, obtained a knife allowing him to survive (1063, o goun 
Pêleus elabe dia touto tên machairan) and was then able to marry the nereid-nymph 
Thetis because he was so decent (1067, kai tên Thetin g’ egême dia to sôphronein o 
Pêleus).  Lesser Discourse then argues she left Peleus because he was not sexually active 
enough for her (1068-1070, apolipousa g’auton ôchet’…sinamôroumenô chairei).  This 
exchange is pivotal for persuading Pheidippides because Greater Discourse again cannot 
                                                 
42
 This point is underscored by the emphasis of the new education not only on the act of speaking, but 
instruction in sophistical logic: “Throughout the play, Aristophanes portrays the process of learning to 
speak (mathōn legein) as a natural consequence of learning to engage in “sophisticated” (though sometimes 
absurd) reasoning” (Schiappa “Beginnings 71). 
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find a reasonable or persuasive defense for his beliefs, and shows that the benefits for his 
brand of morality are not so obvious or compelling.  As he demonstrated before, physical 
beauty and sexual-control will be pleasing for a particularly vain person or one already 
conditioned to following orders; as Lesser Discourse begins to describe, there is another 
type of student who will not be persuaded by these arguments: one driven by intense 
personal pleasures and who does not need the approval of others. 
 Lesser Discourse is concerned only with enjoying the pleasures of life.  His 
remarks about marrying a nymph reflect this point, because his ideology questions the 
value of such a wife if the relationship is sexless.  Peleus is a poor example for Greater 
Discourse to reference because he appears all the more foolish for losing such a desirable 
woman and the accompanying pleasures she could provide, and offers no additional 
benefits to compensate for this loss.    There are many pleasures at odds with Greater 
Discourse’s morality (1071, en tô sôphronein) such as women, young boys, games, 
drinking, and laughter (1073, paidôn, gunaikôn, kottabôn, opsôn, potôn, kachasmôn) that 
are worth pursuing.  Lesser Discourse consistently contrasts the moral language of his 
opponents, often using variants of sôphronein, with the language of pleasure to show 
Pheidippides what he stands to gain from each system and to create negative associations 
with traditional education.  He accepts the definition for moral behavior and can agree 
that deprivation and sexual control are its major components; however, he forcefully 
disputes the implications for morality and why this behavior is worth adopting.  Greater 
Discourse has claimed that respect and discipline are the important results for 
sôphrosunê, benefits that extend greater results for those who can exert self-control in an 
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honor-based system.  However, he “rambles on and on about moderation, yet he cannot 
produce anyone who has ever profited from it.  How could Pheidippides be expected to 
emulate a life so filled with contradictions?  Why would he want to, given what he would 
have to give up---the pleasure of satisfying his natural desires unstintingly and without 
fear of reprisal” (Euben 898). 
Lesser Discourse says the opposite, that losing the ability to indulge in such pleasures 
makes life not worth living (1074, kaitoi ti soi zên axion, toutôn ean sterêthês).  To even 
an audience member listening casually, traditional education of the young sounds quite 
grim:  temperate behavior becomes a discipline that constantly deprives and eliminates 
many physical pleasures.  Lesser Discourse would have them see morality as an 
antiquated set of practices that makes life dull and more work than play.  Argued in this 
way, sophistry involves having lots of sex, drinking, and generally treating other people 
as objects of one’s desires.  As he predicted earlier, Lesser Discourse does indeed invoke 
values completely opposed to the Greater Discourse’s argument, because he presents the 
option of living explicitly for the self and using others as a means to accomplish this goal, 
not living for or at the will of others and their pleasures.  He emphasizes the importance 
of personal goals and desires at the expense of the city and community. 
 The final example to explain this mentality is the case of adultery, where Lesser 
Discourse bridges the principles of immorality with prowess in persuasion and oratory.  
He advises Pheidippides that if he receives sophistic instruction and has a little adultery, 
he will be able to defend himself verbally if caught (1076-1077, hêmartes, 
êrasthês…adunatos gar ei legein).  Lesser Discourse again resorts to Zeus as evidence to 
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support his sophistic logic,   because if the god was unable to resist mortal women (even 
if they were married), how can a mere man do otherwise (1080-1082, ôs ouden 
êdikêkas…pôs meizon an dunaio).  When pressed by Greater Discourse to admit this is 
foolish because the penalty for being caught is sodomy by radish (1083, hraphanidôthêi), 
Lesser retorts that it is not such a bad thing because it happens to everyone (1085ff).  
Public sodomy by radish is a fiendishly terrible punishment for the Greater Discourse 
because it represents passivity and shame in an open forum (what could be worse in an 
honor-based society?), but this is not a concern to his opponent.43  To a student educated 
by Aristophanes’ sophists, pleasure matters irrespective of cost; shame and physical 
discomfort are insignificant and well worth the risk if they can successfully satisfy one’s 
desires.  Furthermore, this underscores the idea that Lesser Discourse cannot be tamed by 
public opinion to adhere to the status quo.  If he can face such an ignominious 
punishment and remain defiant, it is clear that little if any social pressure will affect him.  
The students of Lesser Discourse also stand a reasonable chance of avoiding such a fate 
because his methods, especially the ability to think fast and speak well, should provide a 
consistent safeguard against punishments.  Morality is absent in his system because such 
beliefs are a hindrance to pleasures and fail to provide suitable defense when needed.  In 
contrast, students of Greater Discourse would be prohibited from engaging in personal 
desires, feel acute shame if caught, and have no reliable defense to avoid punishment 
except the hope that moral words would be so inspirational that the audience would be 
                                                 
43 Gardner (1989) explains there were also pragmatic concerns for adultery, including potentially strict 
obligations to citizens and their children, as well as the possibility of adulterous wives helping their lovers 
rob the household of its resources (53-4).  Although Greater Discourse does not mention these issues, an 
Athenian audience would likely have them in mind and recognize that an adulterer with impunity could be 
very dangerous. 
   98 
 
compelled to align with the “right” side.  For these reasons, the educational system of the 
Lesser Discourse is also one predicated on control, but he is concerned with manipulating 
those who can aid him in the enjoyment of pleasure, which could be anyone in Athenian 
society.  As Redfield explains, “as figures of power rather than righteousness, great but 
not good, those gods often prove their greatness by their freedom from ethical norms” 
(“Poetry” 59).  Moreover, enforcement of such control is only available to people with 
the right intellectual wherewithal; a sense of community, family, shame, or physical 
strength is absent or simply irrelevant.  Nussbaum explains that this group would likely 
not have many members because “it is evident that without any social order there would 
be a chaos in which the pursuit of pleasure would become much more difficult than it is 
in a well-ordered city.  Anti-Right nowhere disputes this.  He proposed not the overthrow 
of nomos but its exploitation by a smart minority” (“Aristophanes” 65).  The group likely 
to identify with this message would be the intellectuals or naturally-gifted public 
speakers, especially those who were not as interested in physical training, or those 
without strong ties to family or polis.  The power to redefine situations and ideas and to 
capriciously justify any behavior gives sophistic students added flexibility for enforcing 
their will.  This power of speaking well allows them to be protected from public opinion, 
which they can either shape with their persuasive powers or apathetically ignore.  To a 
society concerned with stability and preventing stasis, sophistic students of this kind 
present great potential for danger because their malleability makes them unpredictable 
and very adept at obtaining what they desire.  At the conclusion of the first agōn, the 
audience is invited to consider which of the following citizens they would most prefer to 
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inhabit the polis: a smart libertine who can wield speech as dangerously as any physical 
weapon or a strong, chaste soldier without the ability to present a coherent argument.  
Regardless of how they answer, the prospect of ethical leadership and decision-making in 
the polis is fairly grim. 
 
IV. Sophistry in Practice: Pheidippides vs. Strepsiades 
 The agôn between the Greater and Lesser Discourses is instructive because it 
lays out the values of their educational programs, but it provides only a general theme for 
citizenship with two clearly grotesque caricatures. The audience can more fully 
appreciate the ethical consequences of allowing sophists to run amok in Athens if a 
young man trained in such speaking techniques applies them directly to his environment. 
Thus, the final encounters between Strepsiades and Pheidippides as a young sophist are 
crucial for Aristophanes to explore the topic of ethical orators and their effects on the 
polis. In this section, I analyze how Aristophanes recreates the agôn between the Greater 
and Lesser Discourse using Strepsiades and Pheidippides as proxies to show the Athenian 
audience that the unethical tenets of sophistry will produce profoundly negative changes 
in Athens. 
         After the Greater Discourse concedes defeat, Strepsiades decides for Pheidippides 
that he will be instructed by the Lesser Discourse. The next section of the play cues the 
audience that major changes are happening to Pheidippides as he transforms into a young 
sophist. The contrasts in the earlier agôn reappear as Pheidippides changes physically and 
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mentally to match his new lifestyle and training.44  Strepsiades is initially overjoyed 
because he believes Pheidippides’ new skills will be a boon to his family: his creditors 
will not be able to sue him because Pheidippides has learned effective speaking (1143, eu 
legein), the type of speech perfect for dodging lawsuits (1151, ôst’ apophugois an êntin’ 
an boulê dikên).  However, the young man shows no respect for the traditional center of 
power and authority, directing his loyalty to his teachers at the Phrontisterion rather than 
his father and family.  This is an important development in Clouds’ critique of sophistic 
education, as Ober explains: “Since the polis could be regarded as a macrocosm of the 
extended family/kinship network, anyone who cheated his family could be seen as 
potentially dangerous to society as a whole” (“Mass” 212). 
 Although Pheidippides transforms into a young sophist with a pale complexion 
and “what are you talking about” look on his face (1170ff), the most striking change is 
his utter disregard for Strepsiades’ orders.  A not-so-friendly disagreement over poetry 
rapidly turns ugly as Pheidippides decides to beat his father viciously.   The main points 
of the earlier agôn are vividly reemphasized for the audience as Strepsiades describes the 
beating that happened offstage and Pheidippides adeptly uses sophistic logic to justify his 
actions.  Strepsiades uses a more conventional style of narration to portray his victimage 
as a wronged authority figure and to highlight traditional values, just as Greater 
Discourse provided a monologue of admittedly poor examples to demonstrate the moral 
                                                 
44
 Dover explains that Clouds is not the only Aristophanic play to highlight more than one debate, but that it 
is distinguished because of the scale of each debate.  The similarities between Greater and Lesser Discourse 
compared with Strepsiades and Pheidippides are not coicindental: “The parallelism of structure between the 
two contests emphasizes the extent to which Pheidippides has emerged from his education a replica of 
Wrong; we shall see how he reproduces not only the rhetorical methods but even the actual words of 
Wrong” (“Clouds” 248). 
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behavior of his students.  Pheidippides employs the same techniques as Lesser Discourse, 
asking his father a series of questions and compelling him to participate in the logical 
process; Strepsiades’ downfall is that he admits to deserving the beating and that, in 
effect, he no longer merits the power he used to wield over his son. 
 Pheidippides displays much of the disrespect and shocking behavior typical of the 
Lesser Discourse after his sophistical training.  Strepsiades is outraged over his son’s 
conduct, calling him a wretch, parricide, and robber (1327, ô miare kai patraloia kai 
toichôruche).  Pheidippides remarks that he enjoys such names and, when referred to as a 
giant asshole (1330, lakkoprôkte), replies that his father should hit him with more roses 
(patte, pollois tois rodois).  This is similar to the language used by the Lesser Discourse 
earlier in the play and shows Pheidippides’ disregard for the prevailing values of his 
culture and willingness to attack them with speech.  These are names that should 
thoroughly shame him, and perhaps cow Pheidippides into submission so that he is 
compelled to renounce his actions, but instead they fuel the desire to defend himself and 
vehemently attack his father.  This becomes evident when Pheidippides offers to let his 
father decide the position he would prefer to defend (1335-6).  Strepsiades seems shocked 
that his son would make such a fearless and confident proposal, and admits that he must 
have been taught well if he can definitively prove that beating one’s father is a just and 
right action.  Before the argument begins, the audience knows that Pheidippides has 
already performed the beating, asserted that it was a justifiable action despite its 
abnormal character, and confidently proclaimed that he can defend himself regardless of 
which position he is given.  This is a young man who can use speech to transform himself 
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into whoever and whatever he wants regardless of circumstance and without any 
connection to established cultural beliefs or customs. 
 Strepsiades reveals that an altercation happened offstage in their home because of 
a series of disagreements involving poetry.  That such a terrible result45 in the eyes of 
Athenian culture began over a trivial issue further demonstrates that Pheidippides is 
unpredictable and anchored by no prevailing cultural authority.  This set of conflicts 
rehashes the dichotomy between old and young, established authority in the oikos and 
potential usurper.  As Strepsiades explains, he was so pleased that his son can wrangle 
him out of debt that the house had occasion to celebrate.  This initiates two disagreements 
between father and son: which song will Pheidippides sing at the party and the manner in 
which he will sing it.  As innocuous and insignificant as these decisions seem, they reflect 
sensibilities with little overlap and generate great hostility between father and son.  
Strepsiades asks his son to play the lyre while singing (1355, prôton men auton tên lyran 
labont’ ego ‘keleusa).  This is an older form of celebrating at a symposium that 
eventually was replaced when guests would sing to the accompaniment of someone else, 
such as a slave playing an instrument (Dover “Clouds” 251-253).  Pheidippides is not 
happy with this arrangement, claiming it is old-fashioned (archaion) to sing and play the 
lyre while drinking.  Then Strepsiades becomes agitated because his son does not approve 
of the choice of music: he wishes Pheidippides to play first Simonides, then Aeschylus.  
                                                 
45
 Children were supposed to respect paternal authority regardless of their own opinions or preferences.  
Clay (1982) emphasizes that anything associated with androphonos (including murder and parricide) were 
so taboo as to be almost unspeakable (280-281).  Although Pheidippides has not killed his father, he has 
already swung to an extreme position from which parricide is not far off.  His actions are all the more 
appalling because Strepsiades validates them through his agreement at the end of the second agôn and may 
indirectly be helping to establish them as a new norm for parent-child relationships in the play’s narrative.   
Dover (1968) also comments on the ability for children to harm parents: “A free man could strike his own 
children (cf. Pl. Prt. 325D), but he himself could not be struck with impunity” (259). 
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Pheidippides brusquely calls Simonides a bad poet (kakon poiêtên, 1362) and refers to 
Aeschylus as the first among poets, full of noise, incoherent, a ranter, and using big, 
rugged words (1366-1367, ego gar Aischulon nomizô prôton en poiêtais---psophou pleôn, 
axustaton, stomphaka, krêmnopoion).  Neither of these poets are acceptable options to 
Pheidippides, who offers to sing some Euripides when pressed by his father to sing 
something from the new poets (1370, lexon ti tôn neôterôn, att’esti ta sopha tauta).  The 
resulting tune is not, predictably, well received by Strepsiades; he is outraged that his son 
would choose a song in which a brother has sex with his sister mother (1371-1372, ôs 
ekinei/adelphos, ô lexikake, tên homomêtrian adelphên).   
It would be easy to assume that poetical taste is the only issue here, but 
Strepsiades makes clear that he is especially upset because his sacrifices while raising his 
son have been forgotten.  He stresses that he was the person who fed Pheidippides, 
brought him drinks, and changed him (1380ff).  His previous efforts should give him 
priority in formal decision-making, even for something as pedestrian as music at a party, 
and he resents that his son is not making good on the initial investment.  In return, 
Pheidippides physically attacked him for insulting Euripides as the poet of the day and 
refused to let him outside when the attack caused him to defecate (1385ff).  Absent 
training at the Phrontisterion, the easiest way to resolve these conflicts would have been 
to privilege the desires of the father as the head of the household; thus, Pheidippides 
would have obliged his father’s whims by singing and playing the lyre simultaneously 
and choosing a song from one of the older poets.  This comic turn underscores that 
Pheidippides has reversed his role in the family from one of respectful or grateful 
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obedience to full-fledged authority.  His father’s previous caretaking is of little import if 
it inhibits the satisfaction of his desires at that moment and he is willing to use whichever 
weapons are at his disposal (it turns out violence and speech are equally accessible) to 
take control of the household for himself. 
A young man deliberately reversing the child-parent relationship may certainly 
have been cause for concern for elder Athenians, but Pheidippides reveals in the ensuing 
dialogue that he represents a far greater danger to the polis.  If one takes the incident 
between Pheidippides and his father at face-value, it is a problematic example for familial 
relationships but nothing more than an isolated incident.  After all, not every young man 
in Athens will receive sophistic instruction and find himself in a position to abuse his 
elders so thoroughly.  However, Aristophanes quickly transforms Pheidippides into a 
public threat capable of harming everyone in the polis with only the power of his words.  
The young sophist is aware that his ideas are not necessarily popular or widely accepted 
at the moment, but that he has the power to alter public opinion so that any taboo, such as 
parent-beating, may become the new norm.  His newfound argumentative strengths 
provide the ability to shape the discourse and attitudes of the polis to suit his own needs, 
regardless of whether anyone else stands to benefit from them. 
 Pheidippides begins his justification by explaining that his beatings come from 
good intentions.  When put to the question, Strepsiades admits that beatings of his son as 
a youth were performed out of good will and concern for his well-being (1410, eunoôn te 
kai kêdomenos).  Just as the Lesser Discourse did against his opponent earlier, 
Pheidippides turns this idea back against his father by extending the initial logic of 
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Strepsiades’ position and providing a clever interpretation of it.  He asks why parents 
alone should be able to show good intentions to their family in this manner, and why 
children could not show the same kind of concern.  If parents do not own a monopoly 
over good intentions for their family, then Pheidippides can claim the same rights and 
responsibilities to “help” as his father.  He concludes this proof by comparing old men to 
children and explaining that elders are more worthy of beatings because it is less right for 
them to make errors in judgment (1419, osôper examartanein êtton dikaion autous).  By 
asserting that his father is acting childishly (and that old men generally act this way), 
Pheidippides makes the case that he is the more legitimate authority figure and would 
merely be doing his duty in correcting his father’s behavior.  His actions become less of a 
personal threat and more of a recognition of cultural obligation to act in a certain way.  
Age and familial position in the oikos become less important compared with observable 
behavior, therefore the role of father figure, as well as its accompanying benefits, is no 
longer exclusive to the eldest male in the family.  It is also noteworthy that the issue is no 
longer about aesthetic differences in poetry; Pheidippides changes the topic of the agôn 
to a more general principle of who is allowed to act in certain situations and what 
authority allows them to do so.  A small dispute about songs has evolved into a debate 
about cultural expectations and how one can be punished (or not punished) for violating 
them. 
 The next issue concerns the legality of beating one’s parents and how it is not 
considered acceptable in Athenian society.46  Strepsiades argues that current laws do not 
                                                 
46 Harris argues that the ensuring scene gives Pheidippides added credibility as a trained sophist because 
he uses a variety of legal terminology when pleading his case.  This is important because “Aristophanes 
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allow fathers to suffer this kind of indignity (1420, all’ outdamou nomizetai ton patera 
touto paschein).  Although this is true, Pheidippides appears unconcerned because laws 
have been and may be changed by anyone, even a man such as himself or his father 
(1421-1422).  He is just as able to establish a new law that allows sons to strike their 
fathers in turn (1424, theinai nomon tois uiesin, tous pateras antituptein).  This is the 
very fear outlined by the Greater Discourse in the earlier agōn, because a young man 
skilled in speaking can turn his talents against his elders and cause them as much or as 
little suffering as he likes, enshrining the new arrangement permanently in the law.  He 
continues to use analogical reasoning, comparing the relationship between human fathers 
and sons to those of roosters, emphasizing that young roosters are not defenseless against 
their fathers (1428, ôs tous pateras amunetai).  This is a tacit admission that his father is 
correct, that existing laws do not favor his position, but that this is perhaps an unfair 
convention that should be changed for sons in the future (1423ff).  The argument is 
couched in broad terms so that it appears to be for the benefit of many people, but this is 
a flimsy excuse for Pheidippides to get away with his own crime, just as Lesser Discourse 
argued he could escape punishment if caught in adultery.  He shifts attention away from 
the specifics of this situation, which show that he has been absurdly petty, and instead 
offers the possibility that the law itself is flawed.  With this reasoning in place, 
Pheidippides serves himself up as the victim of unfair legislation that must be rectified if 
he is to act appropriately, drawing attention away from the fact that his father did not 
deserve the beating and is the victim of actual abuse and harm.   
                                                                                                                                                 
would not have imitated the language of Athenian laws and decrees so carefully unless he thought his 
audience was knowledgeable enough to appreciate the joke” (5) 
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 Pheidippides shows that the value and content of the law become less important 
than its malleability when shaped by a skillful sophist.  Custom, unlike natural law, can 
be changed with enough will from the citizenry and there was no guarantee the norms of 
one generation would be preserved by the next.  Dover notes that “Pheidippides is 
characteristically Greek in thinking of a nomos not as a ‘behavior pattern’ which is 
eventually codified but as the product of one man’s conscious design and one assembly’s 
conscious decision” (“Clouds” 260).  Strepsiades would not have been the only one 
alarmed that his values could be overturned so effortlessly or callously against him.  The 
burning of the Phrontisterion shows how seriously he reacted to these changes.  Although 
he is an excessive portrait of contemporary Athens, even a mild reaction to the 
intellectual changes of the late 5th c. could produce discomfort that so much power could 
be wielded by so unprincipled and capricious a citizen.   Pheidippides felt like beating his 
father today, but one could reasonably ask what he is capable of tomorrow, and how 
much more radically will he attempt to mold Athenian society to his next round of 
desires?  As Baracchi explains, “The Clouds depicts fatherhood in its dejection and loss 
of credibility.  What this caricatured remnant of paternity signals is the simultaneous 
collapse of the orders of the divine, of ancestral authority, and of legality” (152).  This 
depiction of sophistry mirrors the earlier agôn and the performance of the Lesser 
Discourse because Pheidippides is unpredictable, but adept enough to work his oratorical 
powers on whomever he sees fit.  If he can compel his own father to admit that parent-
beating is acceptable (1437-1439) and profoundly alter the conventional relationship 
between father and son, it is not unreasonable to think he could overturn or destroy other 
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important, cherished values in the polis.  He is a stark representation of a violent potential 
that adheres to no consistency other than personal satisfaction, which leaves the rest of 
society in the lurch. 
I should also note that Strepsiades is not automatically seduced by his son’s 
words, only conceding the argument at the end of the dialogue.  Unlike Greater 
Discourse, he responds to his son’s criticisms and points out the absurdity of 
Pheidippides’ positions.  He criticizes the rooster analogy, mockingly stating that roosters 
are perhaps not the best animal for humans to model (1430-1431), but does not press the 
matter far enough to change the outcome of the argument.47  The trajectory of the 
discussion highlights Pheidippides’ mental quickness as he always has a ready answer for 
his father, who often is not clever or mordant enough to refute the opposing argument 
even though he recognizes that it is inherently flawed.  Moreover, the penalty for 
attacking a parent was severe enough that Pheidippides also commits himself to great 
potential for suffering if he loses the argument, thus he shows the characteristic lack of 
shame demonstrated by the Lesser Discourse.  In this brief episode, Pheidippides presents 
a clear example of how sophistic training can undermine the state and create a dangerous 
potential for all its citizens, and how traditional education cannot prepare its students to 
defend against such destructive personal agendas from its opponents.  The traditional 
education represented by Greater Discourse is far from perfect, but the training found in 
the Phrontisterion is markedly more frightening and unethical. 
                                                 
47
 Dover’s commentary explains that Pheidippides distorts the conventional arguments using animal 
analogies  because he has made an improper comparison, as Strepsiades notes: “Strepsiades sees without 
difficulty the fatal flaw in any argument which selects elements common to animals and man but ignores 
the differences. In most extant Greek discussion of this topic it is the differences which are emphasized” 
(261). 
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In the following section I outline some conclusions about Aristophanes’ 
arguments in Clouds about the comparative advantages and uses for different educational 
models.  I contend that Aristophanes paints the issues with broad strokes so that the 
audience may think on the deficiencies in both educational systems and pose questions 
about how Athenian society can look past them to a more syncretic, beneficial 
alternative. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 Aristophanic comedy criticizes pressing issues and conditions for contemporary 
Athenian society, no doubt reflecting concerns for many of his audience.  Unlike other 
oratorical arenas, the comic playwright presents no concrete solutions or answers to the 
problems of his day.  One may reasonably ask how seriously his audience was to receive 
such criticism and if a modern reader should grant it enough influence to alter perceptions 
and cultural norms.  Halliwell argues that it is tempting to compare Aristophanes to the 
late-night satirists of our own period, who regularly mock the same targets and have the 
potential to influence based on repeated, consistent viewings by their audience 
(“Aristophanic” 8).  He rightly points out that Aristophanes produced or wrote plays for 2 
showings a year, and that it is difficult at best to assume he was actively shaping public 
policy through a program that could skewer the reputation or legislative agendas of 
prominent politicians.  It is far more likely that the comic playwrights were able to take 
advantage of a general festive air that permitted more outlandish behavior and criticism 
that was typically considered acceptable in Athenian culture, and that his attacks were 
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made more for general mockery than a specific change in social values.  He echoes many 
scholars in pointing out that Old Comedy was noteworthy “in its implicit impotence, in 
its inability to exert a practical influence on social and political life.” 
 The analogy to modern satire is correct in that Aristophanes did not benefit 
from repeated exposure to his audience.  It misses the mark, however, because one need 
not assume that Old Comedy intended or was in a position to directly challenge 
deliberative or judicial oratory or act as a rhetorical rival for cultural influence.  The 
purpose of Aristophanic comedy (if one must limit it in this way) is perhaps more 
pedestrian---to raise issues currently in the cultural consciousness and explore how 
seriously they affect the citizenry48.  As Hubbard explains, “Like the Clouds, 
Aristophanes deliberately plays with his audience and leaves it open to them to project 
their own sympathies into the drama and its characters, but at the same time deconstructs 
those projections through a complex rhetoric of ambiguity and irony” (“Mask” 89).  The 
negative portrayals of certain character types and social concepts allows the audience to 
recognize that a particular kind of person, one represented by a figurehead in the comedy, 
is one that should not be imitated or with whom to sympathize.  Even if an initial reaction 
is to side with one figure over another (as perhaps one is inclined to do during the first 
                                                 
48
 Euben sees Old Comedy as a kind of resistance or inoculation against political manipulation, but only 
insofar as it can make Athenians “more attentive to the seductions around them” and “help sustain the 
vitality of a democratic citizenry.  Political Education is not a matter of foisting a particular agenda on an 
audience, but of helping them think about what they are doing, and what others are trying to do to them, 
sometimes in their name, often for their unrecognized benefit” (902).  Ober refers to this insulating effect as 
“dissident criticism” that provides enough of a challenge “that (at a remove) the democracy acknowledged 
that valid concerns had been raised by its critics” (“Debate” 196).  They represent the view that political 
commentary is a strong presence in Athenian society, but that its effects are more subtle and nuanced than 
the direct argumentation of other oratorical arenas.  Cf. Meier (2002), who has a more theoretical take on 
Aristophanes, putting the play in the category of political philosophy rather than political commentary and 
contending that the play offers sophisticated moral critiques about Socrates and the philosophical life. 
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agôn in favor of Greater Discourse), Aristophanes consistently highlights that these 
characters are deeply flawed and poor models for engaging in civic participation and 
conducting ethical arguments.  He invites the audience to critically examine what these 
characters offer to the polis and draw their own conclusions about any solutions to the 
problems he raises. 
 The evidence for direct effects on legislative action as a result of Old Comedy is 
difficult to ascertain given the number of surviving texts from the 5th c. BCE and the 
continued influence of mocked politicians such as Cleon.  The most one can assume is 
that similar themes appearing in different literary genres, such as dramatic plays and 
public orations, demonstrate the topics of conversation dominating public discourse for a 
given period.  Even the direct examination of key passages offers only a fleeting glimpse 
of how one author chose to frame a particular issue, such as corruption in the democratic 
process; textual analysis cannot definitively prove that there was “direct intertextuality 
among the works we happen to have preserved, nor that this critic was in contact with 
that orator” (Ober “Debate” 202).  As stated above, the effects of Old Comedy appear to 
be more subtle and appropriate for a festive environment concerned with unbridled free 
speech and less political urgency than those of more traditional oratorical genres 
attempting to provide clear answers to pressing social and political problems.   
 The portrayal of the characters in Clouds tells the audience that both 
educational systems are inherently flawed and their argumentative claims to mold 
students need to be examined more closely.  The Greater Discourse highlights a model 
designed to fashion young men into strong warrior-types without a significant interest in 
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literary matters, critical thinking, or speaking skills.  He posits a strong campaign of 
physical activity and a healthy respect for working outdoors, but his students are ill-
equipped to handle the rigors of political life as legal advocates.  His continued interest in 
protecting the chastity of his charges, as evident from the repeated descriptions of ways 
boys can entice potential lovers, appears excessive and prurient.  It would be difficult to 
take him seriously, especially because he is unable to defend his position and 
wholeheartedly adopts the arguments of his opponent at the conclusion of the first agôn.  
His evidence, reasoning, and examples are consistently unimpressive and easily refutable, 
demonstrating to the audience that he is likely a product of the education and style of 
speaking he promotes and their most damning indictment.  The Lesser Discourse does not 
present a suitable alternative to traditional education.  Although he successfully defends 
his portion of the argument and is able to claim victory in the battle for Pheidippides, he 
delights in proclaiming his antipathy for convention and that reputation and good-
standing in the community are only useful perhaps in satisfying personal desires; put 
another way, they become the raw materials for any logics or evidence he might need to 
secure his desires and overcome an opposing position with speech.  He is reason divorced 
from morality and community, a weapon in search of a target.  Lesser Discourse’s pupil, 
Pheidippides, is perhaps more unsettling than his instructor because he is the proxy for 
the worst-case scenario for young sophists.  Having tasted victory over his father and 
assumed his authority, he is free to set his sights on areas even more dangerous to the 
social order.  Nussbaum summarizes the problematization for each advocate thusly: “If 
the old education was defective in its indifference to reason, the new education may be 
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equally one-sided in its indifference to the training of the passions” (“Aristophanes” 69).  
Both hold severe consequences for a public drive by political deliberation and democratic 
decision-making. 
 Aristophanes uses these characters to demonstrate that democracy has dangers 
inherently built into its system, both because it can be abused by savvy individuals such 
as the sophists, and that it may provoke violent reactions in people unable to participate 
meaningfully in the political process, just as Strepsiades burns down the Phrontisterion at 
the play’s end.  Although it is a point of Athenian pride that the city has avoided many of 
the disasters brought on by tyrants, Clouds shows that democracy can be a monster just as 
dangerous if guided by irresponsible hands (Nussbaum “Aristophanes” 97).  The play 
provokes the audience to question which of these influences would be most beneficial in 
the polis, but neither answer is satisfactory:  The forceful, self-righteous lout who is 
unable to successfully plead a case in public, or the young man with an interest in politics 
but no scruples for practicing it honestly. 
 Aristophanes never reveals his hand on these issues, leaving the audience to 
muse on the question of ethical citizenship after the play’s end.  However, Kenneth 
Burke’s theory of the hortatory negative can shed some insight into the citizen who might 
be a better alternative to the ones presented in Clouds and how one might recognize or 
become him in the assembly.  The flaws present in the two educations imply that there 
are characteristics to be commended rather than reviled, assumed rather than rejected, in 
a person trained differently from the traditional and sophistic models and that the ideal 
for ethical participation in the city lies away from these polarizations or contrasting 
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figures.  Aristophanes fleshes these characters in such a way that their deficiencies may 
be readily acknowledged as the kinds of behaviors detrimental to political stability, and 
that the members of the audience should take pains to avoid them in the performance of 
their civic duty. 
 The depictions of traditional and sophistic education create a stark contrast 
between the kinds of citizens that may be serving Athens in the next generation.  On the 
surface, the first agôn sets up almost a perfect antithesis because Lesser Discourse 
disavows virtually everything his opponent stands for: physical vs. intellectual strength, 
strong vs. weak physique, sexual chastity vs. hedonism, respect vs. distaste for 
convention.  However, neither character type offers an attractive solution to the question 
of training young Athenian citizens, so the antithesis is less useful than at first glance.  
Neither should be considered wholly positive or negative because of the many underlying 
flaws that become revealed as the agôn progresses, and the few positive qualities are not 
enough to compensate for glaring deficiencies that would prove dangerous if taken to 
extremes.  Neither advocate presents a compelling case for how the ideal, ethically-
minded citizen would be trained in persuasive speech and consequently participate in the 
deliberative processes in Athenian society. 
 Clouds presents a more nuanced antithesis because he encourages the audience 
to react negatively to the portrayals of both educational systems.  They may easily 
acknowledge the flaws in the character types on stage and explore a third possibility, a 
citizen who encompasses the strengths of both systems but avoids their moral pitfalls.49  
                                                 
49
 Redfield (1999) treats the character Socrates as the focal point in Clouds, but arrives at a similar 
conclusion: “No successful alternative to Socrates is presented in the play — certainly not Mr. Right, who 
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This interpretive process is not a straightforward dialectic or synthesis, whereby the two 
logoi and the systems they represent come together to form an entirely new education, 
style of speaking, and concrete embodiment for the audience to view.  Aristophanes has 
made sure that old and new education are so incompatible and fundamentally flawed that 
only the most partisan supporters would accept them as legitimate teachers of the young.  
Clouds instead presents the contrasting figure of a model citizen who would display 
respect for the home and parental authority, just as Greater Discourse promotes in his 
education.  This attitude need not manifest an unflinching deference, as Strepsiades 
shows he is not the most competent paternal figure, but would be considered valuable for 
many Athenians to provide a sense of stability and loyalty for the polis.  It is no surprise 
that many Athenians were concerned with political continuity considering how many 
other Greek states had fallen prey to revolution and stasis regardless of the regime in 
power (Edmunds 78-79).  Moreover, the ideal young citizen would recognize his 
connection to the rest of the Athens, not only to his family.  The potential abuse of 
Pheidippides is not that he could wreak havoc only in his own home, but that such 
instability and potential violence could spill over to the rest of the city.  As Berg explains, 
“Pheidippides’ take-over of his own household is merely a prelude to a take-over of the 
city as a whole” (9). With more of an established connection in place, this ideal citizen 
has a greater likelihood of speaking to the interests of fellow citizens and trying to 
increase the prosperity of more Athenians than simply his philoi.  One would find less 
                                                                                                                                                 
personifies the kind of boneheaded athleticism that caused Strepsiades’ son to incur the debts in the first 
place” (55).  If neither the Greater or Lesser Discourse is the ethical alternative to the sophistic abuses 
characterized in the play, there must an implicit third choice conjured by the audience.   
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chance of this contrasting figure to the two logoi thinking selfishly and only to satisfy 
personal desires because a challenge to the status quo would argue to support a 
community of citizens rather than an isolated but powerful individual.   
 The political conditions in many poleis leading up to the 5th c. reveal that self-
interest was an entrenched value in Greek culture, despite its consistent effects on regime 
change and political instability.50 Thus, there is no reason to suspect that the ideal citizen 
would sacrifice all his desires for polis and oikos because the emphasis of sôphrosunê 
advocated by the Greater Discourse sounds unrealistic and unappealing to any but the 
most selfless of young men.  Instead, there must be more of a balance between personal 
desires and how they can affect the rest of the citizenry.  Such a balance would begin by 
recognizing that change is not necessarily the enemy of society, but that it should not 
happen too suddenly or radically. Pheidippides’ plans represent a substantial paradigm 
change that could overwhelm the rest of the citizenry and take shape without due 
consideration.  He makes the mistake of trying to subvert too much of traditional 
Athenian culture, which is the critical step necessary for Strepsiades to resist the 
seduction of his son’s logic and react more intuitively to the wrongness of the argument 
(Nussbaum “Aristophanes” 77).  The antithesis to Pheidippides would maintain a clear 
connection to the polis and its history, recognizing the value in retaining part of the 
culture and perhaps engaging in a less capricious appraisal of proceeding generations 
                                                 
50
 Forsdyke’s discussion (2000) of the constant cycle of exile and regime change leading up to the 5th c. 
underscores how the struggle for political power between aristocratic factions may nominally have 
concerned the well-being of the polis, but often reflected the desire for personal and unrivaled authority 
(257-258).  She asserts that that the institution of ostracism, developed by Cleisthenes as a response to 
capricious exiles by political rivals, helped to peacefully stabilize Athenian politics as a way of giving the 
demos power to regulate the self-interests of powerful individuals and avoid the dangerous possibility of 
exiled leaders returning with a foreign army. 
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while acknowledging that it may be beneficial to enact certain changes.  This contrasting 
figure would not be conservative to the same degree as the Greater Discourse, but 
perhaps exercise more caution when presenting new ideas and allowing for less of a 
radical, immediate shift in social value than the polis is prepared to undergo. 
 The sophists in Clouds contribute nothing to their fellow citizens because they 
live and interact only in the Phrontisterion; the effects of their “knowledge” stop at the 
walls of their school and have little practical use.  Their antithetical figure would have the 
kind of hands-on experience described by Ober because civic engagement is more 
important than knowledge for its own sake.  Pheidippides is not a total monster despite 
his moral shortcomings because he seems willing to participate in civic culture and lend 
his voice to the Assembly, which would be considered a positive character trait.  
Moreover, sophistic education not only provides critical thinking, but a network of 
possible political connections that would prove useful when bringing matters to a vote or 
trying to galvanize support for a proposal.  It would be a waste to have such instruction 
but never or rarely act on it to the benefit of the polis.  These skills and values are 
directed toward social cohesion because there was always the possibility that 
demagogues could gain undue influence over their fellow citizens. States could implode 
from domestic forces just as easily as from foreign ones, but one could prevent this from 
happening by encouraging advocates with strong public speaking abilities to combat 
them in the Assembly. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Judicial Ethics for Orators and Jurors in Wasps 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
As a democratic state, classical Athens prided itself on eschewing the will of the 
individual over the many, enforcing the idea that equality was the city’s defining strength 
and virtue.  However, Athenian culture in the 5th c. was often the site of tension between 
conflict and consensus, personal advantage and public good.  The economic and political 
disparity between wealthy and poor was a common theme, despite the supposed equality 
of all citizens.  Few places could exhibit this paradox between difference and sameness 
more than the law courts, and few authors could present this divide as critically and 
scathingly as the comic playwright Aristophanes.  His play, Wasps, highlights the 
instability surrounding courtroom rhetoric by showing the irresponsible behavior of both 
orators and jurors.  Aristophanes argues that orator and audience do not have the best 
interests of Athens in mind when considering the effects of a verdict, instead privileging 
personal advantage and pleasure to an excessive degree.  Prosecutors and defendants 
routinely use flattering appeals and entertaining performances to sway the jury, whose 
members are consistently capricious and rarely willing to hear the substance of an 
argument without personal incentive.  Wasps presents the argument that judicial oratory, 
if practiced in this way, cannot produce ethical citizens that will put aside their 
competitive and selfish drives in order to better the city as a whole.  By portraying an 
exaggeration of courtroom rhetoric and its excesses, Aristophanes points out the flaws in 
the judicial system in 5th c. Athens and invites his audience to contemplate a more ideal, 
ethical vision of the law courts.  Kenneth Burke would argue these negative examples of 
courtroom oratory imply ideal opposites who see themselves less as individuals scheming 
for an advantage over neighbors and more as members of a community whose success 
and prosperity are dependent on setting aside differences in pursuit of a common good.  
Although Aristophanes does not describe this ideal orator and juror in the play, the 
Athenian audience would see the flaws in these characters and think on how they could 
avoid such excesses and become more ethical citizens themselves. 
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I. Introduction 
Aristophanes devoted significant attention to the power and perceived abuse of 
demagogues in 5th c. Athens, as previous chapters have already discussed.  He argued 
narratively that their influence began in sophistic training and under the tutelage of 
accomplished practitioners, but their story does not end with the burning of the 
Phrontisterion.  In Wasps, the play produced in 422 BCE (the year following Clouds), 
Aristophanes continues his exploration into oratorical ethics by examining another forum 
in which demagogues can incite and unduly influence their fellow citizens.  Instead of the 
school where they learn such techniques, Wasps follows the story of an old man, 
Philocleon, who is addicted to hearing speeches in the lawcourts and serving as a juror.    
The play highlights two dangers that put the polis at risk: first, that certain types of 
speakers should not be allowed to argue and overwhelm the ability of audiences to get to 
the truth of a case with flattery and entertaining stories; second, that the audiences of 
jurors are also responsible for the unethical state of legal oratory because they punish 
speakers who do not provide enough entertainment and privilege the demagogues who 
can pander successfully.  Unlike in Clouds, where only orators seem to receive blame for 
their influence, Wasps argues that both speaker and audience are responsible for creating 
an environment where guilt and innocence are less important that putting on and enjoying 
a good show.  I argue the play can also be interpreted using Burke’s concept of the 
negative to view a more ethical, ideal speaker and audience that will address the 
deficiencies in the Athenian legal sphere.   
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 Aristophanes rightfully turns his attention to the lawcourts in Wasps because this 
aspect of Athenian society provided a consistent opportunity for abuse and unethical 
behavior.  As a signature institution for the polis, the courts publicly represented and 
maintained the democratic values of deciding matters collaboratively and giving each 
citizen the opportunity to pursue justice as individuals.51  Like all institutions, however, it 
was imperfect and could unduly harm citizens unfortunate enough to get caught up in the 
wrong place at the wrong time.   Christ beautifully sums up the Athenian attitude toward 
litigation and explains why Aristophanes would devote an entire play to its examination 
(227): 
 
If the past can provide a lesson for the present, the Athenian experience suggests 
that discussion of and concern about legal excess and abuse are inevitable in a 
democratic society that values access to courts and yet remains conscious that the 
pursuit of litigation is not necessarily synonymous with the pursuit of justice. 
 
 
Unlike the judge in a modern case in western Europe or America, the presiding officials 
(archai) exercised limited authority.  They typically did not convene juries with the 
expressed purpose of deciding particular cases, did not have the power to decide who 
would serve on a jury for a particular case, could not object to or exclude evidence and 
types of arguments, and did not appear to provide instructions for weighing evidence 
appropriately (Todd “Shape” 79).  Although there is certainly room for corruption, the 
                                                 
51
 Christ (1998) correctly identifies one of the difficulties of exploring Athenian attitudes of the court 
system: “Because most of the sources date from the period ca. 430-322 B.C., it is difficult to assess the 
Athenian reaction to the dramatic legal changes that occurred in the decades immediately following the 
reform of the popular courts in 462 B.C.  When the sources speak of legal excess and abuse, they are 
probably not reacting so much to a revolution in progress as to its aftermath” (5).  He concludes that the 
legal system was likely consistent during this lengthy period and did not experience significant change, but 
the extended nature of the evidence is worth bearing in mind. 
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judges themselves were spared Aristophanes’ scorn because there was little they could do 
to bias a jury, favor an advocate, or unduly influence the proceedings. 
With the archai acting mostly as official witnesses to the cases, more potent 
authority rested with audiences and advocates.  Juries were quite powerful because they 
exercised the final decision in any case and there was no appeals process.  The translation 
of juror and court for dikastēs and dikasterion is something of a simplification, as Todd 
explains (“Purpose” 19):  
 
It is easy enough to remember that the dikastes is neither precisely a ‘judge’ nor a 
‘juror’.  But every time that we translate dikasterion as a ‘court’ (and it would be 
insufferably pedantic never to do so) we thereby imply that an Athenian court was 
essentially similar to our own, not only in appearance but also (and this is the 
important point) in function.  This is a false assumption, and it is wasted criticism, 
based on modernizing assumptions, to blame the Athenian dikasterion for failing 
to achieve that supposedly objective enactment of justice for which it was never 
designed. 
 
 
One must also recognize that juries decided cases amongst private individuals, state 
prosecutions (detailed below), confirmed magistrates, conducted audits of public 
officials, and impeached generals (Hansen “Political” 235-239 and “Eisangelia” 59).52  In 
short, the authority of jurors was broad, without review, and delved into several aspects 
of state business. 
Citizens who appeared for jury service in the late 5th c. BCE likely represented a 
range of economic backgrounds, both by profession and amount of income.  A more 
destitute citizen could afford to leave the farm or take some time away from a trade 
                                                 
52
 Hansen estimates that 35 of 143 known generals in a 77-year span were indicted by the polis, which 
demonstrates that juries were not only settling disputes between individuals but conducting important state 
business. 
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because the economic loss or lack of productivity would be somewhat offset by the daily 
juror wage.53  Jury service required only that participants be 30 years old or more and to 
have sworn the juror’s oath at the start of the year.  To differentiate this service from 
others in the polis, any citizen over 20 years old could participate in the ekklēsia, but only 
citizens 30 or older could serve on juries, which eliminated approximately one-third of 
the potential candidates for jury service overall (Hansen “Political” 222-223).  Moreover, 
this reflects the Greek belief that older men are considered more sensible than their 
younger counterparts and that the judicial system required more wisdom than other 
argumentative fora.  The size of juries could change depending on the circumstances of a 
trial, but Blanshard notes that 500 jurors was a fairly standard number, with 1000 and 
1500 citizens casting ballots for more egregious or politically charged cases (33).54  The 
larger jury size than we are accustomed to in the modern west is likely because the 
Greeks assumed “that it would be impossible to bribe such a large number of people” 
(Timmerman and Schiappa 70).  Moreover, even citizens who were not yet eligible to 
serve in juries because they were too young or who arrived after the maximum juror 
capacity was reached might still observe the proceedings.  Lanni explains that this kind of 
spectator politics provided ample entertainment for citizens of all kinds and that “most 
Athenians could be quite familiar with the workings of the lawcourts, the method of 
argument, and some of the city's laws by the time they served as jurors (186).  It is likely 
                                                 
53
 MacDowell (1995) argues that “There can be no doubt that the original purpose of introducing pay for 
juries was to ensure that rich men did not predominate in them; a poor man could not afford to abstain from 
his normal work unless he was paid to do so” (“Aristophanes” 157). 
54
 Blanshard (2004) also explains that there may have been different jury sizes based on the severity of the 
charge and the economic cost disputed by the advocates.  The Ath. Pol. lists 40, 201, and 401 as additional 
jury sizes, although it is difficult to assess the frequency of these cases in court.  See also Christ for a 
thorough breakdown of the different roles allowed in the different assemblies and committees in late 5th c. 
Athens (18-19). 
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that cases were routinely judged and observed by a broad cross-section of the Athenian 
populace and that familiarity with the art of litigation was commonplace for many 
citizens.   
 The advocates who brought cases and publicly pursued justice were the 
counterpart to juries and the other source of courtroom influence.  Athenian jurisprudence 
was a flexible institution in that it provided different procedures and types of cases 
depending on the alleged offense and standing of the advocate.  There were no publicly 
funded prosecutors (or even lawyers as we understand the modern profession) or citizens 
who always acted in the interest of the state, so any suit would be brought by a private 
citizen.  Prosecutors were afforded flexibility based on whether a suit represented a 
public interest (dike demosiae) or dispute between private individuals (dike idiai), as well 
as whether anyone could bring a suit (graphe) or only one of the people directly 
connected to the case (dike in a more narrow sense).  Moreover, there was little to no 
personal risk in pursuing a dike, but anyone prosecuting a graphe could be severely fined 
by the state if a case was too trivial to be successful or wasted the court’s time with 
incompetent arguing (Osborne 40-43).  Since the archai did not provide instructions, it 
was up to each advocate to explain any laws relevant to the case at hand and “often ask 
the jury to shout down their opponent if he misrepresents the laws or facts of the case” 
(Lanni 187).  The ability to decide when a case was brought to trial and which laws were 
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most pertinent offered significant power for advocates to shape the jury’s interpretation 
of facts.55 
This distinction from our own legal system is important for understanding 
Athenian courts because they allowed citizens to tailor their prosecutions to the needs and 
desired outcome of a case, which often meant sabotaging the reputation and influence of 
political rivals.  Todd remarks that “What is most notable here is that if you want to use a 
trial for political ends, you need to choose a procedure that will cause your opponent 
substantial damage: ideally death or atimia, or a fine so substantial as to be crippling” 
(“Shape” 159).  The Athenians not only tolerated but encouraged this kind of political 
combat because helping friends and harming enemies was a cornerstone to their 
conception of social worth and personal identity.56  Engaging in physical combat or 
taking disputes to the street was not considered socially acceptable, as the moral 
takeaway from the Eumenides makes clear; however, “vengeance through a lawsuit was 
well within the bounds of socially acceptable retaliation” (Christ 154).  The courts were 
not only a means for procuring justice in the more virtuous sense of the term, but in the 
hands of skilled strategically-minded speakers could act as a powerful weapon to bring 
down political opponents.  When one considers the shifting and unpredictable nature of 
the courtroom audience alongside the ability for advocates to cherry pick the 
circumstances and context for any charges brought, it is easy to conclude that “Athenian 
                                                 
55
 Gagarin (2002) also makes the point that “A litigant’s primary task in presenting his case was to take 
control of the issue—to direct the juror’s attention to those issues that favored his own case, while at the 
same time drawing their attention away from points that might favor his opponent” (“Antiphon” 137-138). 
 
56
 Major (2013) demonstrates that the common Greek value of helping friends and harming enemies 
appears elsewhere in Aristophanes (65). 
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justice was therefore, to say the least, capricious” (Todd “Shape” 79).  This environment 
of political opportunism in front of spectators who enjoyed the verbal jousting created a 
culture where any individual could be profoundly harmed through the whims of fellow 
citizens. 
The decision to critique and mock this institution in Wasps was not likely an idle 
choice from Aristophanes, as the lawcourts provided ample opportunity for abuse, 
corruption, and unethical behavior.  Because each trial began and concluded on the same 
day, advocates were confronted with a certain urgency to make their case immediately, 
often based on the force of personality rather than facts.57  The timeframe for trials 
created a dramatic spectacle similar to the theatrical plays at festivals, as stories were 
enacted argumentatively for audiences that could enjoy them in their entirety before 
going home for the day.  The play follows the misadventures of an older Athenian 
gentleman named Philocleon (“Loves Cleon” in Greek) who is addicted to jury service 
and the conflict it provokes with his son Bdelycleon (“Hates Cleon”).  Older characters in 
Old Comedy typically represent established values and tradition, whereas their young 
counterparts (such as Pheidippides in Clouds) stand in for new perspectives; in Wasps, 
we see the opposite in that Philocleon demonstrates an unapologetic, impish glee in 
scorning justice while his son argues against the rise and influence of demagogues who 
promote and reward his father’s capricious and spiteful behavior (Konstan “Politics” 29).  
The old man is an atypical juror because he is not compelled to service as a means of 
                                                 
57
 Cf Finley (2004) for the desperation endured by Athenian orators: “Their leaders had no respite.  Because 
their influence had to be earned and exerted directly and immediately — this was a necessary consequence 
of a direct, as distinct from a representative, democracy — they had to lead in person, and they also had to 
bear, in person, the brunt of the opposition’s attacks” (176). 
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supporting himself; the extra money certainly does not hurt and he delights in being able 
to bring obols home to his family, but Bdelycleon appears to be a man of means and 
could provide any number of material comforts for his father (as is demonstrated in the 
second half of the play).  As Christ argues, Philocleon’s addiction to jury service “shifts 
attention away from the problem as one rooted in class and socioeconomic status, and 
paves the way for an imaginary solution to it” (109).  His situation allows Aristophanes to 
comment on the entire court system without excessively hovering over economic 
conditions and their ability to distract from other vital considerations.   
 Philocleon’s addiction is fueled by two competing aspects of his personality, 
which are given further emphasis in the chorus of fellow jurors.  First, he is profoundly 
angry and enjoys inflicting harm on other people.58  The title of Wasps is a sound 
metaphor for his character because he views it as his right and duty to sting people who 
displease him, regardless of whether the offense in question has done actual or perceived 
harm.  The core of this attitude was likely common amongst many Athenians because the 
very act of addressing an audience almost “declared an individuality that was potentially 
suspect” (Ober “Mass” 296).  Philocleon is an object of ridicule because his anger is so 
intense that he is unable to distinguish a trivial from a legitimate threat.  However, the 
idea of righteous indignation being channeled against a worthy foe was considered a 
positive virtue in late 5th c. Athens; Konstan notes that Aristophanes himself uses the 
position of playwright to brag “of having an anger like that of Hercules that has enabled 
him from the beginning of his career to stand up against serious opponents like Cleon 
                                                 
58
 According to Konstan (1985), the chorus of wasps or Philocleon are described with the term orge or its 
related synonyms no less than 19 times in the play (“Politics” 33). 
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rather than prostituting his muse in petty jibes” and that “MacDowell [in his commentary 
on Wasps] rightly glosses orge here as spirit or courage (“Politics” 32-32).  Moreover, 
this kind of mental and physical toughness was integral to the fighting spirit of the polis, 
as citizens were expected to defend Athens and uphold its reputation in the Greek world 
with vigor and passion (Bowie “Aristophanes” 97).  Second, Philocleon demonstrates 
that he is a fairly powerless and uninfluential.  His only authority comes from the casting 
of a juror’s ballot, as he does not hold political office or assume the role of an orator, no 
longer serves in the military, and has relinquished the upkeep of his home and finances to 
his son.  Sitting in judgment as one individual among hundreds is his only opportunity to 
exercise control in Athens.  Konstan aptly compares his standing to that of a child with 
no place to express or release this energetic caprice, which should by definition render 
him unqualified to act as a juror (“Politics 31).  He is not respected by his fellow citizens, 
capable or willing to lead, or an established member of the speaking elite, thus he 
represents the less financially secure class of common Athenians whose main civic duty 
in peacetime was acting as an audience member. 
 The conflicting portrayal of Philocleon as a spirited member of the older 
generation and powerless nobody has led to different interpretations about the play’s 
import or meaning, although many scholars believe Wasps is more than mere 
entertainment.  Interpreting the play broadly, some believe that Aristophanes is 
transgressively playing with norms so that citizens will think more carefully about how 
they fit into the social stratum.  Crane argues that the polis is more of an abstract or 
idealized construct observed in the discourse of the late 5th c., from which one can infer 
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values and themes from the period; Aristophanes strives for an idealized version of the 
city, particularly its judicial system in Wasps, while dealing with the particulars of daily 
Athenian experience (198-202).  Approaching the play in more of an ethical manner, 
MacDowell observes that “Serious criticisms emerge mainly when Philokleon and 
Bdelykleon have a debate (the agon of the play) on the question whether the life of a 
juror is really a good life or not” (“Aristophanes” 160).  One may slightly reframe this 
question to what kind of person ought to participate in the jury system and how can they 
make it less prone to abuse for the polis, which is a defining theme of my argument in 
this chapter.  As I discussed in chapter 2, one of the benchmarks for ethical citizenship 
was participating in government and effecting some kind of service for the polis that went 
beyond benefits for the individual citizen.  Wasps consistently portrays the courts as a 
series of opportunities for both speakers and jurors to game a broken system, with 
mutually beneficial and unethical behavior on both sides. 
 Any examination of the juror system will involve people as targets, because even 
the most entrenched and methodical institution is ultimately composed of and maintained 
by human agents.59  Athenian authors discussing threats to the polis routinely avoided the 
institutions in abstract or general terms because the possibility of real danger was more 
likely to appear as events, actions, or through human intervention (Blanshard 29).  In 
Wasps, scholars see different human elements as part of Aristophanes’ criticism.  Some 
suggest that the demagogues receive the main brunt of the play’s attacks rather than the 
                                                 
59
 For a competing view, cf. Major (2013): “Bdelycleon’s interjections and follow-up arguments pertain 
more to the deliberative and political process generally than to the operation of the courts and juror 
behavior” (103).   
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jurors.60  Referring to an argument from de Ste. Croix, Konstan argues that Aristophanes 
tends to adopt a more conservative political position and that the play criticizes the 
abuses of democracy because of its rule by the people; the inner tension of the play 
“works to mask the popular character of the court system and valorize the upper-class 
ideals of withdrawal and privatism” (“Greek” 27).61  Others argue that the play critiques 
not democracy as a whole, but the particular incarnation adopted by and currently alive in 
5th c. Athens.  Olson convincingly argues that Wasps “is probably better characterized 
simply as ‘conservative’ and interpreted as a response by a representative of one set of 
democrats to the arguments and ideology put forward by another” (“Politics” 147).  This 
view asserts that Philocleon represents the common Athenian, who has been manipulated 
and conned into giving away his vote and a share in the collective prosperity of the polis 
to gratify the needs of a recently influential class of politicians.  If Wasps is not anti-
democratic, this position would stress, perhaps it leans towards a less direct form of self-
governance, one which had been present in earlier generations to remove the element of 
caprice so characteristic of rule by the people. 
In this chapter, I argue that Aristophanes uses Wasps to critique the Athenian 
judicial system by not only attacking the influence of selfish demagogues but also the 
jurors who are complicit in their rise to political power.  Unlike previous commentators, I 
                                                 
60
 MacDowell (“Aristophanes” 163-164) and Christ (12) allow for a sophisticated attack on the judicial 
system, but put more emphasis on the demagogues as collectors of influence rather than the jurors who 
readily surrender their votes in service of unjust causes. 
61
 Olson (1996) briefly extends this argument to its logical conclusion: “As for democracy, Wasps as a 
whole explicitly denies that anything which could reasonably be called "rule by the stilos" exists in 
contemporary Athens and implicitly questions whether an arrangement under which the people administer 
the city's affairs on a day-to- day basis benefits them in any case, given how consistently they have in the 
past, it claims, been taken in by smooth-talking political opportunists who played to all their worst instincts. 
(“Politics” 146). 
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believe the caricature of Philocleon does not spare the voting public from their share in 
the current status of the court system, although his excesses are gross enough not to cut 
too close to their own experience or overly prejudice them against the play as a 
competitive performance.  By highlighting qualities for the most capricious, 
unsympathetic type of juror and the manipulative, selfish type of advocate in Wasps, 
Aristophanes points out serious flaws in the judicial system in 5th c. Athens, to invite his 
audience to contemplate a more ideal, ethical vision of the law courts.  The audience is 
encouraged to think of a citizen who will not look to decide cases based on their 
entertainment value or the ability to use the courts to harm fellow citizens with impunity.  
Instead, the ideal juror will weigh the merits of a case without resorting to significant 
personal motive and render a verdict based on evaluating both sides of a case at its 
conclusion.  His oratorical counterpart, the advocate for a case, is also characterized as 
distorting the legal system because of personal motives which unduly harm fellow 
citizens and using unethical argumentative techniques.  The ideal advocate will persuade 
audiences less through pandering and entertaining stories, without looking to enrich 
himself significantly at the expense of his fellow citizens.  Aristophanes implies that 
these are the only people who can readjust the court system so that it does not fall into 
further corruption.  As in chapter 2, I will describe the arguments of the play’s agōn, 
where Philocleon and Bdelycleon debate the advantages of the juror’s life (526-724), 
how it characterizes the excesses of judicial oratory, and conclude by explaining how 
these arguments help the audience to visualize a more ethical juror and advocate. 
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II. Delusions of Grandeur in the Agōn 
 The agōn in Wasps highlights the motivations for Philocleon and his fellow jurors 
by hearing directly from the source.  The debate has the air of an advocate presenting 
opening arguments for a lengthier and more complicated case, as the old man provides 5 
key reasons or benefits for acting capriciously.  While he lays out these arguments, 
Bdelycleon takes notes, much as a modern courtroom reporter might do, so that he fully 
understands the scope and logic of his father’s concerns.  After Philocleon’s statements, 
his son begins to dissect the arguments to show that the common citizen has been taken 
advantage of by the demagogues and orators.  This section of the play discusses some 
important ethical issues, such as the people who have or should have power to make 
decisions in the polis, whether citizens can consider themselves legitimate equals, and the 
types of persuasion considered appropriate for sound and effective politics. 
 The first key issue involves acceptable types of persuasion, especially concerning 
the power of demagogues and the rise of sophistry.  The term itself, demagogue, bears 
consideration because a modern English understanding implies manipulation, 
sloganeering, and a penchant for propaganda rather than sound argumentation.  In 
contrast, Aristophanes’ contemporaries would likely have had a more elastic definition in 
the late 5th c. because the term applied broadly to virtually anyone who was able to 
address a mass audience.  Finley argues that demagogues were a necessary component of 
the Athenian political system because someone had to present ideas, policies, and 
commentary on past action; without some kind of leading figure, consensus building 
would have been impossible (180).  Moreover, it is telling that Aristophanes himself, in 
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the many caricatures of demagogues and sophists scattered throughout the extant plays, 
only uses the term or its related cognates twice in Knights and once in Frogs.62  One 
might also refer to the class of speakers addressing juries as orator because “debate 
designed to win votes among an outdoor audience numbering many thousands means 
oratory, in the strictest sense of the word” (Finley 173).  For these reasons, I will use 
demagogue, orator, and advocate interchangeably throughout the analysis in this chapter 
to describe the broad class of speakers in the courtroom. 
 The unethical and manipulative speaker is critiqued so often by Aristophanes and 
his literary peers (but especially so in Wasps) because it represented a shifting balance of 
power from traditional governance in Athens.  The end of the 5th c. ushered in a new 
groundswell of persuasive technique, which was likely a cause for concern because one 
person could influence thousands with a single speech. As Rhodes explains, “Xenophon 
remarks in his Memorabilia that a man who dares to use violence needs many allies but 
one who is able to persuade needs none” (“Political Activity” 198-199).  Bdelycleon 
observes how quickly and effortlessly juries are lead to acquit or convict because of their 
apparent helplessness in the face of these speakers.  The only recourse is to use these very 
techniques in a mock-trial setup against his father to demonstrate the full stretch of their 
impact and that Philocleon himself will be affected negatively (Harriot 37).  The audience 
is likely familiar enough with these rhetorical moves to anticipate and laugh at them, but 
the larger question remains whether these techniques should be socially approved or 
rejected. 
                                                 
62
 Finley explains that “demagogue” eventually took on a negative connotation to refer to the “bad types” 
of speakers, but that the term was fairly neutral in the late 5th c and did not have a particularly shocking or 
scandalous connotation (165).  This perhaps explains its consistent absence in the Aristophanic corpuse. 
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  The second issue considered in the agon is the type of person who should be 
granted authority to make decisions in the polis.  Philocleon and Bdelycleon debate the 
use of power strong enough to enslave fellow citizens, so this is not an idle conversation 
about courtroom gossip or mild inconveniences.  The argument hinges on whether elites 
from an upper social class can or should be allowed to direct their fellow citizens or if all 
members of the voting public should be ascribed the same general status and position 
(MacDowell “Aristophanes” 160).  Philocleon will openly admit early in the agōn that he 
is not a simpleton being fooled by the elite speakers, but that he deliberately uses the 
court system and his role as a juror as “a means to an extraordinary, almost unrivalled 
degree of power and pleasure (Olson “Politics” 133).63  Bdelycleon’s main argument is 
that the jurors’ pursuit of power is delusional because they have misread the oratorical 
situation and its effects on them.  Instead, they have willingly handed over power to the 
elites and robbed themselves of the ability to participate meaningfully in political life.64 
 
III. Philocleon’s Benefits of the Juror Lifestyle 
Philocleon lays out his case by arguing that the common juror receives 5 
substantial benefits.  First, he enjoys that rich and important defendants are subservient to 
him, which illustrates the larger dichotomy of autonomous vs. servile actions.  Philocleon 
                                                 
63
 Konstan and Olson disagree about whether Philocleon’s motivations for jury service is only a sickness 
for comic effect, but Olson rightly points that the old man reveals later in the play that he has complex 
rationalizations to explain his enjoyment and continued desire for jury service (“Politics” 133). 
64
 Slater (2002) points out that this was a fairly scathing indictment of the judicial system even within the 
approved impropriety of Old Comedy: “They [the demos] have become titillated spectators of a drama 
orchestrated by the corrupt political leaders of Athens.  They have allowed the pleasures of spectatorship 
(and its modest financial rewards) to delude them, chaining them to their miserable lives on the jury 
benches when they could be living as free men.  The charge that jury service enslaves is a shocking one in a 
society where slavery existed, where in fact participation in such activities of the democracy as jury service 
was considered an essential marker of the status of free man” (91). 
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begins his apologia for the capricious juror by describing the daily activities and people 
he is likely to encounter (Harriot 39).  He elevates the power of a juror to no less than that 
of a king (548-9, peri tês archês apodeixô/tês êmeteras ôs oudemias êttôn estin 
basileias), then outlines the hypothetical story of young defendants who are large in 
stature and six feet tall (553, andres megaloi kai tetrapêcheis), putting their hands into 
Philocleon’s and asking him to grant them a favorable result in court (556ff).  Bdelycleon 
records this part of the argument as a benefit concerning supplicants (559, peri tôn 
antibolountôn).  It is noteworthy that Philocleon does none of the things he said he would 
to the defendants (561, endon toutôn ôn an phaskô pantôn ouden pepoiêka). 
 This first point in the agon sets the tone for the rest of the argument and provides 
Bdelycleon with a counterpoint later in the play.  Philocleon recognizes that there is great 
disparity between the lives of the wealthy social class and his own of older laborers and 
former soldiers.  It is reasonable to conclude that he relishes engaging in a bit of class 
warfare and bringing rich defendant down to his level, because the juror position affords 
him the power to affect the livelihood of his peers in a direct, material way.  Although 
democracy was zealously guarded and upheld in public fora, Philocleon’s desire for 
social control would not have been uncommon or looked at askance in the late 5th c.  The 
jurors were more likely to come from an economically underprivileged class, thus any 
opportunity to improve their situation without causing directly bodily harm to a fellow 
citizen would not have been immediate cause for censure.65  Moreover, Davie observes 
                                                 
65
 There are clear limits to this mentality, elaborated at length by Taylor in her second discussion of 
Athenian bribery (2001): “A further problem for the Athenians was how to react to bribery in the law 
courts, a crime for which there was a special law: the graphe dekasmou.  This law prescribed the death 
penalty for both giving and receiving bribes: there was no alternative penalty, as there was with crimes 
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that the travails of autocratic rule “as a woeful burden, familiar to us from Shakespeare's 
histories, seems not to have troubled the ordinary Athenian overmuch,” despite some 
more introspective examination from the tragedians (167). 
 Philocleon is moved by more than power, as he delights in the different types of 
entertaining appeals provided by legal advocates.  He views it as unimportant whether he 
grants serious consideration to any issue presented so long as he is enjoying the spectacle 
and showmanship of the performers.  He begins by describing the different classes of 
defendants and the techniques they use to ingratiate themselves with jurors.  Some bewail 
the deep poverty of their situation (presumably to instill pity in the audience) until they 
are made equal to Philocleon’s own situation (564-565, oi men g’ apoklaontai penian 
autôn…eôs an pôs anisôsêi toisin emoisin).  Others entertain by telling stories, jokes 
(566, oi de legousin muthous êmin, oi d’ Aisôpou ti geloion) or making Philocleon laugh 
to the point where he sets aside his anger (567, oi de skôptous’, in’ egô gelasô kai ton 
thumon katathômai).  If an appeal from the advocate himself is unsuccessful with the 
jury, some bring their children in front of the audience (568, kan mê toutois 
anapeithomestha…).  Philocleon refers to this set of examples as a great authority and the 
mockery (or derision) of wealth (575, ar ou megalê tout’ est’ archê kai tou ploutou 
katachênê;). 
                                                                                                                                                 
committed by officials or other persons in the public eye. This seems to indicate that the Athenians viewed 
jury corruption as a more serious crime than any other form of bribery. Why this was so can perhaps be 
explained by the common notion that poorer men were more likely to be involved in financial irregularities 
than their wealthy counterparts: if the poor were more likely to accept bribes than the rich, they would need 
a greater deterrent” (“Bribery II” 156). 
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 His argument implies that the jurors have more control over persuasive techniques 
than the speakers because verdicts dictate future action.  An advocate would be foolish to 
use a style of speaking that had produced unfavorable results before, so the most 
consistent path to a legal victory lies through pandering to the audience’s desire for a 
show.  A speaker might even have to adapt or altogether throw out the initial plan for a 
speech because “unpopular speakers were shouted down or even dragged off the orator’s 
platform” (Wallace 106).  Philocleon makes clear that the jurors he represents are looking 
for something beyond the cut and dried approach of logical argumentation.  Either they 
wish to see something pleasant and funny or to see a fellow citizen groveling for their 
favor.  This limited range of persuasive options for advocates further highlights the 
juror’s desire to demonstrate control over their peers and rebalance the social strata so 
that all are brought to a similar level.   
 The ability to exert social control over fellow citizens is not only intoxicating in 
its own right, as Philocleon also revels in the belief that his fellow jurors can act without 
being called to account for their decisions.  This type of power borders on the tyrannical 
since he can bestow favor or malicious attack with impunity (587, kai taut’ anupeuthunoi 
drômen, tôn d’allôn oudemi’ archê).66  Jurors may compel a defendant to blatantly 
entertain them, even if it has nothing to do with the case at hand (Oeagrus, allegedly a 
tragic actor, might have to deliver the best speech from the Niobe if he wishes to 
successfully defend himself in court: 579-80, kan Oiagros eiselthe pheugôn, ouk 
                                                 
66
 As Major (2013) explains, tyranny was generally reviled when originating in an individual who set 
himself above the rest of the polis, but Athenians were remarkably receptive to the concept of tyrannical 
acts if they were endorsed by and for the voting demos (101). 
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apopheugei prin an êmin/ek tês Niobês eipê rêsin tên kallistên apolexas).67  They also 
reserve the right to reject the stipulations in a will to bequeath an heiress daughter to 
someone if they so choose (582ff).  Bdelycleon makes a point to stress that the jurors 
responsible for counterfeiting the seal for the heiress’s will are doing her an injustice 
(589, tês d’epiklêrou tên diathêkên adikeis anakogchuliazôn). 
 The larger point Philocleon makes about the legal system is that jurors could 
decide cases emotionally based on an intuitive rather than intellectual understanding of 
the law.  The arguments presented need not have dealt with facts or evidence pertaining 
to a case, as Bers shows (13): 
 
A litigant in an Athenian popular court was perfectly free to broaden his 
presentation to incorporate any private or public consideration that he regarded as 
favoring his case.  Consequently, trials often took in a variety of issues far 
removed from the specific charge, but having some urgency in the public mind. 
 
Litigants were not trained explicitly as a modern lawyer and rules of evidence did not 
exclude certain types of arguments, so jurors were compelled to vote based on what was 
put before them using community standards or personal understandings of moral 
behavior as guides (Christ 195-196).  In the case of the heiress mentioned by Philocleon, 
the legal system recognized that wills could be corrupted and fraudulent, so some 
                                                 
67
 Slater adds that individual advocates, especially coming from a dramatic background, might be 
compelled by the audience to perform some of their ‘greatest hits:’ “At this period, tragedies were still 
given only a single performance at the dramatic festivals.  An actor might well be asked to reprise a famous 
speech as a party piece—but jurors of Philocleon’s sort were not invited to those parties.  Here the court is 
turned into a form of symposium, with Oeagrus put on the spot by his ‘hosts’” (93). 
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additional evidence was required such as verification by human witnesses (Rydberg-Cox 
653).  However, his larger point stands that any juror is free to ignore the testimony of 
those witnesses, even if he believes them to be credible, and cannot be stopped from 
giving her away to someone not stipulated in the will.  Wallace underscores this point, 
noting that citizens used and recognized the ability “of the Athenian state to interfere in 
virtually any aspect of personal life, as shown by a history of regulations and sometimes 
arbitrary punishments in matters pertaining to speech, thought, and conduct” (107-108). 
 An additional benefit concerns the relationship Philocleon believes he has built 
with influential politicians.  This is not a political alliance in which he can promote his 
own agenda to the polis so much as he receives favors from the politicians to whom he 
gives positive verdicts.  He describes how Euathlus and Flatter-onymous promise not 
betray the people and that they will fight on their behalf (592-3, eit’ Euathlos chô megas 
outos Kolakônumos, aspidapoblês,/ouchi prodôsein êmas phasin, peri tou plêthous de 
macheisthai); moreover, politicians do not convene the Assembly until they have 
adjourned the court after only one case (594-595).68  Even Cleon, the shout-conqueror 
(596, o kekraxidamas), does not gnaw at the jurors (monon êmas ou peritrôgei), but 
protects with the hand and wards off the flies (597, alla phulattei dia cheiros echôn kai 
tas muias apamunei).  Theorus is said to shine Philocleon’s shoes (599ff). 
 This kind of relationship does not appear to be improper and, expressed sincerely, 
would have been akin to the more personal feelings of philia between individual citizens.  
                                                 
68
 The translations for Kolakônumos and kekraxidamas were obtained from MacDowell’s (1971) 
commentary on Wasps.  Moreover, he provides historical context for adjourning the court after a single 
case: “A juror was paid 3 obols for any day on which he sat, regardless of the number of cases tried, but he 
received no fee if no cases were tried.  Thus a proposal that the courts should try one case and then adjourn 
was in effect a proposal that the jurors should have a half-holiday with a full day’s pay” (“Wasps” 213).   
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The argument is noteworthy because it is the only time Philocleon implies that he has 
someone else’s interests in mind when deciding a case or that personal satisfaction is not 
the only guiding principle for his vote.  He seems to genuinely appreciate his connection 
to certain politicians as if they were friendly on more personal terms.  Philocleon likely 
recognizes that men such as Cleon and Euathlos can provide things that he alone is 
incapable of obtaining, but insinuates that their status in the relationship is more equal 
than perhaps would have been realistic.  Instead of depending on political favors from a 
Cleon-like figure as a more traditional patron with clients, they “enjoy his affection” 
(Crane 209).  Moreover, the remark about Theorus shining Philocleon’s shoes is clearly 
an exaggeration that underscores his earlier arguments about possessing a unique power 
to control fellow citizens.  These relationships are further complicated because Philocleon 
does not emphasize the juror’s wage as part of their patronage, but the monetary 
incentive to decide cases in favor of demagogues is not exactly inappropriate.  Harvey 
reflects that terms for persuasion are often used as substitutes for direct gift-giving or 
receiving.  With reference to chremasi peithein, he remarks that “the implications are 
interesting: the phrase seems to suggest that there are two ways of persuading, with 
words and with gifts” and “that neither is necessarily more improper than the other” (83). 
 Philocleon concludes his case for the advantages of jury service by arguing that 
he has a certain degree of personal autonomy when it comes to providing for his family.  
The 3-obol wage allows him to avoid obtaining money or supplies from his son; 
consequently, he derives satisfaction and enjoyment for being the main provider for his 
family.  Philocleon presents the family’s reaction upon his return from a day in the courts 
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as overwhelmingly positive (606ff, his daughter kisses him, calls him daddy while getting 
the jury pay, and washes and oils his feet while his wife brings sweet food and 
encourages him to eat it up).  This is important to him because Philocleon says explicitly 
that he is brightened by these occurrences (612, toutoisin egô ganumai); moreover, 
Philocleon sees his jury pay as a means of defense against negligence from his son, 
referring to it specifically as “defensive equipment against missiles” (615ff, skeuên 
beleôn aleôrên).  He concludes the argument by comparing himself to Zeus and 
proclaiming that his power is no less than the authority of the king of the gods (619, ar’ 
ou megalên archên archô kai tou Dios ouden elattô). 
 The apologia for jury service is founded on the belief that an individual citizen 
can wield enormous power over his peers to secure lasting benefits and personal 
advantage, but it ultimately rings hollow.  If Philocleon’s argument is valid, he is granted 
vast authority over other citizens, provided entertainment, able to build relationships with 
politicians, enjoys the pride of being the breadwinner at home, and is allowed to act in the 
court system without oversight or punishment.  Crane aptly summarizes this argument by 
referring to its complexity as a blending of “money, kinship, emotions, and raw power” 
(211).  Because Wasps is a comedy and prone to elaborate exaggeration, one need not 
accept Philocleon’s claims at face value.  There is a certain mischievous charm to the old 
man’s logic and an Athenian audience would likely have sympathized with his desire to 
be in control over his own life, but the outlandish claims do not measure up with the 
humble status of his position.  As Rodgers explains, the 3-obol pay for jurors was not 
enticing enough for many citizens to participate in court because the wage was barely 
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enough to sustain a small family (150-151).  The implication is that only the most poor, 
or those unable to perform other work, were best suited for daily jury service and that 
they were beholden to demagogues who continued to provide this wage.  This lower 
economic standing creates an ugly opportunity for corruption and abuse of the system, 
because maintaining the relationship between juror and politician becomes more 
important than following an (admittedly imperfect) pursuit of justice. 
Philocleon’s attitudes towards his peers reveal a further complication about the 
life of jurors in the late 5th c and the kind of ethical audience behaviors encouraged by 
Wasps.  Athenian culture at this time was not sympathetic to citizens who believed 
themselves superior.  Kingship and tyranny were dangerous ideas because many poleis 
had witnessed a number of savage, destructive revolutions that Athenian citizens hoped 
to avoid.  Even if Philocleon is not an actual tyrant with a standing army and formal 
political authority, the attitudes he displays are representative of dangerous precedents.  
Given the tensions between upper and lower classes, many in the Athenian audience may 
have appreciated his desire to wound and harass wealthy defendants while looking for 
some personal advantage.  There is little evidence that Athens privileged a culture of 
altruism or charity, because citizens did not feel compelled to help out unless there was 
some room for personal advancement (Christ 121-122).  However, a fellow citizen whose 
reactions to cases could be mightily unpredictable and excessively vindictive would at 
some level have to be considered a potential threat to one’s livelihood and standing in the 
polis. 
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An ideal juror implied as the ethical antithesis to Philocleon preserves his 
exuberant energy and thumos without the savagery and unpredictability.  Each flaw and 
negative characteristic embodied in the old man has a corresponding virtue and positive 
trait lying in wait to be expressed in a more ethical and civic-minded person.  The play’s 
title of an animal that can harm anything in its path but may elect not to if left alone is 
fitting because a single wasp can be an annoyance, while a swarm can be an outright 
dangerous force of nature.  Unfortunately, avoiding the beasts is not a workable solution 
for anyone wishing to use the courts as a formal means of redress; therefore, Wasps 
suggests that the jurors themselves need to change.  When properly channeled, the 
independence claimed by Philocleon can be used to avoid the excessive influence of the 
demagogues or disproportionate advantages for entertaining speakers.  Moreover, 
keeping advocates honest about the issues of the case rather than pursuing unnecessary 
digressions would ensure that disputes are settled with more due consideration of both 
sides and without the vindictive unpredictability of caprice (which Bdelycleon argues 
later in the play).  The ethical juror would not reward speakers for their superficial 
argumentation and obsequious displays of emotion because this privileges persuasion 
based on the cult of personality.  Wasps is especially critical of not only the demagogues 
who wield this kind of power but the audiences who consistently sanction its 
advancement. 
 
IV. Bdelycleon’s Indictment of Demagogues 
 Bdelycleon has been dutifully taking notes during his father’s exposition so that 
he may reply in kind to Philocleon’s arguments.  In the second half of the agōn, he 
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provides a counterpoint to the earlier themes of economic and political power throughout 
Athens but puts more emphasis on the influence of demagogues instead of the jurors 
themselves.  As many commentators have noted, Wasps undercuts the authority of the 
juror by pitting Philocleon in the role of advocate rather than audience, a position to 
which he is not normally accustomed (Slater 91).  In contrast, Bdelycleon is a more well-
to-do young man capable of using the same sophistic techniques employed by the 
demagogues to influence his father.  The contest is rigged in favor of the son because, as 
we have seen with the poor sophistic training of Strepsiades pitted against Pheidippides 
in Clouds, the older generation routinely does not have the wherewithal to compete 
intellectually with their young counterparts (Reckford 248).  The agōn concludes with a 
narrative metacommentary where unethical and manipulative persuasive techniques are 
used to illustrate the danger of unethical persuasive techniques.69 
 Bdelycleon also unveils 5 arguments to make his case, the first of which concerns 
the disproportionate amount of money distributed to jurors compared with politicians.  As 
he explains, the polis takes in nearly 2000 talents from the allies (660, toutôn plêrôma 
talent’ eggus dischilia gignetai êmin), but Bdelycleon supposes that only 150 is 
distributed to the jurors (662, gignetai êmin ekaton dêpou kai pentêkonta talanta).   This 
amounts to less than a tenth of the money coming to Athens and demonstrates how the 
common citizen receives so little for consistent civic service.  It is telling that Philocleon 
is the one who recognizes the disparity immediately, which shows Bdelycleon using 
enthymematic logic to draw his father into the argument and become more fully invested 
in its outcome (664, oud ê dekatê tôn prosiontôn êmin ar’ egigneth’ o misthos). 
                                                 
69
 Cf. Konstan for discussion of the persuasion used to discuss persuasion in this scene (“Greek” 25). 
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 This measurable figure erodes Philocleon’s earlier assertion about the authority 
and unrivaled power of the juror, when their powerlessness appears to be demonstrated 
quantitatively.  The old man has repeatedly stressed the personal impact of the juror’s 
wage and its importance to his well-being, but Bdelycleon reverses this argument to show 
its relative insignificance compared to the amount of money drawn elsewhere.  
Philocleon’s attention is subsequently drawn away from the micro, individual level where 
smaller amounts are awarded to the common citizen to focus instead on the macro level 
where demagogues cash in big.  Based on his earlier reactions, Philocleon can be hot-
blooded and prone to immediate action, especially concerning his livelihood.  Bdelycleon 
overturns the logic of his father’s position, that money is a formidable part of being a 
juror, only to reveal that it is proof he has relatively little influence in the polis after all 
(Crane 211). 
 Bdelycleon’s next argument continues to discredit the disproportionate allocation 
of wealth in Athens by examining the finances of leading orators.  He contends that some 
of the money not allocated for jury service instead is given to politicians, who receive 50 
talent bribes from the allied cities after threatening and frightening them away (669-670, 
kath’ outoi men dôrodokousin kata pentêkonta talanta/apo tôn poleôn epapeilountes 
toiauti kanaphobountes).  Bdelycleon mentions that his father chooses them to rule over 
him, having been baked over by their little pet phrases, so he is complicit in their rise to 
power and personal enrichment (667-668, su gar, ô pater, autous/archein airei sautou 
toutois rêmatiois peripephtheis).  Moreover, the allies recognize where the real power lies 
and ignore the citizens, cozying up to these orators and giving them personal gifts as well 
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(676-677, including, but not limited to, wine, cheese, honey, and crowns among other 
things).  The allies provide a range of different gifts and clearly have allotted significant 
amounts of resources as tribute to Athens, but the common citizen receives very little 
compared to the demagogues.  
 This is a direct indictment of the speaking class and how they mismanage public 
affairs for significant personal gain.  Philocleon had little trouble justifying behaviors 
inconveniencing his peers, (and the play does not detail how severely they were affected 
by his actions), but the level of graft alleged by Bdelycleon could be grounds for major 
public censure.70  To put 50 talents into context, “A single talent, consisting of 6,000 
drachmas would support a single juror for forty years, or a skilled workman for fifty 
years” (Crane 208).  Moreover, the demagogues are taking advantage of the Athenian 
belief that a poor person is more likely to succumb to bribery than someone already 
wealthy, therefore they would be at less suspicion of malfeasance.   Bdelycleon also 
makes the link between politicians who accept bribes and engage in gluttony, because 
overindulgence as a character flaw would manifest in both appetite for food and desire 
for wealth (Davidson 59).  One may conclude that this type of person embodies the same 
fundamental flaw as Philocleon, an excess of a commonly understood or accepted desire, 
brought to an extreme capable of harming many more people and significantly impacting 
the well-being of the entire polis.  Moreover, the demagogues cajole bribes in the first 
place by threatening and frightening the allies, so they resort to scare tactics as a means 
                                                 
70
 Taylor (2001) also supports the idea that “Financial profit was to some extent acceptable and it was a 
recognized part of politics, if not entirely approved of” (“Bribery I” 57).  There were penalties for bribery, 
some of which were quite severe, but being guilty need not always be grounds for conviction if argued 
effectively. 
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of manipulation.  While Philocleon may enjoy watching this technique as a spectator, the 
situation changes markedly when his livelihood is on the line. 
 Another troubling characteristic of the demagogue and their privileged treatment 
is their ability to prevent jurors from receiving daily wages.  This cuts directly against the 
last of Philocleon’s arguments because bringing 3 obols home to his family was a source 
of great personal pride and a signature element of his paternal identity.  Bdelycleon 
claims demagogues receive their advocate’s wage as a matter of course while the jurors 
have to work for their money and, if they arrive after the signal has been given, will not 
walk away with their 3-obol payment (689-690, ôs ostis an umôn/usteros elthê tou 
sêmeiou, to tribôlon ou komieitai).  Moreover, the prosecutor gets paid regardless even if 
he shows up late (691, autos de pherei synêgorikon drachmên, kan usteros elthê), and 
there is the potential for both advocates to conspire together, with one bribing the other, 
to put on a good show and get paid (692-693).  The system is rigged in favor of the 
speaking class so that there is a guarantee of money, regardless of whether they have put 
in genuine effort for their case or shown up on time.  This too is designed to inflame 
Philocleon’s sense of outrage that someone may enjoy an advantage he is not privy to and 
direct his anger accordingly. 
 The causes of the financial hardships endured by the common citizen maintain the 
status quo so that the class of demagogues continues to enjoy their bribes, additional 
political power, and elevated social status.  Bdelycleon again highlights the disparity 
between life at the top and bottom of the economic ladder to undercut the notion that 
juries have any significant political or social power.  The jurors could be rich because of 
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their participation in and connection to the polis as citizens, but they are deliberately kept 
poor by the ruling class of demagogues (703, boulontai gar se penêt’ einai).  Bdelycleon 
does not give the speaking class the benefit of the doubt, accusing them of manipulating 
the system so that the jurors will come to know the one who has tamed them; and 
whenever he sets them upon his enemies having motioned to strike someone, the jurors 
leap upon them savagely (704-705, ina gignôkês ton tithaseuten, kath otan outos g’ 
episixê/epi tôn echthrôn tin’ epirruxas, agriôs autois epipêdas).   
 If the jurors do not attack because they wish to but because they are compelled by 
the economics of their situation, they cannot in good faith lay claim to the mantle of 
tyrant, authoritative figure, or any of the other grandiose titles Philocleon mentioned in 
his opening remarks.  Instead, they have assumed the de facto position of a slave.  
Bdelycleon again reframes his father’s protestations of autonomy so that political and 
social power rests with the speakers instead of the audience.  His point of attack 
legitimately stresses how they pursue their own interests first and foremost, using the 
audience as a blunt object to accomplish their goals.  Following the money, so to speak, 
was not something particular to Aristophanic satire: “From Aristophanes to Aristotle, the 
attack on the demagogues always falls back on the one central question: in whose interest 
does the leader lead” (Finley 166).  It is also worth noting that the regular targets in 
Aristophanes’ plays, such as Cleon, were not the originators of this tactic.   Mitchell 
explains that Pericles was the “forerunner to Cleon” in this regard (“Greeks” 44-45): 
 
By withdrawing from his philoi and using state funds for jurors’ salaries and his 
building projects, Pericles was changing the range and scale of his philia network 
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but was not essentially changing the pattern of the relationship.  It should be 
pointed out not only that he still had the nucleus of a political group supporting 
him, but also that he was creating obligations which could be put to political 
purposes.  Now, rather than forming relationships with individual philoi, he was 
effectively and ostentatiously making all the citizens his friends.  Every political 
leader needed to bind people to himself by ties of obligation and loyalty.  This 
was the new strategy for achieving such support on a large scale 
 
Thus, the demagogic class represented in Wasps by Cleon, Theorus, etc. creates a sense 
of philia in the minds of jurors so that they become obligated to vote favorably toward 
certain speakers and against their opponents; however, as Bdelycleon explains, this is a 
fundamental distortion of the proper relationship since the demagogues enjoy a striking 
imbalance in the exchange.71  Underscoring this point, the three-obol wage for jury 
service would have been sufficient for the daily needs of a poor citizen, but not sufficient 
for much else.  Markle provides evidence that the price of wheat and barley, the staples of 
a poor Athenian’s diet in the second half of the fifth century, were roughly equivalent to 
2.5-3 obols, thus Bdelycleon’s argument that this is enough to keep them coming without 
actually empowering them, is supported by other contemporaneous evidence (108-109). 
The final piece of Bdelycleon’s argument concerns the consistency with which 
orators do not live up to their promises to audiences.  There may come a time when the 
citizens start to recognize they have been deceived and decide to lash out at the 
demagogues.  As he handily demonstrated in his own section of the agōn, Philocleon’s 
waspish behavior could be turned on and off at will, but becomes especially aggravated 
                                                 
71
 Mitchell (1997) also details that these relationships carried the expectation of receiving “either an equal 
or a greater return; so, Aristotle warns, one most take care at the outset from whom one receives a 
benefaction, for whom one performs one, and on what conditions, so that on this basis one may accept 
these conditions or not” (8). 
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when he is in a convicting mood.  To combat this, orators begin to promise whatever will 
assuage the ire of the masses but rarely deliver the goods in the end.  Speaking 
hypothetically, Bdelycleon asserts whenever demagogues become afraid they offer to 
give Euboia, promising to furnish food in the order of 50 medimnoi (715-717, all’ opotan 
men deisôs’ autoi, tên Euboian didoasin/umin, kai siton uphistantai kata pentêkonta 
medimnous/poriein).72   However, they do not actually deliver on the promise (717, 
edosan d’ oupôpote soi). 
The result of Bdelycleon’s case is a damning indictment against the manipulative, 
gluttonous demagogues and the complicit audiences providing favorable verdict almost 
on command.  Philocleon is brought to realize that he does not possess the extensive 
power so important to his daily routine and personal identity; in the end, he receives a 
fraction of the money and resources given to speakers and provides verdicts based on 
their dictates and against their political enemies (Freydberg 83).  He has virtually no 
autonomy and exerts authority only nominally in Athens.  The real power rests with the 
speaking class, caricatured so thoroughly in people such as Cleon, but also embodied in 
the young class of social elites like Bdelycleon.  It is no accident that the justification for 
jury service was demolished effortlessly, with Bdelycleon countering each of his father’s 
points and presenting virtually no concrete evidence to support his position.  If the 
current class of demagogues is not beholden to the facts or main issues of a case, and can 
digress into personal attack, conjecture, or speculation, there is nothing to stop 
Bdelycleon from using the same tactics to persuade his father to stop serving on juries.  
                                                 
72
 MacDowell explains this further in his commentary: “Fifty medimnoi would be an absurdly large 
quantity of grain to give to one citizen.  Ar. Is ridiculously exaggerating the demagogue’s promises: ‘when 
they’re frightened, they offer you the earth’” (“Wasps” 230). 
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As Reckford concludes, “What is more important is that Bdelycleon uses fantasy as a 
weapon to counter fantasy.  He matches a delusion of power with one of riches” (248). 
An ideal advocate implied as the ethical antithesis to Cleon and his class will 
avoid the more manipulative behaviors encouraged by jurors and rebalance the financial 
scales.  Even the direct democracy of Athens required certain people to take a more 
elevated position to guide audiences over key decisions, but Wasps implies this is 
possible without resorting to pandering, corruption, and advanced personal enrichment.  
The Athenian palate likely was not prepared for argumentation that focused exclusively 
on facts, evidence, and issues related to a case, but certainly a reduction of distracting 
elements would help jurors lead to more ethical and just verdicts than speeches composed 
entirely of such oratorical tactics.  This would empower a greater number of speakers and 
allow them greater chance at success when addressing crowds, because only the gifted, 
emotional storyteller is given a privileged position in Philocleon’s court system.  
Moreover, the motives for the ideal advocate would not need to entirely avoid collecting 
some money for their efforts because this was a commonly tolerated if not accepted 
aspect of the court system.  Instead, the ethical speaker would not cash in to the detriment 
of his peers or take a disproportionately high amount of bribes unavailable to rest of the 
polis.  Bdelycleon’s arguments do not claim that it is unethical to receive some monetary 
advancement using the court system, only that it is wrong when the amount of wealth is 
distributed unevenly so that a scant few benefit at the expense of thousands of additional 
citizens.   
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V. Conclusions 
 Wasps demonstrates, as Clouds did in chapter 2, that Old Comedy can create 
implicit comparisons for audiences to make moral judgments.  The form of Aristophanic 
satire does not present fully formed conclusions for audiences to accept at face value, 
instead prompting spectators to draw their own conclusions based on the narrative 
arguments onstage (Freydberg 79).  Christ notes that the play has an overall tone of 
pessimism because Philocleon is never ultimately cured of his obsessions and maintains a 
consistently boorish, entitled attitude regarding the worth of fellow citizens (114).  
However, this absence of a solution is where a Burkean analysis shines: the play cannot 
present a definitive solution to litigation abuse because the forum and audience would not 
likely be receptive to it, but Wasps only needs to plant a seed in the audience that the 
problem is so thoroughly entrenched that something else must be done.  The play is not 
so open-ended that anything else should be considered a legitimate alternative; 
Philocleon and Bdelycleon’s arguments gently guide the audience to consider a court 
system where the jurors and advocates have lost their current excesses in favor of a more 
balanced perspective on their roles and responsibilities, replacing poor behavior and 
values with more socially responsible alternatives.  As long as the audience can recognize 
not to be a Philocleon (a contradiction in Fahnestock’s terminology) or someone who 
embodies his worse characteristics, the play can influence civic attitudes about 
responsible jury service or the expectations for speakers in court. 
 The audience is encouraged to consider juror behavior and motivations to make 
some kind of change to the court system.  This was a serious concern because the courts 
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exercised something akin to “ultimate sovereignty” and whose decisions were not subject 
to review or revision.73  Even if one assumes Wasps is presenting a more panicked or 
exaggerated version of the lawcourts, one can still accept the principle that certain flaws 
will contribute more harms than good if left unattended.  Later events in the play, such as 
the unpredictable end to the trial of Labes and Philocleon’s subsequent ascent and failure 
to adjust to high society, illustrate that some citizens do not handle good fortune or 
responsibility well (Olson “Politics” 144).   The play implies that jurors are part and 
parcel to the corrupt practices because they reward the more unethical and manipulative 
politicians while harming opponents of their favorite demagogues.  If the current system 
and its adherents are working against Athenian interests, something else must step in to 
take its place, a role Blanshard refers to as the “alternative identity” for the jury (44).   
 This ideal juror will take certain positive qualities currently in excess and properly 
balance them.  Burke might rightly point out that any excess (even of a positive trait) may 
logically imply a smaller amount as its opposite, because too much of a good thing calls 
to mind the correct or due proportion as desirable.  Thus the negative characterization of 
the juror’s fighting spirit needs only a reduction to a more moderate quantity to fulfil its 
purpose without unduly harming innocent advocates.  The qualities of being waspish (or 
having thumos), looking for some personal advancement by participating in the court 
system, and taking pride in providing for one’s family are not negative in and of 
                                                 
73
 Cf Hansen (1974) for additional explanations on the power of Athenian courts: “We must conclude that 
any decision made by the Assembly may ultimately be reversed by the courts, whereas no decision made 
by the courts can ultimately be reversed by the Assembly.  This state of affairs is best described by means 
of a terminology which is sometimes used in modern political science in connection with the concept of 
sovereignty, but which might with more reason be applied to Athenian conditions in the fourth century: 
while both the Assembly and the courts are immediate sovereigns, the courts alone have the ultimate 
sovereignty” (“Sovereignty” 17). 
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themselves.  Their extreme versions can be the subject of parody when effects are 
relatively minimal or a genuine concern when they severely impact a larger proportion of 
the polis.  The ideal juror will still desire to sting advocates who have presented a poor 
case or done real injustice to a fellow citizen, but only follow through after hearing both 
sides of the case.  Harriot argues that the crux of Wasps’ argument is simply to forbear 
judgment until the entire case has concluded, which seems beyond Philocleon’s abilities 
even early in the play (43).  Moreover, the ethical picture of a juror may still receive 
something personal from the trial such as being entertained or enjoying the spectacle of 
the courtroom atmosphere, but only so long as it does not interfere with the heavy 
responsibility of settling a dispute properly.  Allaying these concerns should provide 
more just verdicts and create a more balanced and predictable juror (Freydberg 79). 
 The ideal advocate in court stands as an ethical antithesis to the more 
manipulative and self-aggrandizing caricatures described and enacted by Bdelycleon.  It 
is difficult to take Aristophanes’ criticisms at face value because Old Comedy 
deliberately misrepresents and distorts to get a laugh out of the audience, but one can 
reasonably conclude that some people were exerting a disproportionate amount of 
influence with audiences in a way that other  citizens considered dangerous.  Speakers 
could attempt to enrich themselves through the court or legislative system provided they 
did not noticeably damage the state or their fellow citizens.74  It was even considered one 
of the primary responsibilities for the voting public to keep advocates in check so that 
they would not accrue too much power (Taylor “Bribery II” 164).  Wasps focuses on 
                                                 
74
 Taylor uses evidence from Hypereides’ speech against Demosthenes in 323 that bribery was tolerated 
unless it became detrimental to the city (“Bribery II” 162). 
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political demagogues, but it is worth noting that “Private citizens who were not politically 
ambitious must have contributed significantly to the rise in litigation” (Christ 15-16).  
The ideal advocate must therefore cover anyone who addresses jurors or presents a case 
before them, regardless of political reputation or influence.   
 The audience is encouraged to recognize that unethical advocates are also 
working to imbalance the court system and thus need to be curtailed.  Bdelycleon even 
uses the same sophistic techniques employed by the demagogues to outfox his father.  
The dog trial of Labes that follows the agōn further illustrates this trend, as “The scene’s 
primary function is to increase, by fair means or foul, Bdelycleon’s control of his father” 
(Harriot 149).  Bdelycleon uses distracting arguments such as Labes’ good qualities, that 
he protects the house, that he may have stolen the cheese for good reason, and even 
parades the dog’s young puppies in front of “the jury” to elicit sympathy from 
Philocleon.  In the end, he cons his father into putting the ballot into the wrong urn so that 
Philocleon’s desire to convict is thwarted.  He may have sound intentions, but he 
personifies some of the most offending qualities of the men he criticizes.75   
 The ideal advocate must embody Bdelycleon’s positive qualities while 
minimizing his negative influences.  There is no evidence that Athenian jurisprudence 
prohibited certain types of evidence or privileged facts and issues directly relevant to a 
case; based on the surviving speeches, one may conclude as Todd does that jurors of the 
late 5th c. often voted certain in favor of speakers because “‘who you are’ matters more 
than ‘what you say’” (“Purpose” 31).  Despite this flexibility in the courts, Wasps asks 
                                                 
75
 Slater aptly compares Bdelycleon’s demagogic skills to those of the Sausage-Seller in Knights, which is 
the subject of chapter 4 (99). 
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the audience to imagine a speaker who has Bdelycleon’s good will towards his audience 
without resorting to oratorical tricks, emotional manipulations, or outright rigging the 
verdict in his favor.  This advocate would use a more balanced approach that allows for 
some personal enrichment (or not accepting bribes on the level Bdelycleon decries) 
without acquiring enough influence in the polis to harm his fellow citizens.  This too 
presents an opportunity for the Athenian legal system to provide more just verdicts when 
settling disputes and minimizing the opportunity for skilled speakers to abuse the courts 
for excessive personal gain.  
 The argument in Wasps does not call for the audience to uproot the system or 
engage in civil anarchy because these changes, while important, are accentuating 
established Athenian values.  It is no secret that the legal system did not undergo 
substantial change in the century after the play’s production, so a modern reader should 
not import more influence to Aristophanes than the evidence allows (Todd and Millett 
15).  The argumentative advantage to using comedy in this way does not require 
immediate results, especially for something as complicated as a foundational cultural 
institution.  Instead, the play provides an ideal vision of the ethical citizens each member 
of the audience can become so that there is the potential for positive change.  Moreover, 
Wasps highlights the arbitrary rules and conventions that have come to govern the 
Athenian judicial system and how the audience is complicit in maintaining them 
indefinitely (Reckford 242-243).  So long as individual jurors are deceived into thinking 
they have legitimate power and are not dependent on demagogic whim, corruption and 
abuse will continue to pervade the lawcourts.  The logic of the play indicates that 
   156 
 
whatever was constructed by previous citizens can be undone and rebuilt with the efforts 
and more balanced perspectives of their heirs. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Ethical Criticisms of Oratory in Knights 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Aristophanes’ play Knights explores questions of ethical behavior for orators addressing 
the assembly.  Focusing on two rival orators, a slave called the Paphlagonian and a 
Sausage-Seller from the agora, the play highlights unethical behaviors motivated by self-
interest currently in vogue with politicians in late 5th c. Athens to flatter and manipulate 
the citizenry.  Although the play considers these behaviors in several scenes, two are 
frame the arguments of the play in explicit terms for the audience.  The first agon pits the 
two main characters in a direct competition to see who can prove the most shameless 
(anaidos), which would effectively demonstrate their ability to persuade others in the 
service of the aging citizen, Demos.  The second agōn continues the arguments from 
before, but focuses on the ability of the orators to provide tangible results for Demos as a 
result of their persuasive efforts.  The prize for the winner is unlimited influence over the 
Demos, a clear allegory to the Athenian citizens participating in the political process.  
Both characters use the same style of argumentation, stressing skills in public speaking, 
thievery, threats of physical harm, and prosecution for trumped-up charges to 
demonstrate their worth.  Their similarity ensures that the audience, if left with only these 
options, would get a less or worse version of the same politician, neither of which will 
necessarily act in the best interests of the polis.  Continuing to use Burke’s principles of 
the negative, I argue that Aristophanes is proposing a new possibility not directly 
portrayed in the play but acting as an implied opposite concept, in which orators 
addressing the assembly do not feel compelled to pander to or flatter voters, but instead 
try to argue ethically and without considering their own personal interests.  This ideal, 
ethical speaker will be more moderate in tone and more respectful to his opponents, 
without creating a culture of fear and intimidation, unlike both the Paphlagonian and 
Sausage-Seller.  This new orator would proceed ethically in terms of both the motivation 
to engage in politics as well as oratorical technique.   
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I. Introduction 
 As chapter 2 has shown, rhetoric scholars have regularly engaged Clouds in 
recent decades because Aristophanes satirizes and lampoons the practitioners of 
oratorical techniques relatively new to contemporary Athens, but other plays have not 
received similar attention.  Having concluded chapter 3’s discussion of Wasps, I continue 
to argue in this chapter how other plays from the late 420’s BCE can provide similar 
insight into the techniques circulating around Athens.  Knights is particularly noteworthy 
for the scathing criticisms of the politician Cleon and the perceived harms of 
demagoguery.  The play portrays sophistic speechmaking as an extensive and potentially 
long-lasting danger to the polis if the citizenry is not diligent and careful about whom to 
trust. 
 Knights, produced at the Lenaea in 424 BCE, follows the tale of the old man 
Demos, a trusting citizen who’s been led astray by the machinations of a single 
manipulative slave named the Paphlagonian (so called because of his place of origin).  
The Paphlagonian regularly abuses Demos as well as his fellow slaves and effectively 
creates a tyranny in his master’s house.  The Paphlagonian has been able to successfully 
steal and connive his way into a place of authority, and the task of removing him from his 
position is exceedingly difficult.  Two of the other slaves decide that they must take 
matters into their own hands, and following the dictates of an oracle, recruit a champion 
who will fight the Paphlagonian in his own arena.  This champion comes from an 
unlikely source, a Sausage-Seller working in the marketplace.  The contest that ensues is 
   159 
 
a detailed caricature and allegory for the state of Athens and the direction in which it is 
heading.76 
 Although the subject of Knights as political satire is the subject of widespread 
agreement, there is no consensus about how seriously one should take Aristophanes’ 
arguments.77  Edmunds argues that Knights is not an ideological text, because “it is 
impossible to show that Aristophanes is governed by any ideology, either by the ones to 
be discussed or by any other, including ‘the ideology of the city’” (236).  However, he 
does concede that because Aristophanes is commenting on the social and political 
perceptions of his era, one can read Knights and other plays as political documents.  In 
contrast, Stow argues that Aristophanes fashions himself a teacher and instructor of the 
state, if not an outright reformer of poor social and political policy (84).78  Scholz notes 
that the play can be emphasizing two distinct villains in the city: either the greedy elite 
who try to take advantage of the citizens and look only after their own interests, or the 
corrupt citizens looking to gain advantage by tacitly condoning the activities of 
demagogues and using them as a source of money and gifts (281).  Brock argues that 
even if one considers that the works of Old Comedy are not traditional and philosophical 
treatises on the nature of democracy, they are precisely the kind of untheorized but 
                                                 
76
 Glowacki (2003) discusses the transformation of Demos towards the end of the play, as there is 
archaeological evidence that Demos was indeed a deified kind of character in Athenian architecture 
described in terms similar to his rejuvenation in Knights. 
77 The discussion in chapter 1 (pages 5-13) regarding the intentionality of Aristophanic satire, especially 
Heath’s position vis-à-vis Henderson, Ober and Strauss, et alia, provides further detail on this interpretive 
divide. 
78 Bowie (1997) aptly summarizes the play’s dominant theme: “In the absence of guests and with the other 
slaves kept at bay, Paphlagon exercises control over his master, rather as their isolation enabled 
Pheidippides to treat his father as he wished. A Paphlagonian slave dominating his Athenian master at 
dinner acts as a clear image for the state of politics in Athens” (“Thinking” 6). 
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nonetheless rhetorical works that will resonate with the audience and impel them to 
discuss the issues of the day (160).  Olson treats the play as “a thinly veiled allegory 
about contemporary Athens: Demos Puknites (Eq. 42) stands for the people, particularly 
when in Assembly; the old man's property is the state and all its goods; his Paphlagonian 
slave is Cleon; and the Sausage-seller is an aspiring rival demagogue, struggling to win 
the master's favor” (253-254).79 
This latter point about the identity of the Paphlagonian as a reference to Cleon is 
not in dispute.  Drawing upon the etymology of his name, Edmunds explains (241), 
 
Cleon's very name, Paphlagon, re-minds of [paphlazein] “bluster,” a word that 
was used of the waves (II. 13.798). It will be seen that Aristophanes' diagnosis of 
Cleon's demagoguery as “disturbance” and his description of this “disturbance” as 
a storm arise out of an old tradition of Greek thought about the polis. In this 
tradition, civil disorder is conceived in terms of meteorological phenomena-winds 
and storms-and especially in terms of storm-driven water. 
 
The characteristic style of loud, blustering oratory that Cleon was known for (according 
to Aristophanes and Thucydides) was embedded in the Paphlagonian’s name, thus the 
audience should be able to see the reference and put it in the appropriate political context.  
Whether Aristophanes is making a deliberate argument about Cleon the man and/or the 
political class he represents or using a common point of reference as comedic material is 
irrelevant provided the audience can recognize the characteristics associated with this 
portrayal and put them into a broader political context.80 
                                                 
79
 For a full discussion of the relationship between the boulē and ecclēsia, cf. Timmerman and Schiappa 
(69-70). 
80
 See Welsh (1990) for the number of references to Cleon in the Aristophanic corpus and how their public 
personae became antagonistic early in the playwright’s career (429). 
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 Although the contest for Demos’ favor is a recurring theme throughout the play, 
there are two scenes in particular that best represent the allegory for the deliberative 
assembly in Athens, the first (lines 303-460) and second (756-940) agōn.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, the agōn is a debate central to the main plot, in which two characters justify the 
main arguments around which the play is based (Humphreys 179-180).  Although the 
content is typically addressed to an internal judge or audience, such as the chorus or 
Pheidippides in Clouds, McGlew convincingly argues that “when protagonist and 
antagonist in the agon speak to the chorus, they speak also through them as if to persuade 
the real audience sitting behind them, addressing issues (albeit on comedy’s own terms) 
that concern the city’s political future as much as the play’s dramatic needs” (“Citizens” 
94-95).  For this reason, the agōn is considered an important element of the early plays 
for making a larger political point to the immediate audience of Athenian citizens.   
In Knights, these verbal jousting matches pit the Paphlagonian against the 
Sausage-Seller to see who could provide the most benefits to Demos.81  In the first agōn, 
the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller try to prove who can be the most shameless 
(anaidos) in a range of different contexts.  The logic behind choosing the Sausage-Seller 
as an opponent capable of vanquishing Cleon is that he can be greater and more 
combative in all of Cleon’s perceived oratorical strengths, implicitly arguing that the only 
way to fight a monster is with a worse monster.  The second agōn presents to the 
audience a discussion of who can provide more gifts in the form of bribes and material 
gains, a charge that Aristophanes routinely levies against Cleon.  This side of the orator 
                                                 
81
 Silk (2000) fitting describes these exchanges as an “extravagant exercise in competitive odiousness [that] 
takes up most of the play (275-1252)” (336). 
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provides more clear benefits to the audience and acts as a counterpart to the more 
frightening and dangerous elements present in the first debate. 
It is noteworthy that Aristophanes attacks Cleon and does not target the Athenian 
citizens themselves, a least not explicitly within the play.  For pragmatic reasons 
Aristophanes would not wish to alienate the people directly judging the competition and 
deciding who would win the prize for best poet.  In addition, there is evidence that a 
specific law passed around 415 B.C.E either criminalized attacks against the majesty and 
dignity of the Athenian democracy or put language in place that such mockery would be 
censured by the people.  Although this law is several years after the production of 
Knights (Atkinson 59), Aristophanes was likely shrewd enough to know that it is often 
easier for an audience to laugh at an external rather than internal target, especially one 
with a prominent reputation and presence in Athenian politics such as Cleon and the other 
demagogues.82 
Although the contest of one monster pitted against another makes for clever 
comedic narrative, Aristophanic caricature cannot present clear and literal solutions for 
the problems plaguing 5th c. Athens.  His audience is unlikely to consent that the only 
way forward is to fight fire with fire, therefore another message must be implicit in the 
play.  In this chapter, I argue that the characterizations of the Paphlagonian and Sausage-
                                                 
82
 How reasonably one should interpret Aristophanes’ attacks on Cleon is another subject of disagreement.  
Andrews (1994) presents a balanced and more charitable reading of Cleon’s character, noting the more 
blustery and manipulative techniques portrayed by Thucydides and Aristotle, but also crediting him with 
positive ethos via arête and phronesis.  Mitchell (1991) presents a more nuanced description of Cleon’s 
generalship and success in politics, which was not the failure Aristophanes would have the audience 
believe, especially since Cleon enjoyed reelection to this position up to his death.  McGlew (2002) dissents 
from these perspectives, comparing passages of Cleon to descriptions of Pericles in Thucydides; his 
conclusion is that Cleon advanced political oratory as spectator sport to be enjoyed as entertainment rather 
than legitimate civic engagement. 
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Seller portray a picture of Athenian politics so excessive and shameless that the audience 
can visualize a worst-case scenario of what deliberative oratory might become if left 
unchecked by voting citizens.  By picturing how much worse the situation might turn, 
Aristophanes urges his audience to think of a different character more beneficial to the 
city that is in many ways the opposite of his villainous characters.  Using Burke’s 
theories of the negative, the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller in Knights imply an ideal, 
ethical orator that the audience is invited to conjure and bring to mind so that they have 
an example of legitimate, proper oratory that benefits not just the solitary politician but 
the city at large.  I will describe the arguments of the first agōn and how it creates a 
negative image of deliberative oratory, discuss the key arguments in the second agōn and 
how they provide a more positive but still flawed characterization of political speakers, 
and conclude by explaining how the audience can visualize the implied, ethical orator. 
 
II. A Desire to be Shameless: Arguments in the First Agōn 
 The first agōn features the Paphlagonian and the Sausage-Seller in a contest to see 
who can demonstrate the most accomplishment in shamelessness, a characteristic that 
alone proves to be the defender or protector or orators (325, anaideian, ēper monē 
prostatei rhētoron).83  This term appears towards the beginning of the scene in remarks 
by the chorus (who often act as judges for agōnes) to set the tenor of the debate and 
establish a main argumentative theme, but also appears later to remind the audience of 
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 Heath (1997) notes that many of the common motifs in the agon, including deception, flattery, 
corruption, shamelessness, and depravity are also found in the oratory of 4th c. speakers (“Aristophanes” 
232-233). 
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the topic in dispute (409, anaideiai, in reference to the Paphlagonian’s claims and 413, 
uperbaleisthai s’oiomai toutousin for the Sausage-Seller’s retort).  The arguments unfold 
over a series of characteristics that each uses to establish his shameless credentials, with 
quick back-and-forth quips and responses to keep the verbal action flowing and dynamic 
for the audience.  Unlike debates in other plays, the verbal combat in Knights rarely 
features long expositions or monologues which are then critiqued by an opponent; 
instead, the participants fire off jokes and claims at rapid-fire speed so that there are 
several characteristics and supporting claims to buttress their arguments. 
 The first claim to shamelessness concerns the act of speaking and whether they 
have training in oratorical technique.  Each participant disputes who will speak first in the 
debate, culminating with the Sausage-Seller ending the point with a declaration that he is 
especially wretched and therefore will not yield the floor (336, ma Di, epei kagō ponēros 
eimi).  The Sausage-Seller explains that he is skilled in speaking and can make a rich 
sauce of the debate (343, otiē legein oios te kagō kai karukopoiein), implying that there is 
a certain amount of creative manipulation at his disposal that makes him more shameless 
and deceptive than his opponent.  This statement causes the Paphlagonian to accuse the 
Sausage-Seller of using deliberate oratorical techniques to strategize for a major address.  
Specifically, he describes a scenario in which the sausage seller spoke against a foreigner 
in a small lawsuit, in preparation for which babbling the speech all night long and talking 
over the material to himself in the streets (348, tēn nukta thrulōn kai lalōn en tais odois 
seautō), drinking water (instead of wine to remain sober) and showing it to his friends 
while walking about (349, udōr te pinōn kapideiknus tous philous t’ aniōn).  The 
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Paphlagonian’s conclusion is that the Sausage-Seller erroneously thinks that this gives 
him an advantage in speaking.  The implication is that someone who would engage in 
these activities is perhaps naïve and not fully prepared for deliberative oratory in the way 
that the Paphlagonian has been since he took up residence in Demos’ house.  By contrast, 
the Paphlagonian implicitly argues that because he is experienced in this area (350, 
dunatos einai legein) without the use of such techniques illustrated above and has been 
successfully manipulating Demos for some time, he has the advantage in the debate and 
can more convincingly prove that he is the more wretched of the two and worthier of the 
shameless title.  This characterization is consistent with reports of the historical Cleon, 
who was said to have disparaged skill in speaking as a tool of undemocratic politicians.  
Yunis explains this aspect of Cleon’s public statements using the work of Thucydides for 
corroboration (188): 
 
Cleon further disparages the Periclean ideal by mocking the instructive role of the 
political leaders during public deliberation: it is the duty of such leaders to avoid 
engaging in what he terms ‘cleverness and a contest of intelligence’ while 
advising the masses (3.37.5).  Thus, whereas Cleon formally acknowledges the 
propriety of the demos' power of decision, in his scheme instruction in debate is 
mocked as destructive display and the demos is precluded from deciding 
independently and intelligently. 
 
In contrast to the arguments Aristophanes makes in Clouds just a year later, the speaker 
with less training is more wretched and repulsive than the sophist using the new manner 
of speaking, if the Paphlagonian is to be believed. 
 Another major characteristic in the argument concerns physical threats of 
violence.  The debate shifts from a theme of verbal attack to bodily injury, with each side 
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upping the ante and trying to create a more vivid and graphic description of how they 
intend to harm the opposing speaker.  The Sausage-Seller exclaims that he will stuff the 
Paphlagonian’s asshole like a sausage (364, egō de bunēsō ge sou ton prōkton anti 
phuskēs), to which his opponent replies that he will drag the Sausage-Seller outside by 
the ass with his face stooping down (365, egō de g’exelxō se tēs pugēs thuraze kubda).  
The Paphlagonian threatens to put his opponent in the stocks (367, oion se dēsō <n> tō 
xulō) and use his skin as a bag (370, derō se thulakon klopēs), while the Sausage-Seller 
responds that he will bring his opponent up on charges of cowardice (368, diōxomai se 
deilias) and then pluck off his opponents eyebrows (373, tas blepharidas sou paratilō).  
The only threats one could seriously consider are the potential for imprisonment and 
prosecution, whereas the others are delivered for exaggerated comic effect.  The 
implication, however, is that there is no level too vile or inconsiderable for these 
characters to approach if it creates a tactical advantage over their opponents.  As Dorey 
explains, “the whole picture is one of a man to whom no means of peculation, no 
methods of profit-making, were too sordid or too base. Yet incongruously combined with 
this is the picture of a man utterly ruthless and implacable, who will not be turned from 
his hostile intentions by any form of appeasement” (136).  Although the Paphlagonian is 
serving as a proxy for the historical Cleon, he is representative of a larger class of 
politician which Aristophanes considers a serious threat to the democratic process.  Even 
if the actual politicians were not capable of such outlandish actions, the Paphlagonian and 
Sausage-Seller are emblematic of a dangerous attitude of personal entitlement and 
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territoriality in the political arena, as well as a pronounced hostility towards any 
perceived threats. 
 The participants in the agōn also try to distinguish themselves in terms of their 
skills at thievery.  The Paphlagonian does not offer evidence in this area, whereas the 
Sausage-Seller spins a tale of how he used to steal from butchers as a boy (417-420).  He 
does not go into a wealth of detail, as this scene is punctuated more by a shorter exchange 
than longer expositions; however, he describes how he would distract butchers and take 
some of their meat while they were looking away.  He ends this short story with the 
graphic detail of hiding the ill-gotten spoils in his pants (the text is not entirely clear 
where exactly he puts the food) if caught in the act, which any observing politician 
remarks is a sign that there is no way he will not govern the citizenry someday (426, ouk 
esth’ opōs o pais od’ outon dēmon epitropeusei).  Smith remarks that such cleverness and 
deception would not necessarily be considered the sign of a weak or immoral character, 
as there are examples throughout Greek literature such as Odysseus which are considered 
praiseworthy (156).  Other characters in Aristophanic plays privilege this mentality, such 
as Philocleon in Wasps, who fondly remember times when he could successfully steal 
food as a soldier; it is worth noting that Philocleon is a buffoonish old man with whom 
the audience might sympathize at times, but ultimately not identify as someone they hope 
to emulate.  As in Wasps, the context in this scene does not display a hero using 
cleverness in service of a larger cause that benefits other citizens or pursue a mission 
ordained by the gods – the Sausage-Seller’s tale is another example of one citizen trying 
to scam another out of his property.  While any citizen might act in his own interest in 
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this way if the situation presented correctly, there is little doubt that this kind of thievery, 
especially writ large through political circumstances, would be considered a negative 
character trait by many in the audience. 
 Compared with the direct physical threats earlier in the debate, the participants 
move to the more practical and serious threat of prosecution for bribery.  After the 
Sausage-Seller accuses his opponent of accepting a bribe of 10 talents (438), the 
Paphlagonian attempts to initiate a bribe of one talent if the other party will keep quiet 
about the affair (439).  He then turns around and promises that the Sausage-Seller will 
face four charges of bribery with a penalty of 100 talents each if convicted (442-443).  
The Sausage-Seller replies that the Paphlagonian will face charges of draft-dodging 
(which returns to the theme of cowardice from earlier) and embezzlement with a penalty 
of 1000 talents.  This exchange further underscores that whatever the Paphlagonian is 
capable of politically and rhetorically the Sausage-Seller can take to a more extreme and 
frightening level.  Although these charges are clearly trumped up and designed to 
intimidate more than anything else, they reflect a period in which the historical Cleon 
was linked to a number of trials, “in which a private citizen could act as accuser at any 
time” (Mitchell 187-188).  This was one of the more effective ways to strike out against 
an opponent, and the Sausage-Seller shows that he is not averse to using the same tactics 
that have worked so well for the Paphlagonian (and by extension Cleon) in the past. 
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III. The Ethics of Inter-Orator Debate 
 The first agōn in Knights creates a contrast between two characters competing 
over the same prize, the favor of Demos and all of the benefits he can bestow 
accordingly.  As textual evidence has shown, the Paphlagonian and the Sausage-Seller 
are remarkably similar, competing against each other to see who can demonstrate greater 
prowess in a number of moral traits and technical skills.  They do not fit the Burkean 
sense of a pair of polarizing concepts because they are not approaching the argument 
from different perspectives; instead, the Paphlagonian is a more mild version of the 
corrupt and sychophantic politician modeled on the historical Cleon, who himself 
represents a larger class of citizens that Aristophanes deems dangerous to the polis.  The 
Sausage-Seller is not a paragon of virtue and speaking ethics that the audience should 
treat as a model for future politicians; instead, he is the Paphlagonian to an exaggerated 
level – he can overcome his opponent in terms of oratorical ability, thievery, physical 
violence, and intimidation through prosecution.  The Athenian audience watching this 
play would likely not identify with either character, because both represent a shifting 
trend in Athenian politics that obscured rather than aided the decision-making process in 
the assembly, shifting power away from ordinary citizens towards a less ethical, more 
self-serving group of demagogues.84 
These characters act as an easy vehicle for making jokes at the expense of a 
certain class of politician, but they and their many negative traits also serve to create a 
                                                 
84
 As Ober notes (1989), there was always an antagonism or tension between elite and commoners in 
Athens, with no guarantee that speakers in the Assembly would works towards the common good (168-
170).  However, politicians such as Pericles were advocates whose policies produced genuine benefits and 
prosperity to the polis, so there was a certain degree of demonstrable good-will that (so Aristophanes 
argues) is absent in the policies of Cleon and his kind. 
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more positive, ideal image as well.  As Hunter relates, “to criticize others is to imply 
some ideal standard of behaviour from which they have veered” (322).85  Each negative 
trait has a corresponding positive opposite, which the audience is invited to consider as 
they watch these bizarre caricatures make fools of themselves onstage.  The question is 
not whether the class of politicians can be bested using their own techniques, but rather if 
there is an entirely different class of politicians who can govern and lead the assembly 
more ethically and to the benefit of all citizens.  This ideal political candidate might have 
some experience in speaking, but certainly would not exist at the extremes observed in 
both the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller.  The Paphlagonian decries such technical 
expertise, but it is clear that the more emotional and hot-tempered style of speaking that 
he embodies is hardly beneficial for the citizenry; it can be used to intimidate or bully 
opponents, drown out alternative perspectives in a literal shouting match, and provide 
more emotionally reactive sentiments rather those crafted through calm and measured 
deliberation.86  The Sausage-Seller never confirms that he has such training, so it is an 
open question how valuable it actually is.  However, the fact that this skill is criticized by 
the Paphlagonian – and perhaps disadvantageous to his position - means that it is more 
desirable than no training at all. 
The threats of physical violence are also exaggerations in the agōn, but they serve 
to illustrate a larger ideal about how politicians should govern.  Athenians were fond of 
                                                 
85 This argument appears in the context of gossip, but the idea of criticism in a timocratic society such as 
Athens implies that any form of public censure helps to enforce community norms and keep behaviors from 
deviating too far outside of social boundaries.  Gossip was a common form of attack in the assembly and 
lawcourts, thus the connection to Cleon via Knights is not unusual or extraordinary. 
86
 Thucydides makes a similar argument against Cleon in the Mytilenean Debate in Book 3.37-38 of his 
History of the Peloponnesian War.  Cleon remarks that overthinking will be the downfall of Athens and 
lead it to making poor decisions  
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thinking that anyone could address the assembly, while in practical terms there was a 
select group of elite speakers who consistently guided policies and topics of discussion.  
Few would reasonably think they might be sodomized if considered a threat by an 
opposing politician (as the threats from both the Sausage-Seller and Paphlagonian imply).  
However, a more traditional benefactor to the city, such as Pericles, would have no need 
of direct physical threats because the only territoriality he might feel is the most 
advantageous course of action for the city rather than merely the good will of the voters.  
The contrast referenced earlier by Yunis shows that at least within the opinion of the 
contemporary Thucydides, a politician with poise and respect for the democratic process 
is far superior to one who takes advantage of it through intimidation.  One need not 
consider that Pericles is the Aristophanic ideal, but the confrontational and more hostile 
antagonism embodied by the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller conjures a contrasting 
image of a stately and dignified politician more worthy of the polis’ trust.  To allow them 
continued authority and sway over Demos will result in what Major aptly coins “an ever-
spiraling kakocracy” (“Court” 68). 
The caricature inherent in Knights allows the average audience member to see 
himself as superior to the characters onstage.  The excessive character traits do not 
encourage one to create Burke’s audience identification, as he might suggest for a 
speaker in a more direct argumentative situation such as the lawcourts or assembly.  
Thus, even if there is a mild sympathy or admiration for the thievery skills of the 
Sausage-Seller, one would not often or deliberately choose to imitate his behavior 
because of the social and practical consequences.  The ideal orator would have an 
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antithetical trait, linking arguments and policy proposals to a wider benefit for the polis 
rather than what lines his own pocket.  Ones does not have to believe that the accusation 
of thievery was accurate for all demagogues at this time (or even for Cleon), because this 
portrayal reflects a general belief about political motivation.  Aristophanes argues that 
one does not have to settle for the same caliber of orator, and that perhaps there is a 
better, more trustworthy person who can lead Athens instead. 
Lastly, the ideal orator would not need to resort to outlandish political 
recriminations and threat of prosecution to carry a proposal.  Neither the Paphlagonian 
nor Sausage-Seller are especially trustworthy considering what they are capable of 
threatening – even if one hopes and believes that such an ally is capable of harming an 
opposing or enemy faction, the possibility remains that such dangerous and harmful 
abilities could be turned on friends as circumstances change.  The Sausage-Seller is the 
character closest to a hero in Knights because his purpose is to rescues Demos from an 
unwieldy and manipulative tyrant, but the cure is almost as harmful as the disease.  The 
only separation between them is that the Sausage-Seller can be said to help Demos in a 
more beneficial way (as his actions and arguments play out in the second half of the 
play), but the methods he uses as persuasion are just as pernicious and unethical as those 
from the Paphlagonian; no wonder since they are the same!  The implied opposite of 
these characters would still embody this positive trait, but the methods and motivations 
would be different enough that one would not have to worry about a trumped up charge, 
regardless of whether it was bribery, treason, impiety, etc. 
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IV. Bribery and Political Pandering: Arguments in the Second Agōn 
 The second agōn continues the arguments from earlier in the play, as the 
Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller continue their efforts to persuade Demos about their 
worth and abilities as his personal advocates, but the debate focuses less on their 
shamelessness and more on their capacity to provide favors for the aging citizen.  The 
stakes are higher for each verbal combatant because the outcome for this debate is not 
merely a factual claim about their abilities; the winner of the debate will be given more 
authority and the position of formally acting as Demos’ steward, which the Paphlagonian 
had previously held and the Sausage-Seller is contesting.  The circumstances and setting 
for this debate reflect the more “serious” rewards, because Demos is requested to call an 
assembly on the Pnyx, much as would happen for legislative discussion (750).  This 
becomes a point of concern to the Sausage-Seller, because (as the Paphlagonian has 
demonstrated) Demos is the most sharp or clever of men at home but whenever he sits on 
this rock (the Pnyx) he gapes like a person stringing figs together for packing; (752-755, 
oimoi kakodaimōn, ōs apolōl’. o gar gerōn/oikoi men andrōn esti dexiōtatos,/otan d’ epi 
tautēsi kathētai tēs petras,/kechēnen ōsper empodizōn ischadas).  The implication is that 
the spectacle of debate and the kind of entertaining antics associated with the 
Paphlagonian and his type of orator are enough to distract the old man away from 
thinking critically on the issues that directly affect him.  
At center stage is the issue of whose good will and friendship can more profitably 
benefit the old man.  Demos is the judge tasked with making a formal decision on the 
matter, so the analogical connection to the Athenian assembly is clear for the audience in 
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attendance (746-748, (kai mēn poiēsas autika mala’ekklēsian,/ō dēm’, in’ eidēs opoteros 
nōn esti soi/eunousteros, diakrinon, ina touton philēs).  Each speaker will deliver a small 
chunk of argument as happened in the first agon, with a format emphasizing point and 
counterpoint rather than lengthier exposition.  The evidence contrasts the Paphlagonian’s 
promises for the future with the Sausage-Seller’s material gifts to Demos in the present, a 
divide that distinguishes between so-called empty rhetoric and the immediacy of tangible 
results.  It is worth pointing out that each speaker blatantly panders to their judge, so the 
oratorical style is still decidedly manipulative and worth censuring as the Sausage-Seller 
continues his mission to out-Paphlagon the Paphlagonian.  The entire debate hinges on 
whether Demos believes he is better off bestowing his favor on one speaker vs. the 
other.87 
The first major characteristic the debaters try to prove to Demos is how much they 
can provide for him based on their willingness to harm someone else.  The Paphlagonian 
lays out his first arguments by claiming that he has showed a lot of money to Demos in 
the public accounts, torturing and stretching men on the rack, throttling them, demanding 
a share of their work, and not considering anything about their individual situations 
provided it is pleasing to the old man (774-777, soi chrēmata pleist’ apedeixa/ en tō 
koinō, tous men streblōn, tous d’ agchōn, tous de metaitōn,/ou phrontizōn tōn idiōtōn 
oudenos, ei soi charioimēn).   To put it mildly, this set of intended actions shows that the 
                                                 
87
 Heath (1997) notes that “The assembly debate in Knights provides further evidence for the continuity of 
rhetorical practice.  The question at issue in this debate is which of the two rivals has greater goodwill 
toward the people (748)” (233). He uses evidence from the 4th c., in particular Demosthenes’ On the 
Crown, to show that “This is something to which fourth-century political speakers too laid competing claim 
in their struggle for political influence” (233). 
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Paphlagonian is willing to overlook the interests of other citizens if it benefits his master; 
if it is possible to snake some money from them and make Demos more prosperous, he 
will not stop at resorting to physical or psychological manipulation.  Even if their 
situation perhaps warrants some additional consideration, none of which is specified in 
the argument, he will ignore them because the only thing that matters is the final result: 
more money to Demos acquired by his most trusted servant. 
The Sausage-Seller responds in kind that he too is capable of stealing from another 
citizen for Demos’ benefit.  Instead of money, he explains that by snatching someone’s 
loaves of bread he will offer them up to the old man (778, arpazōn gar tous artous soi 
tous allotrious parathēsō).  He also begins a series of refutations against his counterpart’s 
arguments, pleading that the Paphlagonian will not help Demos and that he only enjoys 
sitting by the fire.  The implication is that any action to help his aging master is 
undertaken only for the Paphlagonian’s own benefit and that he has no regard for the 
material comfort or well-being of Demos.  As proof, he stresses that the Paphlagonian 
does not consider that his master sits on a hard seat on the very rocks of the Pnyx (783, 
epi taisi petrais ou phrontizei sklērōs se kathēmenon outōs).  In contrast, the Sausage-
Seller has brought a cushion having gotten it stitched for the old man; he implores Demos 
to get up, and sit down softly or gently, so that he does not wear out or grind that which 
was at Salamis (this is a roundabout description for his buttocks) (784-5, ouch ōsper egō 
rapsamenos soi touti ferō.  All’ epanairou,/kata kathizou malakōs, ina mē tribēs tēn en 
Salamini).  Demos is meant to see that the Sausage-Seller is willing to take care of his 
needs at that very moment, producing tangible results that the judge can experience with 
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certainty rather than relying on the promise of future gains.  Even if the Paphlagonian has 
produced some significant monetary results for Demos in the past, he cannot demonstrate 
that they will be replicated and prove to the old man that he has political or social worth 
right now. 
Aristophanes continues the discussion of demagogic worth by next focusing on the 
issue of political policy and how it will impact Demos.  At this point in the debate, the 
Paphlagonian likely recognizes that his points have not resonated with Demos as much as 
his opponent’s and explicitly double-downs on his arguments, claiming that his previous 
political efforts have proven beneficial and that he is willing to stake his head on the 
outcome of the debate (791, ethelō peri tes kephales peridosthai).  The Sausage-Seller 
takes issue with this statement, counter-claiming that it cannot be true: seeing Demos 
living in wine-casks, crannies, and little towers in now the 8th year (perhaps of the 
Peloponnesian war), the Paphlagonian did not take pirty on him, having imprisoned and 
robbed him of his honey (792-4, os touton orōn oikount’ en tais pithaknaisin/kai 
gupariois kai purgidiois etos ogdoon oik eleaireis,/alla katheirxas auton blitteis;).  
Furthermore, when Archeptolemus brought a peace treaty, having scattered it to the wind 
the Paphlagonian drives out the embassy, the ones who were offering peacē, from the city 
while slapping them on the ass (794-6, Archeptelemou de pherontos/ten eirēnēn 
exeskedasas, tas presbeias t’ apelauneis/ek tēs poleōs rathapugizōn, ai tas spondas 
prokalountai).  If true, this means that the Paphlagonian has willfully recognized that his 
master is living in poverty and made no efforts to alleviate the situation.  Moreover, by 
tossing out the Spartan embassy from the city, he has halted a serious effort to end the 
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Peloponnesian war and prevented his master from returning to his idyllic life in the 
country.  This directly undercuts the Paphlagonian’s previous argument that he is 
dedicated to making Demos’ life better, because even if he has provided monetary 
benefits in the past, his current policies only serve to minimize his master’s income and 
the quality of life it allows. 
The exchange that follows is telling, as the Paphlagonian defends his foreign policy 
decisions and makes the argument that they are indeed working to increase Athenian 
prosperity.  His next argument justifies such a decision on the grounds that he did this so 
that Demos could rule over all the Greeks (797, ina g’ Ellēnōn arxē pantōn), an action 
which adds to the majesty and overall authority of the old man and, by proxy, his fellow 
citizens.  The Paphlagonian adds that it is in the oracles that it will be necessary that 
Demos sit on court cases in Arcadia at a wage of 5 obols (797-98, esti gar en tois 
logioisin/ōs touton dei pot’ en Arkadia pentōbolou ēliasasthai).  If the logic holds, 
continuing the current course of action as advocated by the Paphlagonian is the only way 
to bring about this eventual, positive result.  Up to this point, the Sausage-Seller has 
provided no policy of his own, thus Demos is left with the status quo and the promise that 
things will get better once the war is over.  As further reinforcement of the previous 
argument, the Paphlagonian mentions that he will accomplish this result by good or poor 
means (eu kai miarōs) (798-800), which reinforces his earlier comments about resorting 
to any physical or psychological manipulation if it can benefit his master. 
This section of the agōn ends with the Sausage-Seller directly explaining that none of 
these actions were undertaken for Demos’ benefit.  Instead, the Paphlagonian wages war 
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not for the sake of Demos and Athens’ increased authority in Greece but so that he can 
plunder and take bribes from the allied cities (801-2, all’ ina mallon/su men arpazēs kai 
dōrodokēs para tōn poleōn).  This is especially nefarious because it assumes that Demos 
will not be aware of the situation and how he is being affected by it on account of his 
dependence on the state and the Paphlagonian based on necessity, need, and jury wages 
(804, all’ up anagkēs ama kai chreias kai misthou pros se kechēnē).  In a way this affirms 
the Paphlagonian’s earlier comment about creating revenue for Demos, but changes the 
motivation and overall tone of the relationship; instead of providing income and working 
to reduce poverty, the Paphlagonian is accused of deliberately creating a sense of 
indentured poverty that the old man is powerless to escape.  By reducing him to the 
position of forced juror, the orator can dictate any political or social decisions and assume 
that they will be supported without questions or resistance.  The situation is so dire that 
Demos cannot see past it, but the Sausage-Seller predicts that if the old man ever returns 
to his farm, he will realize the sorts of good things the Paphlagonian has cheated him of 
through the wages received (807, gnōsetai oiōn agathōn auton tē misthophorai 
parekoptou) and that afterward, he will come at his former steward like a bitter farmer, 
seeking out the ballot (to use) against him (808, eith’ ēxei soi drimus agroikos kata sou 
tēn psephon ichneuōn).  The charge of jingoistic war-mongering and ignoring the plight 
of the common Athenian is a consistent one in Aristophanes’ peace plays, and one which 
the Paphlagonian is correct to take seriously.  As Murphy explains, “The Athenians were 
quick to suspect treachery or malfeasance when any of their foreign projects, no matter 
how optimistic, failed of suc-cess” (“Aristophanes, Athens, and Attica” 314).  The 
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historical Cleon was not safe from such political pressures either, because his reputation 
and policies for continued warfare and aggressive enforcement of Athenian power 
represented a fairly radical element of the political landscape.88 
Once this section of the argument is complete, Demos is left to consider two sets of 
consequences based on the political activity of his steward.  His living conditions and 
general poverty are a constant source of suffering felt in the immediate present, without 
the genuine possibility of abatement or relief in the future because the Paphlagonian has 
thrown out the embassy offering peace.  In the meantime, his pains are buying the 
potential advance of Athenian interest (as the Paphlagonian claims), but the Sausage-
Seller reframes this narrative so that only his opponent will stand to gain monetarily if the 
war ends favorably for Athens.  On balance, Demos loses with either outcome — either 
he suffers in the present because the war will not end and there will be no change in his 
living conditions, or the war’s completion will see more money through plunder and 
bribery for his steward, but his income will be tied directly to whatever scraps and 
leftovers the Paphlagonian deems fit to send his way.  As long as he is tied to the Pnyx 
and the influence of such demagoguery, Demos’ life will not improve and he will 
experience no additional material comforts.  The future holds little chance for significant 
progress if the Paphlagonian’s agenda remains unchecked. 
                                                 
88
 Welsh (1990) convincingly argues that Cleon’s reputation was controversial and that Aristophanes’ 
criticisms were well-founded: “The Mytilenean debates and the dispatchment of the second trireme which 
reached Lesbos just in time for the Athenians to countermand the mass execution (Thuc. 3.49.2-4) clearly 
aroused considerable controversy in Athens. Since the 'Babylonians' followed so closely upon these 
momentous events, it is natural to suspect that the criticism of Athenian imperialism and the mockery of 
Cleon which certainly figured in the play were linked with the brutal punishment which he had urged for 
the Mytileneans and some support for this is provided in the fragments of the comedy (“Ending” 426). 
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The debaters use the accomplishments of Themistocles as a representative analogy to 
further the issue of political efficacy.  The Paphlagonian argues that it is terrible that his 
opponent is saying such things about him and slandering his name in front of the 
Athenians and Demos (810-811, oukoun deinon tauti se legein dēt’ est’ eme kai 
diaballein/pros Athēnaious kai ton dēmon,/) and that he is a person who has done more 
beneficial things by far than Themistocles did for the city (811-812, pepoikēota pleiona 
chrēsta/nē tēn Dēmētra Themistokleous pollō peri tēn polin ēdē).  As Anderson explains, 
he “presents himself as the new (and better) Themistocles in the subsequent action of the 
play. Thus, the Paphlagonian boasts that he has done more for the city (a reference to the 
capture of Pylos from the Spartans) than Themistocles ever did (810-12)'” (14).  The 
Sausage-Seller uses a cooking metaphor to reply, that Themistocles found the city full 
and then filled it to the brim (814, os epoiēsen tēn polin ēmōn mestēn eurōn epicheilē), 
that he made a lunch of the Piraeus (815, aristōsē ton Peiraia prosemaxen), and taking 
none of the old away he served up new fishes (816, aphelōn t’ ouden tōn archaiōn 
ichthus kainous parethēken).89  The purpose of this description is to illustrate that 
Themistocles made the city demonstrably better than it had been before, providing new 
opportunities and improvements that made the city more comfortable and pleasant. 
This is a striking difference from the previous argument, in which both debaters 
agreed on the initial set of facts.  The Paphlagonian supported a vigorous campaign for 
waging war throughout the rest of Greece because in his mind the ends justified the 
                                                 
89
 Anderson (1989) further shows that later in the play (1166-1167), when the Paphlagonian offers a Pylian 
barley-cake to Demos, the possession of the cake alone indicates that he looted the food meant as a 
sacrifice to the gods.  This is act of sacrilege provides further evidence of the Paphlagonian hoarding items 
that he is not meant to have and which could more rightly be offered to Demos (15). 
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means.  In dispute was not the definition of his policy so much as how it would affect the 
rest of the Athenian populace.  In the second case case, the debaters do not agree on the 
initial premise that the Paphlagonian has acted as Themistocles; instead, they struggle to 
determine how well the analogy fits and therefore how much esteem and credibility the 
Paphlagonian should receive from Demos in the argument.  The key argument and the 
outcome of the debate continues to depends on who can demonstrate more good will to 
the old man and prove that he can provide enough to be made Demos’ steward.  The agon 
does not appear to going the Paphlagonian’s way, as Demos starts to get upset and 
upbraids him for acting deceitful (821-822).  As the situation becomes more serious, the 
arguments become more antagonistic and personal. 
 Recriminations abound as the agōn progresses, with both the Paphlagonian and 
Sausage-Seller attempting to intimidate the other and returning to the issues of political 
motivations and material comforts.  Beginning at lines 828-829, the Paphlagonian 
threatens to convict his opponent of stealing 30,000 drachmas (which is similar to his 
accusations from the first agōn), while the Sausage-Seller returns the favor by claiming to 
show that his opponent took a bribe from Mytilene of more than 40 minas (832-835, kai 
s’ epideixō/nē tēn Dēmētr’, ek Mutilēnēs/plein ē mnas tettarakonta).  When these threats 
fail, the Paphlagonian lays claim to an accomplishment so great that he is forever 
immune to prosecution, the evidence for which is the shields taken from the Spartan 
soldiers at Pylos (844-46, emoi gar est’ eirgasmenon toiouton ergon ōste/apaxapantas 
tous emous echthrous epistomizein,/eōs an ē tōn aspidōn tōn ek Pulou ti loipon).  
However, the Sausage-Seller replies that this should not disqualify him from prosecution 
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because it is a tactic designed to help him avoid punishment – the shields still have their 
handles, thus the Paphlagonian can get his friends and thugs to take them down at night 
and quickly seize the entrances to the grain markets, effectively holding them hostage 
(847-57). 
 At issue is the orators’ reputation and how much Demos should consider past 
accomplishments as evidence in the debate.  The Paphlagonian focuses on two 
timeframes, the past and future, as a way of convincing his master that he will be the 
more productive and beneficial steward.  Along with the claim to financial prosperity, he 
invokes military victory to underscore that his foreign policy (an argument which was not 
decided in his favor before) has been successful and that he what Aristotle could call 
phronesis.  Unfortunately, this is another self-serving argument because the Sausage-
Seller reframes the narrative so that the victory is tainted; instead of being able to revel in 
a legitimate triumph, Demos is asked to consider the full effects of leaving the shields on 
display in the city.  Because the trophies can still be used for combat and are readily 
available in public, the Paphlagonian has another means of controlling Demos and 
ensuring that he does not act contrary to the slave’s interests and decisions.  If the old 
man decides to strike out independently and resist the juror’s wage that, among other 
things, has kept him locked in poverty, he may be forcibly kept in place by the 
Paphlagonian and his associates. 
 One of the final arguments shores up the Paphlagonian’s motivation to act out of 
self-interest rather than help Demos.  The Paphlagonian mentions that he was the one 
who put a stop to conspirators, and that not anything that has been contrived escaped his 
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notice in the city, but having discovered it he screams [about it] (861-63, ostis eis 
ōn/epausa tous sunōmotas, kai m’ ou lelēthen ouden/en tē polei sunistamenon, all’ 
eutheōs kekraga). In response, the Sausage-Seller compares him to an eel-fisherman, who 
catches nothing when the lake is still but makes a catch after stirring things up 
considerably: for you are in the same state as those who chase after eels, whenever the 
lake waters are calm, they seize nothing; but if they should stir up the mud up and down, 
then they seize something; and you catch something, if you should stir up the city (864-
67, oper gar oi tas egcheleis thērōmenoi peponthas./otan men ē limnē katastē,, 
lambanousin ouden/ ean d’ anō te kai katō ton borboron kukōsin,/airousi.  Kai su 
lambaneis, ēn tēn polin tarattēs).  Furthermore, the Sausage-Seller asks if his opponent 
stopped them out of jealousy, so that they would not become rhetors (878-83).  Returning 
to an earlier theme, he questions how effectively the Paphlagonian actually provides for 
the aging judge: if as one who sells leather hide, has he ever given to Demos a sole (or 
patch) for his shoes (868-69, en d’ eipe moi tosoutoni; skutē tosauta pōlōn/edōkas ēdē 
toutōi kattuma para seautou/tais embasin phaskōn philein).  The answer is of course no, 
but the Sausage-Seller demonstrates his own goodwill to the old man by giving a pair of 
shoes that he has bought specifically for him (871-72, all’ ego soi/zeugos priamenos 
embadōn touti phorein didōmi).  Underscoring this act of generosity, the Sausage-Seller 
provides Demos with a tunic to wear at that very moment (883, all’ egō soi toutoni 
didōmi), in contrast to the Paphlagonian who recognized that his master did not have a 
tunic at his advanced, old age and never thought to give him one in the winter (881, tondi 
d’ orōn aneu chitōnos onta tēlikouton).  Demos is so pleased with the tunic that he 
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exclaims the Piraeus was a clever thing, but indeed no invention appears to be better than 
the tunic (Henderson refers to exeurema as a policy) (884-886, toioutoni Themistoklēs 
oupōpot’ epenoēsen./kaitoi sophon kakein’ o Peiraieus, emoige mentoi/ou meizon einai 
phainet’ exeurēma tou chitōnos). 
 These arguments highlight and position the earlier themes so that Demos can 
consider one more time which orator might be the better steward.  The Paphlagonian is 
made out to be a jealous and manipulative speaker, who intentionally weeds out potential 
opponents so that no one may rival his influence with Demos.  This might be acceptable 
and something the old man could forgive if he were being well compensated for the 
trouble, but the slave continues to focus on past accomplishment and promises for the 
future rather than help Demos in the immediate present.  The Sausage-Seller recognizes 
and brings attention to the fact that the old man is impoverished and not receiving 
anything of worth from the Paphlagonian.  Moreover, he takes the explicit step of 
bringing things that can aid Demos by making his living conditions more comfortable; 
these material possessions are often small (such as a pair of shoes or tunic), but the old 
man appears to be desperate enough to need them.  The Sausage-Seller is also engaging 
in manipulation, but at least Demos gets something direct out of the arrangement and has 
a clear decision for who can take care of him most effectively. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Along with Clouds and Wasps, Knights presents ideas about ethical oratory and 
the role that speakers play in a democratic society.  The class of demagogues initially 
represented by the Paphlagonian slave is characterized as vindictive, dangerous, and 
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looking out only for their own interests.  The Sausage-Seller is the perfect foil, because 
he can engage in the same tricks, techniques, and oratorical style as his opponent so that 
the Paphlagonian’s influence is reduced.90  Demos is a clear stand-in for the Athenian 
audience, but the choice represented in each agōn is not something they are invited to 
consider literally. Instead, the audience should be thinking of the behaviors and character 
traits that are not shown onstage, because the ethical orator is one they must conjure and 
compare with the terrible models in the play. 
The ideal speaker in the assembly will not stoop to manipulating the audience 
through pandering, intimidation, or trickery.  This is the signature technique adopted by 
both the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller, as they routinely try to threaten each other, 
keep Demos in a state that does not allow him to critically engage the issues debated via 
poverty or comfort, and try to buy his vote with gifts.  The Sausage-Seller is more 
effective than his counterpart,91 but the audience should not see his victory as some kind 
of tacit approval for demagoguery.  As Silk explains, “Whatever else it may be, then, 
Knights is not a call to action” (305).  The play’s orators are two versions of the same 
social ill, because both of them will say and do whatever is necessary to secure votes 
from the audience.  If the Sausage-Seller is left to his own devices, he could become an 
even worse monster than the Paphlagonian, which could produce ever greater harms to 
Demos and by extension to the rest of the Athenian citizens.  Silk also notes that the 
                                                 
90
 Lines 888-889 explicitly references this idea, as the Sausage-Seller compares his persuasive style as so 
similar to the Paphlagonian’s, that he is like a man who, while drinking and needing to shit, borrows those 
oratorical tricks like a kind of slippers (ouk, all’ oper pinōn aner peponth’ otan cheseiei,/toisin tropois tois 
soisin ōsper blautioisi chrōmai) 
91
 Demos determines that the Paphlagonian should no longer be his steward and asks for his signet ring 
back at lines 946-8. 
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Sausage-Seller is not the plucky hero who will be reformed into an ethical, model citizen: 
“The problem is not that Sausage-Seller has eventually to be made into a ‘proper’ moral 
hero in order to make his moral point, nor that he has to be converted into an honest 
counsellor of state by the characteristic non-realist means of recreativity: non-realism and 
recreativity are perfectly compatible with political seriousness” (336).  The play feature a 
problematic character who is not redeemed or eventually chastened into good behavior, 
because the audience will recognize that the Sausage-Seller is not the model who’s words 
and deeds should be imitated.   
The Athenian audience watching the play is invited to consider an alternative to 
the ones presented onstage.  Instead of the manipulative, bribing politician, there may be 
a speaker who looks to the audience’s interests before considering his own financial 
advantage.  This speaker rebalances the political system so that the rhetors do not have a 
disproportionate amount of authority and power.  In the status quo represented by 
Knights’ characters, the Athenian citizen asked to vote on measures in the assembly is put 
into an awkward situation because they may not have enough financial security or 
independence to move against the more powerful factions and individuals.  This person is 
not so difficult to persuade provided there is enough of a personal incentive, such as 
being indirectly bribed with jury wages or presenting the argument in an entertaining 
manner.  Although this audience is nominally in control and has the ability to vote on 
political proposals, they are also at the mercy of elite speakers who can advance their 
own agendas without necessarily considering or caring how their fellow citizens may be 
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affected.92  The ideal, ethical orator would reestablish the audience as the main source of 
authority in Athens and whose interests should be privileged in both word and deed; the 
citizenry would not be viewed as a colossal means to an end that must be skillfully 
manipulated and directed to arrive at decisions so much as an end unto themselves.  This 
speaker, much as Plato describes in the Phaedrus, would present arguments truthfully and 
without distortion, would not resort to intimidating tactics such as threatening 
imprisonment or hefty fines, and would seek to make the citizens themselves more ethical 
and keen evaluators of arguments.  The emphasis would no longer rest on how the 
individual speaker might profit, but how all might share in the city’s prosperity.  Knights 
does not argue that the people should be the sole authority or that collective wisdom is a 
cherished trait in a democracy.93  The audience watching the play is the same that 
supported Cleon’s war policies and was complicit in the culture of demagoguery, so they 
are clearly part of the problem Aristophanes describes.94  However, the orators have too 
much control and seemingly not enough competition to provide the audience with a 
legitimate alternative. If Aristophanes wishes to combat their influence, the audience 
must recognize the virtues noticeably absent in the Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller and 
                                                 
92
 The Athenian populace is treated more sympathetically in the play because Demos is the doddering old 
man who simply needs to reclaim his rightful place of authority, but they are not blameless for the 
dysfunctional state of affairs and are also criticized for being complicit in the rise of the demagogues 
(Timmerman and Schiappa 77). 
93
 Aristophanes was not the only intellectual to display concern about the inefficiencies of democratic rule, 
as the Old Oligarch, Plato, and Isocrates would voice similar criticisms based on their own observations 
(Timmerman and Schiappa 110-111). 
94
 Murphy (1964) interprets the play as democratic, but not overly democratic: “the rejuvenated and 
reformed Demos is supposed to en-ter from the gates of the Propylaia, and there is a suggestion that he has 
moved up from the Pnyx, his former habitat, to settle on the Acropolis. This change of address would fit 
well the political tendency of the play, which recommends (as I have always be-lieved) a return to the 
older, limited democracy of pre-Periclean times” (“Aristophanes, Athens” 310-311). 
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hope that a different politician (perhaps a philos or aristos) will embody them in the 
future. 
Burke’s theories of the negative and antithesis provide an insightful method of 
interpreting the play and what it considers a transformative argumentative moment for the 
audience.  There is little evidence that Aristophanes was able to persuade his audience 
with a magic-bullet experience, especially considering Cleon was reelected to the 
generalship after the production of Knights.  However, it is common practice for 
playwrights in both modern and ancient periods to use the cultural values and 
expectations of their audiences to contribute to larger discussions of social and political 
values.  Aristophanes adds to the conversations no doubt happening amongst many 
citizens in the 5th c. who were concerned about the new trends in political and oratorical 
techniques.  Moral considerations were largely built on one’s actions; the motivations of 
a select few had a disproportionate effect on the polis, which made their choices and 
behaviors a concern for everyone.  The negative meanings implied in any term, as Burke 
explains, means that the audience does not have to accept the character types onstage as 
their only options because there is always a new possibility waiting to arise and become 
the predominant meaning in any pair of terms.  The contemporary politicians in 
Aristophanes’ period of the late 5th c. BCE were perhaps not the most ethical or altruistic, 
but a concerned citizen watching Knights could envision or attempt to become the kind of 
leader who would inspire genuine trust in the audience without using bribes, intimidation, 
or any of the other negative behaviors mocked in the play. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
 
I. Summary of Evidence and Analysis 
 
 In this dissertation I have focused on several issues relating to Aristophanes, 
ethics, and the role of oratory in late 5th c. Athens.  Using Burke’s theory of the negative 
as a touchstone, my analysis has presented evidence about the characters, attitudes, and 
behaviors surrounding orators, argumentative arenas, and their effects on the polis in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, Wasps, and Knights.  The plays consistently portray the worst 
excesses of characteristics considered positive by the Athenians, which demonstrates to 
Aristophanes’ audience the path to corrupt institutions and oratorical practices.  By 
highlighting the flaws in caricatures, Aristophanes can bring suspect behaviors to more 
immediate public attention and invite the audience to consider a different set of actions to 
right the ship of state.  This allows the audience to view themselves as superior to the 
presented conduct and imagine themselves acting more ethically and towards a more 
communal good.  The plays also put a limit around acceptable behavior so that the 
audience can recognize which actions may position them as the object of ridicule, which 
is not an idle concern in a timocratic society such as Athens.  Their own behavior and 
values are put under a microscope so that the Athenian citizens do not succumb to the 
trap of accepting the status quo in its present state, or believing that it may progress 
further without significant social and political harm.  Finally, Aristophanes is presented 
as an author who can be read influencing his audience using the emotional arguments 
found in comedy while commenting on serious social and political issues.  The plays 
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subtly nudge the audience to think about how their conduct in the public sphere as 
audience members and orators can lead them to become more ethical and productive 
citizens.   
 In chapter 2, my analysis focused on Clouds and its presentation of sophistic 
education in the late 5th c.  The play followed the desire of the aging father Strepsiades to 
enroll his son Pheidippides in Socrates’ Phrontisterion, so that the young man could 
successfully argue away his father’s debts.  Key arguments about the value of education 
and its effects on the polis hinged on the debates between the Greater and Lesser 
Discourse and Strepsiades and his son.  The Greater Discourse, as the representative of 
traditional education, privileged a system where young men were given martial training, 
valued obedience and loyalty, and maintained a positive reputation for themselves and 
their families.  This amounted to an indirect form of social control where a corps of 
strong youth carried out the orders of their elders without engaging in critical thinking or 
participating meaningfully in the democracy.  The Lesser Discourse represented a newer 
form of education privileging critical thinking, transgressive behaviors, and personal 
satisfaction.  This system also revolved around control over fellow citizens, but assumed 
that the individual owed loyalty to no one but himself.95 
The ideal, ethical citizen acting as a counterpoint to the Greater and Lesser 
Discourse embodies their positive traits while excluding the negative.  He acts as an 
antithesis to their worst excesses while retaining the characteristics that make them strong 
and powerful forces in the polis.  The imagined ethical citizen will not strive to 
                                                 
95
 Because women were forbidden citizenship, the ideal ethical citizen in Athens at this time could only 
have been male.  Later commentary in this chapter that focuses on modern implications for my research 
will broaden the conversation to include other cultural groups. 
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manipulate other citizens in such a pernicious, overpowering way because he is more 
(although not exclusively) concerned with the well-being of the city as community rather 
than pursuing his own satisfaction.  The tendency for the Greater Discourse to focus on 
strength and physical training might be preserved but would not include his desire to 
inculcate the young to be obedient automatons.  This flaw seems designed to create a 
populace ripe for following whichever orders they are given, which cuts directly against 
democratic ideals.  Moreover, the ethical citizen would inherit the Lesser Discourse’s 
ability to speak well in front of audiences and cut through the logic of poor arguments, 
but would not hold the welfare of other citizens hostage to satisfy his own desires.  There 
is also room for personal advancement provided the ethical speaker considers the 
interests of the polis along with his own.  These new values reflect a perspective that 
repositions personal and public interest in a more balanced and beneficial way for the 
city.   
 In chapter 3, the analysis focused on Wasps and its portrayal of audiences and 
advocates in the Athenian judicial system.  The play followed the conflicts between the 
aging Philocleon and his son Bdelycleon as they argue about the value of a juror’s life 
and responsibilities.  The agōn features a range of social advantages and disadvantages as 
the old man is put into the position of arguing on behalf of his lifestyle rather than 
remaining an interested spectator.  He believes the role of juror affords him authority 
over fellow citizens, to enjoy the spectacle of a trial, act with impunity, build 
relationships with influential speakers, and function as the main provider for his family.  
All of these results create the self-identity of a powerful individual that Philocleon is 
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loath to give up.  In contrast, Bdelycleon argues that these virtues are in fact vices that 
keep his father locked into a servile position while demagogues enjoy the spoils of true 
power.  He alleges that orators receive a disproportionate amount of resources and wealth 
based on their position, regularly receive bribes from the allied cities after issuing 
frightening threats, work to keep jurors poor by design, can prevent juries from receiving 
the 3-obol wage, and do not typically deliver on their promises.  These charges create the 
impression that jurors are deluded into thinking they exercise legitimate power in the 
polis when they are actually blunt tools used to intimidate or punish the rivals of 
demagogues and serve only to line the pockets of influential speakers.   
 The play creates two images of an ethical citizen, focusing respectively on the 
roles of audience member and advocate.  The ideal, ethical audience member will retain 
the waspishness and desire to inflict harm on deserving peers, but acts without the caprice 
and vindictive qualities embodied in Philocleon and the other jurors onstage.  Moreover, 
the audience of Athenian spectators is encouraged not to value his more negative 
excesses, such as judging a case based only on its entertainment value or Philocleon’s 
immediate like or dislike for an advocate.  Instead, they are asked to suspend judgment 
until both sides of the case has been heard so that a more accurate and just verdict can be 
rendered.  This kind of citizen is more likely to judge a case based on sound argument 
rather than personal predilection, although Wasps leaves room for the juror to act 
however he sees fit rather than focusing exclusively on facts.  The ideal, ethical advocate 
will likely still look for an attempt to advance his personal situation, but will not act to 
the extremes as Bdelycleon describes.  This person would employ a more balanced 
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approach to how the polis distributes its resources, so that it is possible for the ideal 
citizen to occasionally wet his beak while still leaving enough for the rest of the citizens.  
The techniques used to persuade audience might still include some entertaining material, 
but would not employ them to the exclusion of other issues that pertain directly to the 
case at hand.   
 In chapter 4, I examined Knights and its characterization of oratory in the 
legislative assemblies.  The play describes the negative influence of a Paphlagonian slave 
in the house of Demos and how a Sausage-Seller from the agora engages him in verbal 
combat.  The result is nothing less than total influence over Demos, a clear stand-in for 
the Athenian populace.  The first agōn focuses on each advocate’s aneideia or 
shamelessness in public. The Paphlagonian and Sausage-Seller attempt to outdo one 
another in terms of whether oratorical training provides an opportunity to be more 
shameless, offer up threats of violence to each other, demonstrate their relative skills at 
stealing, and threaten to prosecute the other for bribery.  The debate implies that advocate 
superior in these skills will be more valuable to Demos and a more effective speaker in 
the assembly overall.  The second agōn provides a more heated confrontation between 
the speakers as they argue over who can demonstrate more good will and friendship to 
Demos.  Several key issues are debated, including whether the Paphlagonian or Sausage-
Seller can give things to the old man by harming other people, how their political policies 
(such as engaging in continued warfare throughout Attica) may benefit or harm Demos, 
which person is better able to threaten and eventually convict his opponent on a trumped 
up charge, whether their arguments should be accepted based on past and future action or 
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gifts provided in the immediate present, and how much self-interest affects their goodwill 
towards the old man.  The Sausage-Seller is judged to be superior in all categories, 
deemed the best speaker, and receives the good will and favor of Demos.  The logic of 
the play seems to argue on the surface that the only way to combat a monster is with 
someone more monstrous, dangerous, and capable of using the same tactics more 
forcefully. 
 The ideal advocate in the legislative assemblies would not possess these qualities 
because Knights also portrays characteristics in the negative to conjure an image of more 
ethical behaviors and values.  This person would develop enough skills in speaking to 
influence an audience, but would not resort to such extreme tactics as threats or 
intimidations as a matter of course.  As observed in previous chapters, there is 
opportunity or perhaps tolerance for a speaker who wishes to receive some compensation 
for civic efforts but not to the detriment of the rest of the polis.  Threats of prosecution, 
recrimination, and pandering were an accepted part of the Athenian oratorical landscape, 
but Knights demonstrates that these values can be pushed to the point where decision-
making is severely hampered and rendered ineffective.  The ideal speaker would still 
have room to attack political rivals and engage in some audience flatter but would use the 
assemblies to advance both personal and public agendas.  This more proportionate 
amount of authority reflects a balanced perspective where the interests of the individual 
present fewer conflicts with the polis at large.   
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II. Implications of Comedic Oratory 
 
Considered collectively, Clouds, Wasps, and Knights describe speakers who are 
complicated, multi-dimensional, and a direct response to the alleged corruptions of the 
late 5th c in Athens.  A caricature cannot be taken at face value, so it is improper to 
assume that charlatans such as the Lesser Discourse and Pheidippides, Philocleon and the 
demagogues he admires, or the Sausage-Seller were alive and flourishing en masse in 
Athens.  One may reasonably conclude, however, that some citizens were using these 
tactics, that their influence was gaining some traction in the polis, and that enough 
citizens were concerned about their actions for Aristophanes to draft characters that 
would be easily recognized and whose comedy could be readily digested.  The audience 
is encouraged to avoid performing the behaviors onstage or to at least consider the 
alternative if similar situations should arise, so that they too will not be ridiculed.  
Comedy rarely offers rational and deliberate appraisals of situations and values because it 
is primarily an emotional force.  Executed effectively, the ability to disarm with laughter 
builds a connection between speaker/author and audience, which allows one to direct 
attention to sensitive issues without immediately creating a defensive or hostile tone.  
Aristophanes is consistently able to address serious social and political issues that directly 
affect the well-being of his audience and, if his competitive success is any indication, 
often while remaining a popular playwright with the ear of the city on an annual basis.  
Old Comedy thus allows modern critics to examine historically untraditional avenues of 
persuasion and the way multiple sources may have influenced the 5th c. polis in Athens.    
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 The research of this dissertation demonstrates additional methods of interpreting 
Aristophanes and the genre of Old Comedy.  I believe he presents arguments about the 
ethical use of persuasion designed to gently influence the decisions and behaviors of his 
fellow citizens in isolated, solitary performances that may challenge or reinforce the 
arguments of traditionally persuasive fora such as the lawcourts and legislative 
assemblies.  His techniques can be understood using Burke’s characterizations of the 
hortatory negative and antithesis because comedy is an art of target, humiliation, and 
warning the audience not to become the next object of ridicule.  Burke is rarely invoked 
as a means of examining ancient texts, but his philosophies of language that work so well 
for modern rhetorical artifacts can also yield valuable insights into the world of antiquity.  
Few if any scholars believe that Aristophanes can be reduced to mere entertainment, so 
the issues worth pursuing concern any additional effects, purposes, or influences he 
exerts on audiences.  The plays do not present political commentary as an abstract or 
philosophical ideal; Aristophanes is not writing the Republic or any other logical treatise.  
He does, one may conclude, attack some of the more novel additions to the oratorical 
landscape as one type of democrat seeking to preserve an older, aristo-centric version of 
governance.  When the audience encounters the newer class of demagogues after the 
festival’s run of plays, they are asked to consider more carefully whether support of these 
leaders is justified or working against their own interests, and whether the means with 
which they have acquired support in public fora are ethical and worth continuing or 
manipulative and deceptive.   
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 My intention with this research was to examine the oratorical techniques from a 
particular point in history to determine additional persuasive influences, but I believe 
Aristophanes can also serve as a model for modern persuaders.  It is difficult, of course, 
to generalize about comedy across different eras and cultures, but there are many 
similarities to modern American comedy and Aristophanic techniques.  Through 
shocking obscenity or subtle cleverness with language, humor often conjures a target for 
the audience to view as inferior to themselves regardless of whether the victim is the 
comedian or an external person.  The force of these attacks rarely concludes with an 
explicitly stated belief or suggestion because the audience enthymematically arrives at the 
desired outcome or encounters some elements of cognitive dissonance: if I am or become 
this person, I will be guilty of the same offenses and perhaps socially sanctioned in a 
similar way; however, if I abstain from these behaviors and act contrary to them, I am 
likely to be spared this treatment and will be adhering to acceptable social norms.  
American society is less timocratic than 5th c. Athens, but attacking one’s personal 
identity can yield severe reactions from both subtle and intense mockery.   People who 
wish to use humor to ethically influence audiences can look to Aristophanes as an ancient 
forebear, whose tactics can be readily assimilated into modern contexts and which can be 
adapted for current audiences.   
 A modern audience may also find value in Aristophanes’ arguments about ethical 
speaking behaviors.  Although the radical democracy of Athens is substantially different 
from the representative version found in the modern west, one can find similar concerns 
about the power of language and persuasion, improper influence from elite and powerful 
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citizens compared with the common person, corruption in key institutions such as 
elections and the judicial system, and who should be making decisions that affect an 
entire culture.  The conclusion that audience members need to be savvier at detecting 
manipulation and more open-minded when hearing competing sides of an issue is worth 
considering in a culture as diverse as 21st c. America.  The same consideration should 
apply for ethical speakers that attempt to balance their own interests with those of the 
audience instead of using them as means to a personal end and engaging in pandering 
distractions.  Moreover, it is easy to ignore the abuses or marginalizations of one’s own 
society because they seem commonplace or normalized after a period of time, thus seeing 
an example of similar conduct without the cultural baggage may highlight the nature of 
unjust or unethical behavior all the more. 
 
III. Implications for Future Research 
 
 A project of this kind necessarily must make strategic selections so that certain 
types of evidence are included at the expense of others.  Aristophanes has 11 plays that 
have survived to the 21st century, only 3 of which are included in this analysis.  This 
choice was based on the observation that Clouds, Wasps, and Knights explicitly presented 
material concerning oratorical situations and characters, thus the connection to rhetorical 
studies was immediately clear.  Other plays, such as Acharnians, Lysistrata, 
Thesmophoriasuzai, and Ekklesiasuzai, also consider implications for persuasion in the 
public sphere and are worthy of continued study.  Moreover, the 3 plays considered in 
this dissertation reflect the earlier period of Aristophanes’ writing career, when the 
Peloponnesian War was still in its infancy and before later historical events such as the 
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Peace of Nicias and the disastrous Sicilian expedition.  They are routinely categorized as 
part of his “anti-war” plays, but the period of their production spans only a few years in 
total.  Further exploration into his corpus may discover an evolving or consistent attitude 
towards persuasion, focusing on several aspects such as techniques, motivations, 
participants, and contexts. 
 Hellenistic literature is fairly limited in the number of surviving texts that 
explicitly feature humor as a defining or signature element.  In contrast, ancient Rome 
produced a few more surviving authors that use humor to subvert or maintain established 
norms, particularly in the genre of satire.  Future research can use Burke’s theory of the 
negative as well as additional theories (perhaps the comedic frame discussed in Attitudes 
Towards History) to examine the rhetorical tactics available to humorists in a more 
dictatorial regime.  As one of the earlier satirists, Horace was writing for an audience in 
the golden age of Augustus while his successors, Persius and Juvenal, found themselves 
in periods of harsher and more authoritative emperors.  It is worth asking whether 
humorous appeals can maintain consistency in different political contexts or whether 
speakers and authors must adapt techniques to achieve similar results.   
 I alluded to modern works of rhetoric earlier in this chapter as another avenue for 
analysis.  Focusing on the late 5th c. necessarily precludes American humorists or rhetors 
who include humor, but this is another fruitful source of additional research.  Grouping 
stand-up comics broadly and from different generations, one may observe that individuals 
such as George Carlin, Louis CK, Eddie Murphy, Dave Chapelle, Sarah Silverman, and a 
wealth of others consistently challenge pervasive social and political ideals in America 
   200 
 
while looking to establish new mores.  The belief that they are only trying to make the 
audience laugh belies the often scathing criticisms associated with their targets, either as 
individuals, types of people, or cultural institutions.  One may also include media such as 
television, film, literature, crowd-sourced internet fora, and other rhetorical artifacts that 
do not involve comedic arguments spoken in front of a live audience.  Although 
American culture is strikingly different in many respects, it is worth exploring whether 
there is consistent similarity amongst the rhetorical techniques of Aristophanes and 
modern comics to generalize about rhetorical humor. 
 The last area of potential research concerns additional cultures, especially those 
outside the privileged citizens of Athens and more broadly the western world.  Ancient 
Athens was a fairly small and monochromatic community, thus its texts reveal the values 
of an insular group of citizens that excludes many other noteworthy groups such as 
women, foreigners, and the large population of slaves.  Their views are not likely 
included or represented in Aristophanic comedy, thus it is difficult to determine if they 
would present a counterpoint to the arguments raised in his plays or confirm their cultural 
values.  Moreover, humor can change quickly when crossing from one area to another, 
thus it is worth posing the question whether cultures outside the western world share 
similar techniques or values to using humor.  In a heavily face-saving environment, for 
example, one may wish to explore if comedic persuasion is permissible at all and, if so, 
whether its form changes markedly from western humor. 
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